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Introduction
Of the numerous theoretical rationales used to justify federal en-
vironmental regulation, perhaps the most broadly compelling is the
argument that without such regulation, states would engage in a wel-
fare-reducing "race-to-the-bottom" in environmental standard-setting.
The term "race-to-the-bottom" refers to a progressive relaxation of
state environmental standards, spurred by interstate competition to
attract industry, that also occasions a reduction in social welfare below
the levels that would exist in the absence of such competition. The
widely accepted theoretical model for the race-to-the-bottom is non-
cooperative game theory, of which the classic Prisoner's Dilemma is
perhaps the most well-known example. According to this model,
although all states would be better off if they each cooperated with
each other by collectively maintaining optimally stringent environ-
mental standards, the incentives are such that each state will instead
relax its standards in an ultimately unsuccessful bid to attract industry.
Recently, in the wake of a widely cited article by Professor Rich-
ard Revesz,1 scholars have begun to question the very existence of a
race-to-the-bottom in environmental standard-setting. Swimming
against the tide of prior scholarship, 2 these revisionist critics contend
that the effects of state competition upon state environmental stan-
dard-setting are welfare-enhancing, rather than welfare-reducing3
1. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-
the-bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1210
(1992) (finding race-to-the-bottom argument unsupported and federal intervention
inappropriate).
2. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196,
1211-12 (1977) [hereinafter Pyramids]; Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Adminis-
trative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking:
Lessons from the Clean Air Ac 62 IoWA L. REv. 713, 747 (1977); Craig N. Oren, Preven-
tion of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IowA L. RFv.
1, 29 (1988); Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. Rv. 473, 509 (1991); Susan Bartlett
Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L.
REv. 1429, 1462 (1984).
3. See, e.g., James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in
a Federal System-And Why it Matters, 54 MD. L. REv. 1226, 1236-37 (1995) (arguing that
the race-to-the-bottom does not exist); Alvin K. Klevorick, Reflections on the Race-to-the-
bottom (Jan. 2, 1995) (unpublished paper presented at the American Association of Law
Schools Annual Meeting, on file with the author) (elaborating upon Revesz' argument that
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Revesz, for example, concludes that "the forces of interstate competi-
tion, far from being conclusively undesirable" in environmental law,
"are at least presumptively beneficial."'4 These revisionists contend
that any welfare loss resulting from reduced environmental quality is
more than made up for by compensating gains from increases in eco-
nomic activity.
The theoretical basis for the revisionist argument is neoclassical
economics, according to which each state's individual rational pursuit
of its own best interest, when set in the context of an ideally competi-
tive playing field, leads to allocations between environmental ameni-
ties and material goods that are socially optimal in all states. This
even if a race-to-the-bottom exists, federal intervention is not the solution); Howard F.
Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83
GEo. L. 3. 2131, 2146 (1995) (citing Revesz for the proposition that, in the absence of
international environmental externalities, competition in trade and investment will be effi-
cient); Steven G. Calabxesi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In De-
fense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 781 n.88 (1995) (citing Revesz for
"disproving the race-to-the-bottom thesis in environmental law"); John C. Coffee Jr., Com-
petition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial
and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAW. 447, 475, n.130 (questioning the race-to-the-bottom
theory and citing Revesz's article as an "excellent critique" of the argument). Other com-
mentators citing Revesz's 1992 article do not take a position either way as to whether or
not Revesz has demonstrated that the race-to-the-bottom exists, but acknowledge that
Revesz has posed a challenge to the theoretical validity of the race-to-the-bottom ration-
ale. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Panel III: International Law, Global Environmentalism,
and the Future of American Environmental Policy, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 485,487 (1994); Vicki
Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally
Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CoRNELL L. Rv. 1001, 1085, 1059 (1993). A few commenta-
tors have expressed skepticism of Revesz's conclusions, but fail to take issue with either
Revesz' choice of or reliance upon the neoclassical economic literature to challenge the
race-to-the-bottom rationale. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Volun-
tary Contamination Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability,
80 MmN. L. REv. 35, 110-15 (1995) (arguing that Revesz's analysis fails to resolve whether
"different political dynamics at the state and federal level might nonetheless in particular
contexts lead one to favor a federally imposed standard over state choice".); Joshua D.
Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal
Environmental Regulation, _ DuKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'y FORUM - (forthcoming 1997)
(arguing that even if correct, Revesz' argument relies upon the efficiency of state-aggre-
gated preferences which may not be "efficient" from a national perspective); Adam
Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REv.
1516, 1533 n.64 (1995) (arguing, from personal experience, that states do in fact relax envi-
ronmental standards to attract industry, but not addressing Revesz's arguments for why
such relaxation does not necessarily signal a reduction in social welfare). Even Richard
Stewart, perhaps the first to propound the race-to-the-bottom argument as a rationale for
federal environmental law, appears largely to defer to Revesz's argument. See Richard B.
Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039,
2058-61 (1993) (listing several ways that a race-to-the-bottom could occur, despite Revesz'
argument ).
4. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1253.
theory stands in stark contrast to the game theoretic approach under-
lying the Prisoner's Dilemma, according to which the very same be-
havior-rational pursuit by individual states of their own best
interest-leads to the opposite result: inefficient allocations, subop-
timal environmental standards, and reduced overall welfare.
The stakes of this debate for environmental policy are high and
the repercussions far-reaching. If the accepted view is right, the
framework of federal environmental laws instituted by Congress dur-
ing the 1970s contributes to overall welfare-enhancement as well as to
environmental protection for its own sake. The federal minimum
standards that are the mainstay of such laws brake destructive state
competition by preempting state environmental quality standards be-
low a federal "floor." Uniform technological requirements for catego-
ries of industrial operations, also prevalent in federal environmental
laws, reduce interstate competition in environmental standard-setting
by making geographic location all but irrelevant to the cost of envi-
ronmental compliance. If, on the other hand, the revisionists are cor-
rect, then such competition-stifling federal environmental laws are
leading to a reduction in, rather than a maximization of, social wel-
fare. Consequently, according to the revisionist view, any federal en-
vironmental law incapable of being justified on any ground other than
the race-to-the-bottom ought to be repealed post haste. In other
words (and to put the above stakes in a more immediate and contem-
porary context), if the traditionalists are right, the attempts of the
104th Congress to dismantle the current framework of federal envi-
ronmental laws were misguided5 and many of the Supreme Court's
5. Among other provisions that reduce the capacity of the federal government to
carry out its historic mandate to protect the environment, the 104th Congress enacted dras-
tic appropriations cuts for the Environmental Protection Agency, exempted timber-har-
vesting on national forest lands from compliance with environmental laws, prohibited the
use of federal money for listing a species as threatened or for designating a critical habitat,
and imposed procedural restrictions upon congressional consideration and passage of fed-
eral laws that require the expenditure of funds by state and local governments and fail to
appropriate federal funds to cover the costs. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
for Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 240 Stat. 194 (1995) (containing
the "Timber Salvage" rider); Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for
the Department of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-6, tit. II, ch. IV, 109 Stat. 73, 86 (1995) (endangered species legislation); Un-
funded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (1995). See generally Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Environmental
Law as a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values Confronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time
of Counter-Revolution, 23 B. C. ENVTL. AF. L. Rav. 733, 734-35 (1996) (discussing envi-
ronmental legislation of the 104th Congress); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMEN-
TAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 113-14 (2d ed. 1996) (same).
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recent rulings restricting the power of the federal government vis-&-vis
the states should be viewed apprehensively; 6 if the revisionists are
right, these developments should be looked upon favorably.
The question is thus acutely posed: who is right? Which theoreti-
cal approach-neoclassical economics or game theory-best captures
what is actually going on in the real world? This is a question that can
only be resolved by theoretically informed appeals to evidence and
empirical arguments that attempt to match up real world conditions
with one approach or another. Insofar as economic efficiency is an
object of environmental regulation, the choice of theoretical approach
is important. Only by reference to the proper approach is it possible
to determine whether a race-to-the-bottom exists and hence whether
federal regulation is necessary to achieve economic efficiency. It is
important to point out, however, that environmental policy did not
have the same narrow focus on economic efficiency as it does today.
When Congress developed our current framework of environmental
laws during the 1970s, economic efficiency was only one of several
justifications for federal regulation to which Congress was responding,
and even so, it is not at all clear that Congress considered it primary.
While the legislative histories of the federal acts clearly demonstrate
Congress's conviction that states' failure to adequately protect the en-
vironment was attributable to interstate competition for industry, con-
gressional action seems to have been motivated as much by the need
to reduce the resulting threats to human health and the environment
than to overcome any economic inefficiency resulting from states'
inactivity.
On the economic efficiency front, Professor Revesz has made a
significant contribution to the literature by stimulating an important
debate about shortcomings in the race-to-the-bottom justification for
federal environmental law. However, while he and the other revision-
ists claim that the shortcomings are theoretical (e.g., that the race-to-
the-bottom rationale for federal environmental law "is without theo-
retical foundation"), I argue in this Article that the problem is not a
6. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (holding that the 11th
Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits against states to enforce legislation
enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995) (invalidating a federal statute prohibiting firearms in schools); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a "take-title" provision of federal act
that required states to accept ownership of radioactive waste). See also John P. Dwyer,
The Commerce Clause and the Limits of Congressional Authority to Regulate the Environ-
ment, 25 ENvrL. L. REP. 10421 (1995) (discussing the impact of Lopez on environmental
legislation).
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lack of theory (there is, in fact, an extensive theoretical basis for un-
derstanding the dynamics of how a race-to-the-bottom could work),
but too little empirical evidence. In short, arguments based on the
mere explication of a favored model or theoretical approach, with no
reference to real world evidence which might support or undermine
the theoretical claims, should be without persuasive force.7 I contend
that the existing theoretical foundation for race-to-the-bottom claims
(based upon non-cooperative game theory) is sound; thus, the main
contribution of this Article is to sketch, for the first time in the legal
literature, an empirical framework for deciding which of the existing
theoretical approaches best captures the dynamics of state competi-
tion over environmental standard-setting.
In this article, I argue that (1) the preponderance of the evidence
available at this time does not support the simple neoclassical frame-
work favored by the revisionists, but instead suggests that the game-
theoretic approaches are likely to be more appropriate for under-
standing interstate conflicts; and (2) even if a neoclassical framework
is used to analyze interstate competition, evidence suggests that the
interstate market for industrial development and environmental bene-
fits is substantially distorted. Indeed, I will argue that the very neo-
classical model favored by the revisionists to support their claims,8
when combined with empirical realities, tends to undermine the claim
that interstate competition leads to efficiency, indicating instead that
such competition in the real world should, in fact, be viewed as pre-
sumptively detrimental to social welfare. Thus, there is little reason to
believe that state environmental standards established in the absence
of a federal framework will be optimal.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the role of the race-to-the-bot-
tom rationale in explaining the current structure and content of fed-
7. See, e.g., Pyramids, supra note 2, at 1211-12 (using a model, unaccompanied by
empirical data on real world conditions, to claim that the race-to-the-bottom exists);
Revesz, supra note 1, at 1238-42 (same). But cf Wallace E. Oates, The Invisible Hand in
the Public Sector: Interjurisdictional Competition in Theory and Practice, 17-31 (University
of Md. Dep't of Econ.) (Working Paper No. 95-17, 1996) [hereinafter Working Paper]
(presenting a model of interstate competition and then using empirical data on real world
interstate competition to assess the model's predictions and suggesting needed future em-
pirical research to better understand the welfare implications of interjurisdictional
competition).
8. Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdic-
tions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988), cited in
Revesz, supra note 1 at 1238-42. See infra text accompanying notes 97-111 for a detailed
explanation and critique of the neoclassical economic model of interstate competition set
forth by Oates and Schwab.
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eral environmental laws.9 Part II is devoted to the theoretical issues
underlying the race-to-the-bottom debate.10 It first describes the two
contrasting theoretical approaches to understanding the effects of in-
terstate competition in environmental standard-setting by reference to
two idealized models that capture the essential features of each: the
Prisoner's Dilemma model versus a simple model of perfect competi-
tion. The remainder of Part II examines the key assumptions that dis-
tinguish these two theoretical approaches, and follows with a careful
consideration of the conditions necessary for a market in industrial
development and environmental benefits to be efficient. This sets the
stage for Part III, in which I introduce empirical evidence relevant to
answering the theoretical questions raised in Part II, to wit: which
assumptions-those underlying game theory, or those underlying neo-
classical competition-appear most plausible in light of real world
data? And secondly, even if we accept the general neoclassical frame-
work, do the conditions for efficiency actually hold, or does the evi-
dence indicate that in the absence of federal involvement, states will
reach suboptimal outcomes?" Chief among the evidentiary sources
discussed in Part III are the results from a survey that I conducted (on
issues related to the race-to-the-bottom debate) of over 400 state envi-
ronmental and economic development officials, state legislators, and
interest groups influential in state environmental standard-setting.
The empirical studies presented in the first section of Part III pro-
vide two bases for presuming that the results of states environmental
standards will be suboptimal, each of which is discussed at length in
Part IV.'2 First, while numerous studies indicate that environmental
standards are only a minor factor in firm location decisions, a survey
that I conducted of persons influential in the state standard-setting
process demonstrates that a substantial minority of states relax their
environmental standards in order to attract industrial firms. If (1)
states compete for industry by lowering environmental standards, but
(2) industry location is substantially unaffected by this competition, it
logically follows that (3) states' welfare will be reduced because there
will be no economic gain to compensate for the environmental quality
losses. My survey provides support for (1) and the firm location stud-
ies described in this Part provide support for (2). Hence I contend
that my data together with the location studies provide prima facie
9. See infra text accompanying notes 14-70.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 71-122.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 123-233.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 234-274.
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evidence of a race-to-the-bottom. Furthermore, empirical data
demonstrate that the assumptions underlying the particular model
used by critics to predict efficient outcomes are unlikely to hold true
in the real world.
In Part V, I make two main recommendations based upon the
results of Parts II, IlI, and IV:13 federal minimum standards should be
retained, and federal regulators should experiment with methods to
induce cooperation between states in environmental standard-setting.
I suggest that such experimentation include promoting uniform stan-
dard-setting on behalf of small groups of states to address regional
environmental problems. Such an approach would prevent a state
race-to-the-bottom, and yet avoid some of the economic inefficiencies
of federal environmental standard-setting that have spurred criticism
of federal involvement in environmental protection.
I. The Influence of the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale
upon the Development of Federal Law
A. Constitutional History of the Race-to-the-Bottom Argument
The term "race-to-the-bottom" seems to derive from Justice
Brandeis' dissent from a 1933 majority opinion overturning a discrimi-
natory state tax upon corporate chain stores.14 At about the same
time, the United States government began to use the race-to-the-bot-
tom rationale to fight off Commerce Clause challenges to New Deal
legislation.1 5 Initially, the Court rejected this rationale (and the valid-
ity of the New Deal legislation), holding that Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause was limited to the regulation of those
activities having a "direct" effect upon interstate commerce.' 6 When
13. See infra text accompanying notes 275-293.
14. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the removal, by leading industrial states, of limitations upon the size and pow-
ers of business corporations and remarking that "[t]he race was one not of diligence but of
laxity").
15. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 509 (1935) (argu-
ment for the United States) (defending National Industrial Recovery Act code of fair com-
petition as eliminating the economic advantages enjoyed by states with more relaxed
poultry standards).
16. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918) (striking down a federal child
labor law upon holding that the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress general author-
ity to prevent possible unfair competition among the states by reason of one state's eco-
nomic advantage over others); Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 549-50 (striking down
law providing for promulgation of national "fair codes of competition" upon holding, inter
alia, that the authority vested by the Commerce Clause did not encompass preventing com-
merce from being diverted from states with high labor standards).
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the Court's hostility to the New Deal subsided, however, so did its
rejection of the race-to-the-bottom rationale. 17 The Court has since
argued that the prevention of destructive competition was the tradi-
tional role of congressional action under the Commerce Clause.' 8
The justification for federal regulation based upon a race-to-the-
bottom rationale remains somewhat distinct from the traditional justi-
fication for the exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority.
Whereas the traditional justification looks to the interstate effects of
an intrastate activity, the race-to-the-bottom rationale looks to the lo-
cal effects of interstate competition.' 9 Nevertheless, the current con-
stitutional validity of congressional power to prevent a state
regulatory race-to-the-bottom can be justified on at least two grounds.
First, it appears that the framers intended that the Commerce Clause
power extend to the regulation of commercial transactions where such
regulation is in the general interest of the Union as a whole and where
individual state action would be ineffective. 20 Interpreted thus, the
17. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100. 117,122 (1941) (overruling Hammer and
upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 on the grounds that the Act prevents the
"spread of substandard labor conditions through the use of the facilities of interstate com-
merce for competition by the goods so produced with those produced under the prescribed
or better labor conditions . . ").
18. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,282 (1981)
(upholding nationwide surface mining and reclamation standards as necessary to prevent
interstate competition among sellers of coal from undermining the ability of states individ-
ually to maintain adequate coal mining standards on the basis that "[t]he prevention of this
sort of destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional action under
the Commerce Clause").
19. See, eg., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that Congress may
regulate any intrastate activity that has a substantial cumulative effect on interstate
commerce).
20. The strongest evidence of this "framer's intent" argument rests upon the adop-
tion, at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, of a resolution concerning the scope of the
powers of the new national legislature and the relation of this resolution to the Conven-
tion's adoption of the Constitution's Commerce Clause. According to this resolution, orig-
inally drafted by Governor Randolph of Virginia, the delegates resolved that the new
Congress ought "2. ... to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and
3. also in those to which the states are separately incompetent." MADISON'S DEBATES 389-
90. Upon amendment by a Convention Committee, and without challenge or debate by
the delegates, this resolution became Art. 1, § 8 of the Constitution, the Commerce Clause.
let at 475. See Robert L. Stem, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47
HARv. L. REv. 1335, 1338 (1934) (recounting the above Constitutional history to argue
that Congress had the power to redress the economic difficulties besetting the Depression
era). But cf. Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the
Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 555, 602-07 (1994) (recounting the same
history of the Commerce Clause's origins but concluding somewhat paradoxically that, be-
cause the framers intended the Clause as a negative power to prevent state abuses as
opposed to an affirmative grant of power to the federal government to regulate for the
general welfare, the Commerce Clause is limited to regulating state externalities).
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Commerce Clause power would seem to include the prevention of re-
ductions in social welfare resulting from individually-rational state
regulatory determinations. Second, stare decisis supports the Court's
continued adherence to prior precedents upholding the race-to-the-
bottom rationale for federal regulation.21 And indeed, in the course
of the last fifty years, the need to prevent the states from engaging in a
welfare-reducing competition to deregulate in order to attract indus-
try has been used repeatedly to support the tremendous growth of
federal control in areas of labor law,22 corporate law,23 and environ-
mental law,24 among others.
21. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992)
(discussing the importance of stare decisis to the rule of law underlying the Constitution).
22. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651-678 (1994); Kathe-
rine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational
Labor Regulation, 16 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 987, 992-94, 1021-27 (1995) (comparing the effec-
tiveness of domestic and international regulatory approaches to the race-to-the-bottom in
labor standards); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETmINKING THE PROGRESsIVE AGENDA 85-
90 (1992) (listing the prevention of destructive interjurisdictional competition as a policy
justification for the Occupational Safety and Health Act).
23. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (discussing the need for federal corporate law); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1437 (1992) (advocating for an expansion of federal
regulation to counter the failures of corporate market competition); Roberta Romano,
Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lessons of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L.
REv. 843 (1993) (noting that while federalism provides a safety net against self-serving
management decisions, the current state-based system of incorporation is preferable to a
national regime); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competi-
tion and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CADozo L. REv.
759 (1987) (proposing that federal minimum standards are affecting corporations because
of a general heightened concern for fiduciary standards); David Charny, Competition
Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the
"Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423,430-31 (1991)
(discussing interjurisdictional competition for incorporations).
24. It should be noted, that with the recent lowering of barriers to international trade
resulting from the Uruguay Round of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade and
the North American Free Trade Agreement, much of the concern over a domestic race-to-
the-bottom has shifted to a concern about a global "race-to-the-bottom" in which devel-
oped nations relax their labor and environmental standards and enforcement efforts in
order to compete for industries that might otherwise locate in developing countries with
less stringent regulations. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, International Trade and Social
Welfare: The New Agenda, 17 Comp. LAB. L. 338, 368 (1996) (Introductory Remarks)
(commenting that the largest "race-to-the-bottom" threat concerns the relaxation of envi-
ronmental and labor law standards by developed nations in response to competition by
developing nations); Senator John F. Kerry, Trade and Environment" Charting a New
Course, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 447, 452 (1994) (outlining the risk of an international race-
to-the-bottom).
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B. Terminology of the Race-to-the-Bottom Debate and Significance to
Current Federal Environmental Laws
It is generally acknowledged that competition from other states
for the location of industry causes states to relax their environmental
standards.2 For many scholars and policy makers, the simple lower-
ing of state environmental standards constitutes a "race-to-the-bot-
tom." For purposes of the current scholarly debate, however, a "race-
to-the-bottom" refers in particular to a lowering of state environmen-
tal standards that also occasions a lowering in net social welfare.26 In
arguing that there is no "race-to-the-bottom," Professor Revesz is
claiming not that states fail to relax their standards as a result of inter-
state competition, but that the relaxation of standards does not occa-
sion any lessening of social welfare.27 This could be because standards
were too high in the first place-i.e., lowered standards occasion suffi-
cient additional economic benefits to more than "cancel out" the wel-
fare losses that follow from lowered environmental quality.
The distinction between a simple lowering of state environmental
quality and a lowering of environmental quality that also lowers social
welfare is important, not only to an understanding of the terminology
of the current debate over the existence of the race-to-the-bottom, but
also to the significance of the debate to the justifiability of the federal
environmental laws currently on the books. The revisionists' critique
extends only to federal regulation that is justified solely on the basis
that it corrects for the suboptimal state environmental standards re-
sulting from interstate competition. Thus, the recent critique has no
bearing upon federal standards deemed necessary to prevent any low-
ering of state environmental standards caused by interstate competi-
25. In addition to revising existing standards to make them less stringent, "relaxation"
in this context also refers to the failure to adopt an environmental standard in the first
place, or to delay the adoption of a standard. Given that the existence of lowered stan-
dards in response to interstate competition rests upon anecdotes rather than a systematic
study, it is in some sense surprising that both policy makers and scholars alike assume that
the relaxation of standards is the natural state response to interstate competition. In Part
IV of this Article, I present data from a survey which tested this presumption. See infra
text accompanying notes 181-221.
26. According to Professor Revesz:
[A] race-to-the-bottom requires not just the existence of a "race," but also that
the race be "to the bottom." This latter element requires, first, that a competitive
jurisdiction adopt a less stringent pollution control standard than an otherwise
identical island jurisdiction would have adopted. Second, it requires that the less
stringent standards that emerge from the competitive process be socially
undesirable.
Revesz, supra note 1, at 1219.
27. Id. at 1241.
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tion, regardless of the impact upon total social welfare.2 Moreover, as
will be discussed in the following section, the race-to-the-bottom is
only one of several justifications for federal environmental law. To
the extent that any current or future law is founded on some other
basis, the justifiability of the law is unaffected by the current debate.
C. The Role of the Race-To-the-Bottom Justification in the Development
of Federal Environmental Law
Consistent with the nation's strong tradition of localism, environ-
mental protection was traditionally the domain of states, municipali-
ties, and counties.29 As a consequence, the burden has rested upon
those advocating federal displacement of local authority to justify the
basis for federal involvement in environmental policy-making. The
"nationalization" of environmental law began in the 1970s with Con-
gress's enactment of several major federal pollution control statutes.30
The regulatory approaches employed demonstrate that Congress con-
sidered federal involvement in environmental regulation justified and,
indeed necessary, because of at least four distinct needs: (1) the need
to reduce interstate spillovers; (2) the need to reap the benefits of
centralized administration, including the economies of scale that can
be achieved in areas vital to environmental protection such as scien-
tific expertise; (3) the need to guarantee a minimum standard of
human health and ecological integrity as a right of all Americans by
ensuring a minimum level of environmental quality everywhere in the
28. For example, like many Americans, congressional policy-makers might believe
that environmental and economic goods are nontransferable and hence that a loss of envi-
ronmental quality or irreplaceable natural resources or species cannot be "made up for"
regardless of the number of jobs or other remunerative benefits such a loss occasions. Cf.
Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MicH. L. Rav. 1393, 1411-12
(1981) (basing degree of environmental protection upon "willingness to pay" constitutes a
"category-mistake" since public preferences for environmental quality "do not involve
desires or wants, but opinions or beliefs").
29. See, e.g., PETER S. Mm,,L & RiCHARD B. STrwART, ENV-mONMENTAL LAW AND
PoLIcY 241 (1994) ("Legislative and administrative control of air pollution was long the
preserve of municipalities, counties, and states."); PERcivAL ET AL., supra note 5, at 104-05
(discussing that federal programs during 1950s and 1960s were premised on notion that
environmental problems were the responsibility of state and local government); David L.
Markell, States as Innovators: It's Time for a New Look at Our "Laboratories of Democ-
racy in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation," 58 ALBANY L.
REv. 347, 356 (1994) (listing several reasons state and local laws are primary sources for
new environmental legislation).
30. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q
(1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994); Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994).
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nation, and (4) the need to prevent a lowering of environmental stan-
dards resulting from interstate competition for industry, including (but
not limited to) competition based on the advantage of geographic lo-
cation. I list this last purpose of federal regulation separately because
it has sometimes been referred to as a need to prevent a "race-to-the-
bottom." I do not use that term here, however, because, as I argue
below, Congress's intent in blocking interstate competition over envi-
ronmental standards was clearly broader and more complex than just
preventing economic inefficiency (which is an essential component of
the definition of the term "race to the bottom" as used in this Article).
Although Congress was clearly concerned, in part, about the possibil-
ity of competition-induced inefficiencies (the classic race to the bot-
tom), the record shows that in the formulation of legal approaches to
standard-setting and enforcement mechanisms, this was inextricably
linked to concerns about preserving environmental rights to minimum
levels of environmental quality that go beyond simple economic con-
siderations. The following section discusses each of the four ratio-
nales for federal environmental regulation in more detail.
(1) Prevention of Interstate Spillovers
The interstate spillover rationale is the classic economic efficiency
argument that federal intervention is necessary to prevent the envi-
ronmental, social, and economic losses that accrue when air and water
pollution originating in one state are carried by natural forces into
other states. States from which the pollution originates have little in-
centive to curb interstate pollution because they benefit from having
the harmful effects of pollution externalized while they enjoy the eco-
nomic benefits of the polluting activity.31 Bargaining between the
source state and the injured states to minimize losses occasioned by
the spillovers is costly, and the position of the injured states may have
31. For example, during the early 1970s, many states allowed industries to externalize
air pollution through the use of tall smokestacks that disperse the pollutants high into the
atmosphere, exporting them to other states and to Canada. 123 CONG. Rc. 18,026 (1977)
(remarks of Sen. Muskie). Congress intervened to prevent such spillovers in 1977 by
amending the Clean Air Act to remove industry's incentive to export pollution. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7423 (1994) (prohibiting states from taking stack-height and dispersion techniques into
account in calculating emission limits). After several court challenges, EPA regulations
implementing § 123 of the Clean Air Act as amended were finally upheld by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, 838 F.2d
1224 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 888 (1988); Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984).
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been weakened by the dispersion of the pollutants.3 2 The federal gov-
ernment, however, which was created in part to resolve interstate con-
flicts, is presumably a neutral party that can regulate to eliminate the
more harmful forms of interstate spillovers.33 While concern over in-
terstate spillovers explains much of the earliest federal pollution
laws,34 it is responsible for only a small portion of the current struc-
ture of federal environmental regulation.35 Until the 1990 Amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act, for example, only three provisions of that
Act directly addressed interstate externalities.3 6 In creating an inter-
state transport commission to deal with common pollution problems
of the East Coast,37 and a tradable permit scheme to control the inter-
state pollution problems of acid rain,38 the 1990 Amendments added
significantly to the Air Act's arsenal for combating interstate pollu-
tion. While the jury is still out on the efficacy of these latest additions
to the Act, the pre-1990 Amendments are generally considered to
have been ineffective in preventing harmful spillovers. 39 Similarly,
32. See Pyramids, supra note 2, at 1216. According to the famous Coase theorem, in
the absence of transaction costs, states would achieve an efficient allocation of pollution
through bargaining amongst themselves. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cos4 3 J. L.
& ECON. 1, 5-7 (1960). Of course, as Coase well understood, transaction costs are always
present, and are often high enough in many important instances to prevent bargaining
alone from leading to efficient pollution levels. Id.
33. Id.; see also M-NELL & STEWART, supra note 29, at 246; Roger H. Gordon, An
Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism, 98 Q. J. oF ECON. 567 (1983) (exploring
the federal government's role in reducing problems of externalities caused by individual
state decisionmaking).
34. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (authorizing the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to investigate interstate air pollution problems
and make recommendations for action); Water Pollution Control Act of 1948.62 Stat. 1155
(1948) (authorizing federal research programs to address interstate water pollution).
35. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1225 ("By far the bulk of the provisions of the Clean
Air Act, however, are wholly unrelated to the control of interstate externalities."); John P.
Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. Rv. 1183, 1220
(1995) ("Interstate air pollution, however, was not a significant concern of the Congress
that enacted the 1970 Clean Air Act.").
36. The three provisions were section 110(a)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (1994),
which requires state implementation plans to prohibit facilities within the state from caus-
ing a violation of another state's air quality regulations; section 126, 42 U.S.C. § 7426
(1994), which provides for a remedy to states who are injured through a violation of section
110(a)(2)(D); and section 123, 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (1994), which prohibits states from al-
lowing facilities to meet the requirements of a state implementation plan through the in-
stallation of a "tall stack" which can effectively disperse pollutants far distances.
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7506a, 7511c (Supp. 1994).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994).
39. See Richard Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 2341 (1996); Kay M. Crider & Timothy Talkington, Comment, Interstate Air
Pollution: Over a Decade of Ineffective Regulation, 64 C-.-KEN L. Rv. 619 (1988); Coin-
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only a few provisions in the Clean Water Act directly address inter-
state externalities. 4° Finally, the interstate spillovers rationale cannot
explain federal laws such as the Safe Drinking Water Act,41 which
protects a resource-public water systems-that is almost entirely lo-
cal in nature.42
(2) Realization of Efficiency-Related Benefits of Centralized
Administration
Congress also saw federal involvement in environmental regula-
tion as necessary to realize certain benefits for both states and regu-
lated entities that accrue from centralized administration of
environmental law. One such benefit is realization of economies of
scale in scientific research. The federal government is in a unique po-
sition to foster and disseminate the results of scientific research on the
effects of pollution and the discovery of pollution control technolo-
gies.43 Arguably, it makes little sense for each of the fifty states to
ment, Interstate Air Pollution Abatement and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Bal-
ancing Interests, 62 U. COLO. L. Rlv. 957, 960-71 (1991).
40. These provisions are section 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994), which requires, as
a condition of receiving delegated authority to run a pollutant discharge permit program,
that states ensure that other states whose waters may be affected by a water pollutant
discharge permit issued by them receive notice of, and an opportunity to provide com-
ments on, the permit; section 402(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1994), which provides the Ad-
ministrator the authority to veto a permit issued by a delegated state based upon its effect
upon the waters of another state; and section 401(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1994),
which allows for hearings in which the issuance of a federal permit may be denied where
the discharge would violate applicable state water quality standards. See Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) (upholding the EPA's interpretation that § 401(a)(2)
prohibits the issuance of a Federal Clean Water Act permit unless compliance with state
water quality standards can be assured but holding that whether the state standards will be
complied with is up to EPA's interpretation, as opposed to the interpretation of the state
whose standards are at issue).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1994).
42. See David H. Getches, Groundwater Quality Protection: Setting a National Goal
for State and Federal Programs, 65 CHi.-KENT L. RFv. 387 (1989).
43. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (requiring EPA to issue air quality
criteria for air pollutants which "shall accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge");
33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (requiring the EPA Administrator to issue "criteria for water qual-
ity accurately reflecting the latest scientific knowledge"). Federally promulgated water
quality criteria guidance is used by states in developing state water quality standards and
by the EPA in approving or disapproving the state's water quality standards. EPA wavers
in the degree to which it considers its scientific guidance "binding" upon the scientific
judgments of state officials that go into regulatory decisions. Compare Mississippi Comm'n
on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1980) (EPA disapproved a state
water quality standard for dissolved oxygen because it failed to comply with EPA's recom-
mended criteria) with Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir.
1993) (EPA approved a state water quality standard for dioxin approximately 10,000 times
less protective than the standard recommended by EPA).
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duplicate the research and data collection necessary to formulate sci-
entifically-complex environmental standards. 44 Rather, it makes
much more sense to vest this research role in a central authority who
can then simply disseminate the information to the various state envi-
ronmental agencies. The critique of the economies-of-scale rationale
maintains that a federal government unfamiliar with local industries
may be a less effective and efficient regulator than state agencies, and
the creation of duplicative federal bureaucracies and mandates may
multiply compliance, implementation, and confusion costs.45 In any
case, the economies-of-scale argument does not explain why the fed-
eral government is needed to develop binding environmental stan-
dards, rather than simply non-binding guidance documents.
A second efficiency-related benefit of centralized, as opposed to
decentralized, administration of environmental law is the ability to
lower the potential barriers to interstate trade that might otherwise be
posed by non-uniform state product regulation. For example, Con-
gress has preempted state vehicle emission standards and substituted
in their place (with the exception of California) a nationally-uniform
set of vehicle emission standards, thereby saving automobile manufac-
turers from having to comply with the emissions standards of fifty dif-
ferent states.46 Congress has done the same with respect to other
product standards, such as the wording of required warning labels of
pesticides. 47
(3) The Environmental Rights Argument
The structure and legislative histories of the federal pollution
laws indicate that Congress considered the guarantee of minimum
levels of human health protection and environmental quality a preem-
inent value that must at times trump considerations of cost or eco-
nomic efficiency. For instance, the "spine" of the Clean Air Act is
minimum ambient air .quality standards, applicable throughout the
44. See Pyramids, supra note 2, at 1213-15; Dwyer, supra note 35, at 1222.
45. For a revealing insight into just how massive the "confusion costs" of dual federal-
state regulation can be, see Joshua D. Sarnoff, Overcoming Uncooperative Federalism,
ARiz. L. REv. - (1996).
46. The Clean Air Act actually gives states a choice between adhering to the federal,
EPA-promulgated vehicle emission standards, or California's more stringent vehicle emis-
sion standards. Under § 209 of the Clean Air Act, all state vehicle emission standards
other than California's are preempted by federal vehicle emission standards. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7543. Notwithstanding § 209, under § 177 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7507, states are author-
ized to enact vehicle emission standards identical to California's.
47. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 24, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)
(1994).
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United States, and which the EPA must establish on the basis of
human health without regard to cost.48 In many ways, Congress has
treated minimum health and environmental protection as a funda-
mental human right.49 A strong theory of individual fights would hold
that fights-based arguments trump arguments based upon economic
efficiency.50 Thus, by affording environmental quality the status of a
fight, environmental protection is freed from what some would con-
sider a diversionary chore-that of economic justification.51 Although
some belittle the force of the fights-based argument in environmental
law by pointing to the unequal environmental quality authorized by
48. Clean Air Act, § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409; see Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the Administrator may not consider economic
and technological feasibility when establishing national ambient air quality standards).
The very cost-oblivious nature of the national ambient air quality standards is a source of a
brewing controversy over the EPA's proposal to tighten the existing standards for particu-
lates and ozone. 61 Fed. Reg. 65716 (1996) (proposed revised ozone standard); 61 Fed.
Reg. 65638 (1996) (proposed revised particulate matter standard). The EPA claims that
the revised standards will prevent 40,000 premature deaths and 250,000 cases of serious
respiratory problems in children each year. Barred by court precedents from challenging
the rules on cost grounds, industry opponents are instead questioning the validity of health
studies being used by the agency to support the new standards and pressuring Congress to
amend the Clean Air Act to require the agency to consider costs in promulgating ambient
air quality standards. See Margaret Kriz, Heavy Breathing, 28 NAT'L J. 8, 8-12 (1997).
49. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 486; M[EtELL & SrEwART, supra note 29, at 247.
50. According to the theory of individual rights espoused by Ronald Dworkin, for
example, some rights of individuals against the state "are prior to the rights created by
explicit legislation." RONALD DwOP.KN, TAYING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY x-xi (1978). Thus, a
rights-based argument would trump an argument designed to achieve efficiency since eco-
nomic utilitarianism is part of a general theory that relies upon legal positivism, which
holds that law is a product of explicit social practice or institutional decision.
51. Sentiment that the right to the environment ought to be considered a human right,
is especially prevalent in international environmental law. See W. PAUL GORMLEY,
HUMAN RiGHTs AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
96 (1976) (quoting 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (stating
"[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life, in
an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being.. .")); R.S. Pathak,
The Human Rights System as a Conceptual Framework for Environmental Law, in ENvi-
RONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS
205 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1992); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights,
and the Right to Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (1991). But cf. Gunther Handl,
Human Rights and Protection of the Environment! A Mildly "Revisionist" View, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 117-20 (A. Cancado
Trindade ed., Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, San Jose 1992), reprinted in,
ANTHONY D'AmATO & KIRSTEN ENGEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 68-69 (1995)
(arguing that conceptualizing environmental protection as a generic human right "reflects
a maximalist position that offers little prospect of becoming reality in the near term while
its propagation diverts attention and efforts from other more pressing and promising envi-
ronmental and human rights objectives").
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federal laws actually enacted by Congress,52 absolute equality is not
necessary to fulfill a minimal rights promise and thus, federally guar-
anteed minimum levels are not necessarily inconsistent with the
rights-based approach.
While federal regulation is obviously superior to state regulation
when the goal is the prevention of interstate spillovers or the realiza-
tion of economies of scale, selection of federal controls to guarantee
minimum levels of environmental quality seem a less obvious choice:
why were states not considered competent to protect the environmen-
tal quality rights of their own citizens? According to the legislative
histories of the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972, Congress thought the answer obvious: states
simply could not be trusted to impose upon industry the costs that
would be necessary to adequately protect human health and the envi-
ronment. To Congress, a history of state reticence to impose controls
under prior federal laws demonstrated that states were too afraid that
they would lose existing or new industries to other states to impose
stringent controls or take an aggressive stance on environmental en-
forcement.5 3 Consequently, if human health and the environment
were to receive adequate protection, the job must fall to the federal
government which is comparatively immune to such pressures. The
legislative history of the Clean Air Act, for instance, is marked by
comments such as the following, appearing in the House Committee
Report:
The promulgation of Federal emission standards for new sources...
will preclude efforts on the part of States to compete with each
other in trying to attract new plants and facilities without assuring
adequate control of extra-hazardous or large scale emissions
therefrom. 54
52. Merrill, supra note 3, at 488 ("[T]he rights argument would generate a regime that
tries to equalize environmental quality across jurisdictions."). The most telling example of
this is the Clean Water Act, which, despite the fishable-swimmable goal, has always al-
lowed for states to designate the use of a water body "industrial" and thereby never
achieve fishable-swimmable quality.
53. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3671 ("The task of setting water quality standards, assigned to the States by
the 1965 legislation, is lagging. More than 4 years after the deadline for submission of
standards, only a little more than half of the States have fully approved standards.").
54. H. R. Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1970). See also 116 CoNG. Rac.
33,115 (1970) (comments of Sen. Prouty) ("To be sure, minimum Federal standards are a
must, as they free the 50 States from thd necessity of competing for business by lowering
their standards."); id, at 33,116 (remarks of Sen. Cooper) (federal nationally-uniform new
source performance standards will "eliminate a large element of 'forum shopping' that is
possible if new facilities are not required to meet the level of pollution control."); id. at
19,209 (remarks of Sen. Jarman) ("The promulgation of Federal emission standards for
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD-SETTING
Similarly, it was concern over the apparent inability of states-
given interstate competition for mining business-to adequately pro-
tect the environment from acid mine drainage and other hazards of
mining that was a primary motivation for federal regulation of the
environmental effects of the mining industry.55
Federal environmental laws were designed to capitalize upon the
powers of state government while, at the same time, to preempt the
states as the primary standard-setters in order to circumvent the per-
ceived deleterious effects of interstate competition. Thus, many fed-
eral environmental statutes impose minimum environmental
standards that preempt less stringent state standards.56 In essence, the
federal government sets a "floor," below which state standards cannot
sink. Significantly, few federal laws impose a "ceiling" preventing
states from enacting more stringent laws, demonstrating that Con-
gress's concern was with lax state standards, rather than with more
strict state standards. 57 This feature of environmental law supports
new sources in the aforementioned categories will preclude efforts on the part of States to
compete with each other in trying to attract new plants and facilities without assuring ade-
quate control of extra hazardous or large-scale emissions therefrom."); id. at 19,213 (re-
marks of Rep. Preyer) ("But if we do not have national standards, we find what has
happened is that States begin to bid against each other to attract polluting industries."); id.
at 19,218 ("National standards of pollution control would prevent another State from at-
tracting any industries because of a greater pollution tolerance. Such competition is unfair
and against the public interest.").
55. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994). See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1994) (finding that na-
tionwide "surface mining and reclamation standards are essential in order to insure that
competition in interstate commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States will
not be used to undermine the ability of the several states to improve and maintain ade-
quate standards on coal mining operations within their borders"). See Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 285 (1981) (holding that the Surface
Mining & Reclamation Act of 1977 is constitutional).
56. See e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994) (retaining
state authority to adopt and enforce any effluent limitation, pretreatment standard or stan-
dard of performance except those less stringent than those promulgated by EPA); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1994) (same with respect to any standard or requirement with
respect to the emission, control, or abatement of air pollution); Solid Waste Disposal Act,
42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1994) (prohibiting any state from imposing any requirement less strin-
gent than those authorized under the Act); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,
30 U.S.C. § 1254(g) (1994) (preempting state laws regulating surface mining and reclama-
tion operations where a federal program has been promulgated for a state and insofar as
the state law interferes with the federal program).
57. There are a few rare exceptions, however, such as the standards for automobile
emissions, the labeling of pesticides, and the requirements for testing and manufacturing
toxic chemicals, each of which preempt all state standards or preempt any state standard
not identical to the federal standard. Congress has required uniformity in federal and state
law, rather than just preempting less stringent state standards, where differing state laws
would hinder the manufacture or distribution of nationally distributed products such as
automobiles and pesticides. See; e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7507, 7543 (1994) (pre-
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the environmental rights-based interpretation of the law's origin, but
not the economic efficiency rationale. If a right to some minimum
level of quality is the concern, establishing a floor is sufficient to ad-
dress that concern; if economic inefficiencies are the problem, how-
ever, standards that are too stringent are just as worrisome as those
that are too lax.
(4) Prevention of Interstate Competition Via Environmental Standards
A fourth purpose of federal environmental laws is to reduce the
significance of geographical location to the level and cost of required
pollution controls. The major federal pollution control statutes miti-
gate the significance of location in a variety of ways, the most common
of which is to require that plant emission or effluent limits be estab-
lished according to federally established uniform technology-based
standards by industrial category. Uniform technology standards re-
quire that all plants within a particular industrial category meet emis-
sions limits established by EPA according to the emission reductions
that can be met through the application of the "best available technol-
ogy," or the "maximum achievable control technology" for that
source. The Clean Air Act relies upon uniform technology standards
in its standards for new sources58 and, since the 1990 Amendments,
standards for emissions of toxic pollutants. 59 The cornerstone of the
Clean Water Act is the requirement that all "point source" discharges
conform to nationally-uniform technology standards established by
the EPA by industrial category.60 Similarly, under amendments to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, hazardous waste
must be pretreated to uniform technological standards prior to being
land-disposed.61
Nationally uniform environmental standards appear to have been
Congress's response to several different perceived problems. On the
empting all state vehicle emissions except California's standards and standards adopted by
other states that are identical to California's standards); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2617 (1994) (prohibiting any state law for the testing of a chemical substance or
mixture, and prohibiting any state law governing the manufacture of hazardous chemicals
other than those identical to the federal law or one prohibiting the use of the chemical
within the state); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v
(1994) (prohibiting states from imposing any requirements for the labeling or packaging in
addition to or different from those required by EPA under the Act).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1994).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. 1994).
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)-(m) (1994) (banning the land disposal of hazardous waste that
fails to meet pretreatment standards or qualifies for a capacity or "no migration" variance).
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practical side, uniform emissions limits based upon technological
achievability were reliable and enforceable, in contrast to limits based
upon the perceived assimilative capacities of the natural environment.
The difficulties of relying upon models to derive site-specific effluent
limits for industry had paralyzed the pre-1972 water pollution effort,
for example.62
A second benefit of nationally uniform standards is that they cre-
ate a "level playing field" for geographically scattered industries and
consequently reduce interstate competition in environmental stan-
dard-setting. Because standards are nationally uniform by industrial
category, a steel plant sited on Puget Sound is subject to the same
level of controls as a steel plant located on a Virginia stream; the steel
plant in Washington does not gain a market advantage over the Vir-
ginia plant as a result of environmental compliance costs and Virginia
is freed from the worry that its plant will relocate to Washington on
the basis of more lax standards alone. An early effort to take the pol-
lution-assimilation capacity of the receiving waters into account when
establishing the new technology based limits was quickly rebuffed by a
federal appeals court.63
The prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) program, a ma-
jor modification of the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air act,6 4 can
62. See S. Rep. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3675 ("The Committee adopted this substantial change [switch from state-issued effluent
limits based upon water quality standards to nationally uniform effluent limits based upon
best technology standards] because of the great difficulty associated with establishing relia-
ble and enforceable precise effluent limitations on the basis of a given stream quality.
Water quality standards, in addition to their deficiencies in relying on the assimilative ca-
pacity of receiving waters, often cannot be translated into effluent limitations-defendable
in court tests, because of the imprecision of models for water quality and the effects of
effluents in most waters."). See also Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants
Under the Clean Water Act, 21 ENT-'L L. REP. 10528, 10531 (1991) ("What is remarkable
about the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 is... how well in-
formed Congress was about the failures of the water quality standards, and how united and
emphatic Congress was in rejecting them as a basis for upgrading the nation's waters.").
63. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1041-43 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
64. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492 (1994). PSD requirements were first is-
sued in the form of administrative regulations after the Sierra Club filed a suit against the
EPA in which it successfully argued that the Administrator's approval of state implementa-
tion plans allowing for the degradation of clean air areas violated the Clean Air Act's
stated purpose to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air." Sierra Club v.
Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 255 (D.D.C. 1972), affd by an equally divided Court, 412
U.S. 541 (1973). In December 1974, the EPA promulgated regulations that established
increments in pollution concentrations over existing levels that operated as the maximum
extent to which a clean air area could pollute the air and maintain compliance under the
Clean Air Act. Congress codified and revised the EPA's regulations in the 1977 amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act.
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be explained as an effort to deny industry any advantage to locating in
unpolluted areas and hence to similarly reduce interstate competition.
While the PSD program prevented the degradation of areas with air
quality better than that mandated by the maximum ambient air qual-
ity standards, it also ensured a measure of equity among industries
located in polluted and unpolluted states and among the states them-
selves. The congressional voting record on the PSD requirements
shows that the provisions were supported by dirty air states that
served to lose in the competition for industry in the absence of such
amendments (northeastern and midwestern states), and opposed by
states serving to gain in their absence (southern and western states).
This demonstrates that passage of the requirements was at least some-
what motivated by a desire to eliminate locational competition.65
(5) Discussion
Congress believed that states could not be trusted to achieve min-
imum levels of environmental quality because of the intense pressures
they received from mobile industries to relax their environmental
standards. Consequently, federal regulation was considered necessary
not only to ensure a federal "floor" of minimum levels of environmen-
tal quality, but also to implement nationally-uniform industry-wide
emission and effluent standards. By rendering environmental compli-
ance costs nationally uniform across industrial categories, such tech-
nology-based standards would reduce the economic benefit of
relocating to states that possess either geographic features that are
actually capable of assimilating larger quantities of pollution or are
governed by political administrations willing to say they do.
The federal laws and their legislative histories reveal that the ef-
fects of interstate competition upon state standard-setting is an impor-
tant reason why Congress stepped up its involvement in
environmental regulation during the 1970s. Nevertheless, Congress's
primary concern was with the laxity of the state standards that re-
sulted from interstate competition and not exclusively with the possi-
ble economic inefficiency of those state standards. Thus, the "race"
which Congress intended to prevent through federal regulation was a
race to low environmental quality, and not just a "race-to-the-bottom"
as defined in this Article as a race to economic inefficiency.
65. See Peter B. Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being
Protected?, 23 ECON. INQuIRY 551 (1985).
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Professors Revesz and Stewart have interpreted congressional in-
tent to eliminate interstate competition in environmental standard-
setting through preemptive minimum environmental quality standards
and nationally-uniform technology standards as demonstrating Con-
gress's intent to prevent economic inefficiency by eliminating subop-
timally lax environmental standards.6 6 Neither scholar presents
evidence, however, that Congress's concern about interstate competi-
tion was limited to the economic inefficiency implications of that com-
petition, as opposed to the threats to environmental fights of lax state
standards. On the contrary, there is much to suggest that it was not
economic inefficiency alone that Congress acted to prevent. In addi-
tion to the legislative history documenting Congress's concern with
human health, the structure of federal regulation chosen by Congress
is not such as to ensure economically efficient standards. As pointed
out by Professor Revesz, minimum ambient air quality standards are
unlikely to be optimal since the residents of different states might
have varying preferences for environmental protection, some of which
might be for lower levels of health protection.67 Similarly, it is un-
likely that Congress's concern was just economic efficiency when it
enacted nationally uniform technology-based standards because
preventing industries (and states) from capitalizing upon pollutant-as-
similating geographic features actually reduces economic efficiency.
Rather, it seems that Congress's intent was to preserve conceptions of
fairness or justice that would be harmed if a state were allowed to
fully use advantages conferred upon it by accidents of nature to obtain
a competitive edge over other states.
Clearly, times have changed in the twenty-odd years since many
of these laws were passed. Whether or not one agrees on the underly-
ing rationales, it should be clear that "preventing an interstate compe-
tition-induced lowering of environmental standards" is not the same
as "preventing a race-to-the-bottom" (at least as defined in this Arti-
cle). I have argued that Congress intended, for a variety of reasons to
66. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1226 ("Further evidence that the race-to-the-bottom
rationale underlies much of the Clean Air Act comes from the statute's legislative history.
For example, at the time that it considered the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act,
Congress perceived the prospect of the interstate migration of industry in search of more
permissive environmental standards as a serious threat .... "); Pyramids, supra note 2, at
1212 ("The characteristic insistence in federal environmental legislation upon geographi-
cally uniform standards and controls strongly suggests that escape from the Tragedy of the
Commons by reduction of transactions costs has been an important reason for such
legislation.").
67. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1226.
January 1997]
do the former, not just the latter. Revesz has carefully noted the dis-
tinction between the two, since failure to observe it has been the
source of much confusion in the literature,68 but then he (along with
Stewart who preceded him) seems to contribute to the confusion by
reading evidence that Congress intended to do the former as support-
ing the notion that its goal was the latter.69
The above outline of the role of the race-to-the-bottom justifica-
tion in federal environmental law should give some perspective to the
current growing debate over what the role for economic efficiency ar-
guments should be in state and federal environmental standard-set-
ting. Because Congress enacted our current framework of
environmental laws for purposes broader than preventing an econom-
ically inefficient race-to-the-bottom, the revisionists' questioning of
the existence of an inefficient race-to-the-bottom should have little ef-
fect upon the validity of our current laws as originally conceived of by
Congress. In other words, the current laws are not in place under
"false pretenses." Congress knew what it was doing; and what it was
doing was fulfilling valid purposes which included, but were broader
than, preventing an economically inefficient race-to-the-bottom.
The historical record aside, the current prominence of economic
efficiency rationales for federal regulation in general and environmen-
tal regulation in particular,70 should nonetheless force us to examine
very carefully the claim that a race-to-the-bottom inefficiency does not
exist. Although I have argued that the alleged absence of such a race
68. Id. at 1219 ("Obviously, a race to the bottom requires not just the existence of a
"race," but also that the race be "to the bottom." ... [This] requires that the less stringent
standards that emerge from the competitive process be socially undesirable."). Id. at 1219
n.23 ("The distinction between a race to less stringent standards and a race to lower levels
of social welfare is not always well understood."); Pyramids, supra note 2, at 1212 n.67
(illustrating the effects of rationally informed emission limitations on state economies).
69. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1226-27; Pyramids, supra note 2, at 1212 n.67 (citing as
evidence that the possibility that states might engage in a welfare-reducing "tragedy of the
commons" prompted Congress to impose nationally uniform emission limitations for ex-
isting sources under the Clean Air Act, since such limitations "lessen the capacity of such
areas to attract new industry while still complying with ambient standards").
70. See Executive Order 12291 (Reagan Administrative Executive Order requiring
cost-benefit analysis for major agency regulations); Executive Order 12866 (Clinton Ad-
ministration Executive Order requiring cost-benefit analysis of major agency regulations).
The interest in economic efficiency of environmental regulations can be found in the em-
phasis upon market-based mechanisms of pollution control. See Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651(a)-(e) (establishing system of marketable permits for the
emission of sulfur dioxide); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits:
Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361 (1989); Bruce A. Ackerman &
Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market In-
centives, 13 COLUM. J. EiwTL. L. 171 (1988).
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among states should pose no significant challenge to the existing struc-
ture of federal law (so long as its original rationales continue to be
compelling), the fact is that efficiency justifications are likely to be
increasingly sought by future congresses and administrations for envi-
ronmental regulation. As a consequence, the rest of this Article will
focus upon the question of whether such a race does, in fact, exist.
H. The Theoretical Debate: Does Interstate Competition
Reduce or Enhance Welfare?
A. Theoretical Foundations for the Race-to-the-Bottom and the
Revisionist Critique
The argument that interstate competition leads to a race-to-the-
bottom and the revisionists' argument that it does not are both based
on long-standing theoretical traditions. A principal argument for the
existence of a race-to-the-bottom is based upon game theory, of which
the classic Prisoner's Dilemma model is a simple but frequently cited
example.71 According to this model, competition among a small
number of players makes each player worse off than if he or she had
not been a player in a game. The argument that interstate competi-
tion leads to socially-optimal environmental standards, on the other
hand, is based upon competitive neoclassical economics, according to
which competition among market participants leads to efficient out-
comes for society as a whole.72
Despite revisionist claims to the contrary,73 the argument that in-
terstate competition in environmental standard-setting triggers a race-
71. Commentators employing the Prisoner's Dilemma (or models similar to it) to ex-
plain the race-to-the-bottom include: MENELL & STEWART, supra note 29, at 246; Stewart,
supra note 3, at 2058-59; James A. Brander, Economic Policy Formation in a Federal State:
A Game Theoretic Approach, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 33, 47-49 (Richard Si-
meon ed., 1985); Eli M. Noam, Government Regulation of Business in a Federal State: Allo-
cation of Power Under Deregulation, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 762, 767-72 (1982); Kathryn
Harrison, The Regulator's Dilemma: Regulation of Pulp Mill Effluents in the Canadian
Federal State, 29 CAN. J. POL. Sci. 469 (1996).
72. See Oates and Schwab, supra note 8, at 342.
73. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1244 ("[R]ace-to-the-bottom arguments in the environ-
mental area have been made for the last two decades with essentially no theoretical foun-
dation."); "There are no formal models supporting the proposition that competition
among states creates a Prisoner's Dilemma in which states, contrary to their interests, com-
pete for industry by offering progressively more lax standards." 1d.
It [the legal literature] has not shown why when an island jurisdiction is placed in
a competitive situation, it becomes a participant in a race-to-the-bottom. This
part demonstrates that there is no support in the theoretical literature on in-
terjurisdictional competition for the claim that without federal intervention there
will be a race-to-the-bottom over environmental standards.
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to-the-bottom is based upon a detailed theoretical literature. The
Prisoner's Dilemma was applied to the generation of public goods as
early as 1965 by Mancur Olson74 and applied specifically to environ-
mental problems in 1968 by Garrett Hardin (the "tragedy of the com-
mons"). 75 Many scholars have used a game-theoretic approach to
model a race-to-the-bottom in interstate competition.76 As stated re-
cently, "[t]hese simple games therefore arguably provide sound theo-
retical basis for legal intervention. '77
The rejection of game theory in favor of neoclassical competitive
economic models as the theoretical foundation for interstate competi-
tion contains a deeper irony, however. As discussed more fully below,
game theory was invented fifty years ago to address shortcomings in
traditional neoclassical economics, which could not handle situations
in which market participants interacted strategically.78 Thus, the revi-
sionists' return to the neoclassical economic framework to understand
interstate competition, a problem many theorists were already solving
through the application of game theory, is, historically speaking, a
conceptual step backward.
Id. at 1233
Revesz's claim for the theoretical vacuum underlying the race-to-the-bottom is still
more puzzling given that Revesz actually constructs, in his article challenging the race-to-
the-bottom thesis, a simple game-theoretic model illustrating how interstate competition
might theoretically lead to a race-to-the-bottom. Id. at 1231 ("Thus, as a result of non-
cooperative action, both states are made worse off-the race is, therefore, a race-to-the-
bottom."). Revesz's purpose is to illustrate the approach he then goes on to oppose, but
regardless, his model presents a theory that, if true, would show precisely why, in Revesz's
words, "when an island jurisdiction is placed in competition.., it becomes a participant in
a race-to-the-bottom." Id. at 1233.
74. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECrIVE ACMION 22-36, 49-52 (1965).
75. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCmNCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
76. See, e.g., Brander, supra note 71, at 47-49 (using Prisoner's Dilemma to model a
provincial rivalry in using tax and subsidy policy to influence firm location); Noam, supra
note 71, at 767-69 (presenting a theoretical model in which regulation in one state affects
the interests of groups in another state, triggering a "race-to-the-bottom"). Several more
recent works, published after Revesz's article, model a race-to-the-bottom in state regula-
tion using a game theoretic approach. See Harrison, supra note 71, at 473-78 (using the
Prisoner's Dilemma and related models as the theoretical foundation for a race-to-the-
bottom in environmental standard-setting among competing provinces); Jenna Bednar &
William N. Eskridge, Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforce-
ment of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1447, 1470-75 (1995) (using the Prisoner's Dilemma
as the theoretical construct for failures in federalism due to the existence of incentives to
"cheat" on the federal arrangement through trade wars and the like that offer higher indi-
vidual state payoffs than those that accrue from being a member of a federation).
77. BAIRD GERTNER PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 188 (1994).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 89-96.
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Inadequacies in the traditional neoclassical economic framework
are reportedly what prompted John von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
genstem to write Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, the publi-
cation of which is generally considered to have given birth to modem
game theory.79 Some modem game theorists consider this book a
"scathing critique" of neoclassical economics.80 To von Neumann and
Morgenstern, the first a mathematician and the second an economist,
the assumptions of perfect competition were inappropriate in markets
consisting of just a few participants. 81 The two scholars instead be-
lieved that how any one participant acted where the total number of
participants in the market was small would depend upon how that par-
ticipant believed other participants would react to her actions:82 ac-
cording to one contemporary game theorist, "[a] game is being played
by a group of individuals whenever the fate of an individual in the
group depends not only on his own actions but also on the actions of
the rest of the individuals in the group. '8 3 Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern put it this way:
79. JoHN VON NEuMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND Eco-
NOMIC BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1947). Much work on strategic behavior preceded the publica-
tion of von Neumann and Morgenstern's book, however. Various aspects of strategic
economic behavior were formulated by scholars such as Antoine-Augustin Cournot, Fran-
cis Ysidro Edgeworth, Frederick Zeuthen, and Emile Borel. However, Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior "axiomatized" all of the relevant ideas of game theory, and pro-
vided a thorough discussion of zero-sum games. Philip Mirowski, What Were von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern Trying to Accomplish?, in TOWARD A HISTORY OF GAME THEORY
114 (E. Roy Weintraub ed., 1992).
80. See Mirowski, supra note 79, at 136-37.
81. According to one of Morgenstern's students, "Morgenstern clearly saw the prob-
lem of strategic interaction among economic agents as the central problem and the individ-
ual maximizing model of neoclassical economics as an inadequate representation of it ....
In order for an agent to decide how to behave rationally in [certain] circumstances, that
agent must know how others are expected to behave, but these actions involve a similar
expectation on the part of others." Andrew Schotter, Oskar Morgenstern's Contribution to
the Development of the Theory of Games, in TOWARD A HISTORY OF GAME THEORY 97
(E. Roy Weintraub ed., 1992). See also Mirowski, supra note 79, at 130-31. It has been
argued that it was the anti-neoclassical message of Theory of Games and Economic Behav-
ior that retarded its acceptance, and with it the development of the field of game theory.
See E. Roy Weintraub, Introduction, in TOWARD A HISTORY OF GAmE THEORY 9-10 (E.
Roy Weintraub ed., 1992).
82. SHAUN P. HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY: A CRIT-
CAL INTRODUCTION 2 (1995).
83. KEN BiNmoRE, ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY 1 (1990). This
definition is in fact narrower than that given by the founders of game theory, John von
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, who defined a game as "any interaction between agents
that is governed by a set of rules specifying the possible moves for each participant and a
set of outcomes for each possible combination of moves." VON NEUMANN & MORGEN-
STERN, supra note 79.
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The fact that every participant is influenced by the anticipated reac-
tions of the others to his own measures, and that this is true for each
of the participants, is most strikingly the crux of the matter (as far as
the sellers are concerned) in the classical problems of duopoly, oli-
gopoly, etc. When the number of participants becomes really great,
some hope emerges that the influence of every particular partici-
pant will become negligible, and that the above difficulties may re-
cede and a more conventional theory become possible. These are,
of course, the classical conditions of "free competition." 84
Admittedly, because game theory is best understood as a branch
of economics, it shares with neoclassical economics several common
assumptions. 85 For instance, both assume that individuals are instru-
mentally rational and thus have ordered preferences over various
desires. 86 Additionally, both assume that the satisfaction of individual
preferences yields "utility" and that individuals wish to maximize their
utility.87
But while neoclassical economics assumed that the individual had
no impact upon the results of the market and that the rational pursuit
of the individual's self-interest would result in society being better off,
game theory assumed that, under certain circumstances, individuals
could make a difference in market results and that all persons pursu-
ing their rational self-interest might not result in welfare-maximiza-
tion. The view of neoclassical economics by those schooled in game
theory is best summarized by a modem game theorist who said of the
neoclassical framework: "[iut is as if the only game in the world were
Solitaire, and all of the cards were face up."188
The following section will sketch the theoretical bases for both
the suggestion that interstate competition could lead to a race-to-the-
bottom and the suggestion that it might not-as well as analyze the
84. VON NEUMAmN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 79, at 13. It should be noted that
the key distinction between market interactions to which competitive assumptions apply
and those for which game theory applies, lies in the number of participants acting indepen-
dently of each other, as opposed to the absolute number of participants. As von Neumann
and Morgenstern recognized, a market with numerous participants may resemble a game if
a sufficient number of the players are colluding with each other and the resulting number
of coalitions is small. Id. at 15.
85. This is not to say game theory is not tremendously influential outside economics.
To the contrary, game theory has transformed the social sciences. HARGREAVES HEAP &
VAROUFAXIS, supra note 82, at 1.
86. See id. at 5-7. This assumption can be traced back to David Hume's Treatise on
Human Nature, which argued that it is "passions" that actually motivate people to act and
that reason is the slave of the passions. Neoclassical economics modified the Humean view
by substituting preferences for passions and requiring that preferences are consistent. See
it. at 7.
87. See id. at 5.
88. MICHAEL BACHARAH, ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 3 (1976).
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fundamental assumptions on which the two sides differ. Armed with
an understanding of their basic differences, Part IV will explore the
empirical literature to determine which theoretical construct finds the
greatest factual support.
(1) The Game-Theoretic Approach of the Classic Prisoner's Dilemma
In everyday parlance, the Prisoner's Dilemma is simply an ab-
stract formulation of the common situation whereby what is best for
each participant individually leads to an outcome that is socially
suboptimal, whereas with mutual cooperation everyone would have
been better off.8 9 In the usual story that accompanies the Prisoner's
Dilemma, two prisoners each have the same two choices: to cooper-
ate with each other by keeping silent with respect to his and the other
prisoner's involvement in the crime or to "defect" by confessing his
and the other prisoner's criminal act. Each prisoner must make his
choice without knowing what the other prisoner will do. If both deny
all involvement in the crime, each is sentenced to a light sentence; if
both confess, each is given a sentence of medium-severity; if one con-
fesses, the one confessing is released, but the other prisoner is handed
a harsh sentence. Although collectively the prisoners would be best
off if both denied the crime, each follows his own self-interest and
confesses.90
89. Technically, the Prisoner's Dilemma is an example of a two-person, variable-sum,
noncooperative game in which both players have a dominant strategy. See, e.g., ERIC
RASMUSEN, GAMms AND INFORMATION 17 (2d ed. 1994) ("The strategy s* is a dominant
strategy if it is a player's strictly best response to any strategies the other players might
pick, in the sense that whatever strategies they pick, his payoff is highest with s."). The
name "Prisoner's Dilemma" was first used in 1950 by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood at
the RAND Corporation. When presenting the basic game to a seminar at Stanford Uni-
versity, Albert W. Tucker created the prosecutor-prisoner story to go with the game, which
gave it the name of "Prisoner's Dilemma." See P-min D. SaTRArIN, GAME THEORY AND
STRaTEGY 73 (1993). For excellent discussions of the Prisoners' Dilemma, see ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-10 (1984); R. DuNCAN LuCE & HOWARD
RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY 94 (1967); HAR-
GREAVES HEAP & VAROUFAxIS, supra note 82, at 146-66; ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 48-52.
90. In order for a dilemma to be a Prisoner's Dilemma, several relationships must
hold. First, the size of the payoffs to an individual player must follow a prescribed order
whereby T (temptation to defect) > C (mutual cooperation) > D (mutual defection) > S
(sucker's payoff). In other words, a player receives the highest return when she defects and
the other player cooperates (T), the lowest return when the other player defects while she
cooperates (S), and a higher reward for mutual cooperation (C), than mutual defection
(D). See RASMUSEN, supra note 89, at 30 n.1.2; AXELROD, supra note 89, at 9-10. Second,
the following relationship must hold: 2C > T + S > 2D. The players' combined payoffs are
highest when they both cooperate, the second largest when one of them cooperates while
January 1997]
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The real world state interactions in environmental standard-set-
ting are undoubtedly more complex than the simple Prisoner's Di-
lemma. For example, environmental standard-setting in the real
world is complicated by the participation of a large number of govern-
mental and non governmental organizations; real life environmental
standard-setting is an on-going, dynamic process 9' that provides states
with opportunities for intergovernmental negotiation and for revising
existing standards; and, in the real world, whatever game states are
playing in environmental standard-setting is "nested within a larger
constitutional game" concerning questions of jurisdiction between
state and federal governments.92 Nevertheless, the Prisoner's Di-
lemma model provides a simple, useful heuristic that captures the es-
sence of incentives that might be faced by state actors engaged in
interstate competition for mobile capital, and thus provides a useful
starting place for understanding the more complicated real world in-
terstate interactions.93
To best understand how state environmental standard-setting
might be similar to a Prisoner's Dilemma, it is first necessary to under-
stand how a welfare-maximizing state would approach environmental
regulation were it an island jurisdiction. Once this basic "economic
logic" of environmental regulation is established in the island jurisdic-
tion context, we can see how this same economic logic can create a
Prisoner's Dilemma, given certain conditions governing interstate
competition for industry. The simple mathematical model used to il-
lustrate this dynamic should not be taken too literally, but rather as a
cartoon picture illustrating the logical possibility of such an
interaction.
the other defects, and the lowest when they both defect. Thus, collectively the players are
worst off when they follow strategies maximizing their individual well-being.
91. This opens the way for cooperation between the players when the game is played
an infinite number of times, i.e., an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. In a celebrated contest,
Robert Axelrod discovered that the strategy of "tit for tat" was the best strategy for use in
an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. "Tit for tat" is a strategy of starting with cooperation and
thereafter doing whatever the other player did (cooperate or defect) in his previous move.
See AxELROD, supra note 89, at viii.
92. Harrison, supra note 71, at 470.
93. See Brander, supra note 71, at 48 ("The value of this description [the application
of the Prisoner's Dilemma to interstate competition for industrial firms] is that it does
capture, in the purest possible setting, non-cooperative incentives faced by provincial gov-
ernments. Real policy decisions certainly have an element of this rivalry, leading to out-
comes that reduce national welfare.").
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(a) The "Logic" of Environmental Regulation
The economic rationale for regulating waste emissions in the first
place is the enhancement of net social benefits. In order to justify
environmental regulation on economic grounds (though not necessar-
ily ecological, moral, or equity grounds), the emissions standard
chosen must make society better off than were emissions left uncon-
trolled. Consider that net social benefits are just the benefits of the
waste-producing activity (jobs, etc.) less the costs of the pollution
damages from the activity, and less the costs of complying with the
emissions standard. This can be expressed as:
net benefit = benefit - cost of damages - cost of compliance.
This can plausibly be expressed in more precise form as:
net benefit =bk - c(1-s)ek - a(sek)2
where k = amount of capital; s = pollution standard (expressed as a
required fractional reduction in uncontrolled emissions such that
0<s!1); b k = economic benefit from capital (where b is the benefit per
unit of capital); e k = unregulated pollution emissions (where e is
amount emitted per unit of capital); c = cost of damages from a unit of
pollution (and hence, c e k is the total costs imposed by unregulated
emissions); s e k = amount of pollution reductions mandated by pollu-
tion standard s (notice that as s increases, emissions reductions result
in a proportionate reduction in the cost of damages from emissions;
this reduction in damage costs, equal to c s e k, is the benefit of the
standard); and a(sek)2 = costs of complying with pollution standard s
(expressed as a quadratic to allow marginal costs of compliance to
increase as the standard becomes more stringent).
The "job" of an environmental regulator of "island" jurisdiction
State A, where the amount of capital is fixed, is to choose a standard,
s, that maximizes net benefits. For example, let capital, k = 50 units;
the benefits, b = $10 per unit of capital; pollution costs, c = $9 per unit
of pollution emitted; compliance costs, a = $0.1 per unit of emissions
squared; and emissions per unit of capital, e = 1 unit of pollution per
unit of capital. In this case, the net social benefits of industrial activity
in the absence of environmental regulation will be $50, but net social
benefits can be increased if an emissions standard is imposed, and
these net benefits will reach a maximum value of $250 with the opti-
mal emissions standard of s=0.9 - i.e. a 90% reduction in waste emis-
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sions (if these benefit values seem small, they might be thought of as
accruing per unit of output). 94
(b) The Environmental Regulator's "Dilemma" 95
If we relax the "island jurisdiction" assumption, and assume the
existence of a second state B as well as state A in the above example,
these states are suddenly faced with a choice as to whether to alter
their environmental standards or keep them the same. This choice
can be simplified and summarized as the choice between two strate-
gies: (1) maintain existing environmental standards, or (2) relax ex-
isting environmental standards. The dilemma arises if, by the
relaxation of pollution standards, one state can attract at least some
industries from the other state. Where the jurisdiction relaxes its pol-
lution standards across the board (i.e., relaxes the standards applica-
ble to relocating facilities as well as for existing facilities), both the
jurisdiction's newly locating plants and its existing plants will produce
more pollution at the same time that they produce more products and
economic benefits.
The example below (Figure 1) gives a concrete illustration of how
the dilemma arises when the "island jurisdiction" assumption is re-
laxed in our simple example. Assume that, by cutting its emission
standard in half, one state can attract half of the other state's indus-
trial capital. This assumption, together with the underlying model and
numerical values already described in the island case, generates the
payoffs depicted in Figure 1.96 With these payoffs, the incentives will
push both States A and B to relax their emission standards to the
suboptimal standard of 45%.
94. The optimal standard is determined by choosing the value of s that makes the
marginal benefit of the standard equal to its marginal cost. Simple differentiation of the
benefit csek with respect to s gives the marginal benefit cek, while differentiation of the
cost a(sek)2 gives the marginal cost 2as(ek)2. Setting these equal gives the optimal solution:
s = c/2aek, or 0.9 when the above numerical values for c, a, e, and k are plugged in. The
specific numerical values were rather arbitrarily selected to give round numbers for pur-
poses of simple illustration. I am grateful to Scott Saleska for suggesting the form of this
simple model and for working through its mathematical details.
95. This phrase is borrowed from Harrison, supra note 71, at 469.
96. The payoffs are generated by simply calculating the net benefit for each state from
the equation in the previous section, plugging in the appropriate values for capital, k (50 or
25), and environmental standard, s (90% or 45%), according to the state's position in the
payoff matrix.




State A Maintain Std at 90% Relax Std to 45%
Maintain Std at 90% Mutual Coop. Sucker/Unilat. Defect
($250, $250) ($175, $265)
Relax Std to 45% Unilat. Defect/Sucker Mutual Defection
($265, $175) ($200, $200)
Note: payoffs in each square are listed in order (payoff to state A, payoff to state B)
The order of the payoffs here complies with the formula for the
classic Prisoner's Dilemma: a State receives its highest payoff when it
unilaterally "defects" by dropping its standard to 45% while the other
state retains its standard at 90% (thus gaining, at the expense of the
other state, extra capital and associated economic benefits which out-
weigh the environmental quality losses of lower standards by the $15
difference between $265 and $250); the second highest payoff when it
cooperates with the other state and maintains its 90% standard (re-
ceiving the same net benefit of $250 as it would in the island jurisdic-
tion case); the third highest payoff when it defects by dropping its
standard to 45% but the other state does the same (in which case
neither state attracts the other's capital but both states suffer because
their standards are suboptimally low); and the lowest payoff when it
maintains its standard at 90% while the other state drops its standard
to 45% (thereby losing capital and its associated benefits to the other
state). Fearful that they will be left the "sucker," and tempted by the
possible extra benefits of unilateral defection, both states wil ration-
ally choose to "defect" (unless there is a mechanism-such as a fed-
eral power-for imposing the optimal standard or for enforcing
agreements between the states not to defect). Thus, according to this
simple Prisoner's Dilemma-like "environmental regulator's dilemma"
model, the result of interstate competition is a "race-to-the-bottom."
(2) The Neoclassical Economic Model of Perfect Competition
The revisionists suggest that interstate competition might better
be modeled as a perfectly competitive neoclassical market, and that
the game-theoretic approach embodied by the Prisoner's Dilemma is
not necessary after all. Professor Revesz, for instance, relies upon a
neoclassical economic model developed by Wallace Oates and Robert
Schwab. 97 In the Oates and Schwab model, jurisdictions have the
choice of competing for a mobile stock of capital using either or both
97. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1238-42, citing Oates & Schwab, supra note 8.
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of two different mechanisms: lowered taxes or lax environmental
standards. Oates and Schwab were motivated to develop their model
in response to a rift in the literature on local public finance between
Tiebout-driven models, according to which interjurisdictional compe-
tition leads to the efficient provision of local public goods98 and the
models driven by a second body of literature that contends that in-
terjurisdictional competition distorts public choices.99 Oates and
Schwab decided to explore the conditions under which jurisdictions
98. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956). Tiebout's "vote with your feet" model is a cornerstone of the literature of local
public finance. According to this model, when mobility is costless, residents will move to
and settle down in the community that best satisfies their preferences for schools, parks,
fire and police protection, and other local public goods. Id. at 418. Precisely because these
goods are "public," in that it costs the community no more to provide the good to all
residents than it does to provide it to one, jurisdictions will compete for more residents to
share the costs of the good's initial provision. (Additional residents cost the community
while lowering the costs of public goods for all.) In equilibrium, the residents of all com-
munities have identical preferences and consequently, all communities are homogeneous.
This sorting process supposedly results in an efficient allocation of public goods without
the intervention of a federal authority. Id at 420. Criticism of the Tiebout model has taken
two forms: a questioning of the model's underlying assumptions and a questioning of the
desirability of the "efficient" Tiebout-world. Regarding the former critique, see Edwin S.
Mills and Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Local Public Services and Finance: Its Rele-
vance to Urban Fiscal and Zoning Behavior, in EDWIN S. MILLS & WALLACE E. OATES,
FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CoNTmOLs 3 (1975) (because additional residents increase
the demand for more schools, roads, police protection, etc., most services provided by local
government are not "pure" public goods); JOE B. STEVENS, TR ECONOMICS OF COLLEC-
TriE CHoIcE 333-34 (1993) (quantity and quality of local public goods are not very impor-
tant in explaining why people move from community to community and that no-growth
advocates have waged political battles with growth advocates in many cities and towns);
Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exac-
tions, 45 VAND. L. Rnv. 831, 837-39 (1992) ("[M]unicipalities ... will not compete for
[poor residents or residents who are] unwilling or unable to cover the marginal cost of the
public services they consume."). The latter critique asks, even if Tiebout is correct, would
we want to live in communities populated solely by persons like ourselves and in which
rich communities would be isolated from poor communities? See STEVENS, supra, at 333.
These shortcomings of the Tiebout model elevate the importance of a second body of liter-
ature that also sees interjurisdictional competition as efficiency-enhancing, but bases this
conclusion on alternative grounds. The so-called "leviathan" literature sees interjurisdic-
tional competition as restraining the undesirable expansionary tendencies of government.
See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Tim POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL
FOuNDAToNS OF A FISCAL CONSTrTUTON 33 (1980).
99. Those adhering to the view that competition distorts public choices by causing
public officials to hold down taxes and other sources of costs to households and businesses,
with the result that public goods are provided at suboptimal levels, include GEORGE F.
BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 28 (1967), and
John H. Cumberland, Interregional Pollution Spillovers and Consistency of Environmental
Policy, in REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE ECONOMIC ISSUEs 255 (Horst Siebert
et al. eds., 1979).
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would select both an optimal tax rate on capital and local environmen-
tal standards despite competition for mobile capital.
The mechanics of Oates and Schwab's model are actually quite
simple. Oates and Schwab presume that society at large consists of
many jurisdictions, each of which is sufficiently large that all individu-
als both live and work in the same jurisdiction and none of the pollu-
tion generated by firms in one jurisdiction spills over into other
jurisdictions.100 The output of the jurisdiction's firms is a function of
the jurisdiction's given stock of capital, labor, and allowable polluting
waste emissions. 01 Given a series of restrictive conditions, Oates and
Schwab conclude that interjurisdictional competition will yield wel-
fare-maximizing environmental standards.102 Society's overall stock
of capital is fixed and perfectly mobile (i.e., transaction costs do not
pose a long-term barrier to profit-maximizing relocations of capital in
different jurisdictions). Consequently, firms will move to whatever ju-
risdiction provides the highest net returns to capital. (The net rate of
return of capital in a given state equals the marginal product of capital
in that state, minus the locality's tax upon capital, and plus any local
subsidies.) As a result of capital moving, the net return will adjust
until equilibrium is reached at which point the net return will be equal
across all jurisdictions. 03 Note that, by changing their environmental
standards or tax rates, localities can temporarily change their net rate
of return to capital. However, the inflow of additional capital will
eventually cause the locality's rate of return to capital to come back to
the equilibrium rate of return. A key assumption of the Oates and
Schwab model is that the national equilibrium rate of return to capital
is a fixed value, determined by the market, that localities cannot
influence.
In this context, local regulators set a jurisdiction-wide environ-
mental emissions limit (allocated among the firms according to their
productivity), and a tax on capital.' °4 Imposing an emissions limit
both raises social welfare by improving environmental quality, and
100. Cumberland, supra note 99, at 336.
101. Thus, the firms' production function can be written as: Output = F(L, K, E),
where L = labor, K = capital, and E = waste emissions. The production of Q (product
produced) exhibits constant returns to scale, so a doubling of inputs K (capital) and L
(labor) results in a doubling of outputs Q and E (waste emissions). Id. at 336-37.
102. Id. at 336.
103. Id. at 336-37.
104. Id. at 336.
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lowers it by chasing away capital, thus lowering wages. 105 Similarly,
imposing a capital tax raises social welfare by increasing public reve-
nues, but only at the cost of lowered wages (again, due to the lost
capital). The problem of the regulator is thus to maximize social wel-
fare by (1) choosing the emissions limit where the marginal private
cost of stricter environmental standards (in terms of loss of capital and
lowered wages) equals the marginal private benefit (in terms of higher
environmental quality), and (2) setting the capital tax rate that bal-
ances the cost of the tax (in terms of lower wages resulting from lost
capital) with its benefits (in terms of the additional public revenues).
In order to ensure that the regulator's choice of optimal stan-
dards and tax are in accord with what an individual would choose if
confronted with the same choice, Oates and Schwab assume that resi-
dents' preferences (all residents are presumed to be identical in tastes
and preferences106) are translated into governmental policies accord-
ing to the median-voter model.'0 7 Following this model, local officials
are assumed to choose only policies that maximize the utility of the
voter whose preferences represent the median of all voters on a par-
ticular issue.'08 Because Oates and Schwab assume all individuals
within a given jurisdiction have identical utility functions and in-
comes, 0 9 application of the median-voter model means that public of-
ficials will choose policies that maximize the utility of a representative
resident.
By equating marginal costs and benefits in their individual juris-
dictions, the regulators in competing jurisdictions will of course
choose environmental standards and capital tax rates that maximize
the utility of their own residents. Under the conditions specified by
Oates and Schwab, however, these same standards and tax rates will
also be socially optimal for society at large. According to the model,
the optimal tax rate in each jurisdiction will be that which just recoups
105. Wages are dependent on the marginal product of labor, which in turn is deter-
mined by the size of the capital stock. For example, increasing the amount of capital (e.g.,
investing in more office space, computers, or widget-making machines) increases the de-
mand for labor (i.e., workers who can staff the offices and operate the computers or ma-
chines). Hence, if all other factors remain the same and if the labor supply is fixed,
increasing capital will raise wages, and conversely, decreasing capital (or chasing it away to
other jurisdictions) will lower wages.
106. Id. at 337-38.
107. Id. at 339.
108. DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 18 (1958) ("The
theorem states that the motion which will defeat any other put forward becomes determi-
nate as soon as the position of the median optimum becomes determinate.").
109. Oates & Schwab, supra note 8, at 339.
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the expense of public goods consumed by industry in that jurisdiction
(e.g. roads, police and fire protection, etc.), while the environmental
standard will be the one which equates the marginal benefit of the
standard in that community (determined by the environmental quality
preferences of the local residents) with its marginal cost (measured in
terms of forgone consumption). These standards will in general not
be equal, because the residents of different jurisdictions may have dif-
ferent relative preferences for material goods and environmental
quality. Why should the standards chosen nonetheless be socially op-
timal for all jurisdictions jointly? Because in this equilibrium, there is
no way to change the allocation of capital between jurisdictions to
improve the well-being of some residents that does not come at the
cost of making other residents worse-off. This is, of course, the defini-
tion of social optimality. Note that this stands in contrast to the equi-
librium of the Prisoner's Dilemma model of the previous section (i.e.,
the lower-right payoff quadrant in Figure 1), where both states could
be made better off by a move to the payoffs in the upper left quadrant.
Under these conditions, the Oates and Schwab model dictates
that regulators in individual jurisdictions will choose both an efficient
environmental standard and capital tax rate. The efficient environ-
mental standard will be that standard which represents the point at
which the marginal private cost of pollution equals the marginal pri-
vate benefit from additional capital. Due to the median-voter model,
there is no divergence between the point that maximizes private indi-
vidual utility and the point that maximizes the utility of all of the juris-
diction's residents; whatever level of environmental quality maximizes
individual utility will also maximize the utility of the community as a
whole." 0 As to a tax rate on capital, the regulator will choose the rate
that simply recoups the expense of the public goods consumed by in-
dustry (e.g., roads, police and fire protection) and no more.'
Thus, the Oates and Schwab model creates the conditions under
which the private sector's alleged "invisible hand" can work in the
public sector. In their model, the individual jurisdiction is best off at
the same point that society is best off, and interstate competition leads
to efficient local environmental standards. Hence, under the Oates
and Schwab model, there is no "race-to-the-bottom" in state environ-
mental standard-setting.
110. Id. at 342.
111. Id. at 337 n.6, 339 n.11.
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C. A Key Assumption Distinguishing the Two Theoretical Models
Juxtaposed against one another in the current debate over the
existence or nonexistence of a race-to-the-bottom in state environ-
mental standard-setting are thus two very different models of inter-
state competition. According to the non-cooperative game-theoretic
models relied upon by adherents of the race-to-the-bottom hypothe-
sis, the market for firm location is imperfect; crippled by strategic in-
teractions between the state participants, it causes states to establish
suboptimal environmental standards. In contrast, under the neoclassi-
cal economic model held out by the revisionists, this same market is
perfectly competitive and hence leads to efficient state environmental
standards. Which of these two models best approximates interstate
competition in the real world (or whether another model altogether
would be more appropriate) is a question that can only be answered
through theoretically informed appeals to evidence that would allow
one to match one or another approach with the conditions of inter-
state competition in the real world.
What accounts for the different predictions of the two models?
There are a number of superficial differences between the models, but
one difference that is essential from the perspective of this Article is
the number of states involved in the interaction: in the Prisoner's Di-
lemma, it is two, while in the Oates and Schwab model, the number is
unspecified, but assumed to be large. The assumption of a "large"
number of states is what allows the rate of return to capital in equilib-
rium to be treated in the Oates and Schwab model as a fixed value
given by the market that individual states cannot influence. One way
to think about the importance of this is to consider what happens
when one state lowers its environmental standard, thereby attracting
capital to itself and away from others. In the Oates and Schwab
model, the number of other states from which this capital comes is so
large, that only a negligibly small amount comes from any individual
state. In other words, the "pain" of capital loss is spread so thin, that
no state can notice it because no state's stock of capital can be af-
fected by any other state's regulatory decisions. The efficient outcome
of the Oates and Schwab model depends unavoidably on this assump-
tion of a fixed equilibrium rate of return (i.e. large numbers of states).
If the number of states were "small", the overall equilibrium rate of
return would not be fixed by the market, but would depend on the
particular configuration of state environmental standards, and effi-
cient outcomes could no longer be guaranteed by the Oates and
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Schwab model. Outcomes could not be easily predicted, and it would
be necessary to apply game theory to the situation.
Thus to conclude that interstate competition results in efficient
environmental standards upon the authority of Oates and Schwab's
model, at least two sets of conditions must hold true in the real world:
the number of participants in the market must be large (or their rela-
tive market power small), and several assumptions particular to the
Oates and Schwab model must hold true. The number of market par-
ticipants and their relative market power is relevant to the neoclassi-
cal versus game-theoretic distinction and will be discussed in detail
directly below. The other assumption will be discussed later in Part
IV.B.
(1) The Perfect Competition Assumption
The requirement that the number of participants be small (i.e.
that the participants have small market power) is one of four standard
conditions generally recognized as necessary for markets to generate
efficient outcomes. 112 It is generally referred to as the competitiveness
condition: no single market participant can have enough market
power to affect the price of a good. The other three conditions of
efficient markets are: first, the goods or services traded must be pri-
vate goods, the most important requirement of which is that non-buy-
ers must be excluded from enjoying the good;113 second, consumers
must have accurate and complete information about the market prices
and product quality; and third, all of the value of the good to potential
consumers must be contained within the good's demand curve, and,
similarly, all of the costs of producing the good must be reflected in
the supply curve (in other words, there are no externalities).
In the context of the current interstate competition debate, the
requirement that the market be competitive is critical. As noted, this
condition is fulfilled when a market is composed of so many firms and
consumers that none of them is able to have any effect upon price.
Instead, price is determined by the total market supply and demand
curves and taken as a given by market participants. For this reason,
neoclassical economics uses the term "price-taker" to refer to the
112. For a list of the conditions for an efficient market see generally STEVrNs, supra
note 98, at 57-59; ROBERT S. PiNDYCK & DANIEL L. RumnFELD, MICROECONOMIcs 587-88
(3d ed. 1995); HARvEY S. RosEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 51-53 (4th ed. 1995).
113. Consumption of the goods must therefore be rival and excludable and the produc-
tion of the good must be capable of being separated from the consumption of the good.
See STvENs, supra note 98, at 57.
January 1997]
competitive firm and the competitive consumer." 4 Were a competi-
tive firm to ignore the price-taking condition and offer its product at
above-market price, no one would buy its product.
Oates and Schwab's model explicitly relies upon the assumption
of perfectly competitive markets. Oates and Schwab assume that local
environmental officials are "price-takers" in the market for industrial
firms, stating, "just as perfectly competitive firms believe they have no
influence on price and therefore behave as price-takers, these compet-
itive communities take the rate of return on capital as a given.""'
5
This is due to Oates and Schwab's assumption that the market consists
of a great number of market participants (states as well as firms), none
of which hold disproportionate market power. It follows that Oates
and Schwab also assume that public officials are "price-takers" in rela-
tion to each other. According to their model, no public official has
sufficient power in the market for industrial firms that she can influ-
ence the decisions of officials in other jurisdictions with respect to
their actions in the same market." 6
(2) Monopoly and Oligopoly
The classic case of a market imperfection due to an individual
with excessive market power is that of monopoly. Unlike the partici-
pant in a perfectly competitive market who, as discussed above,
114. See, e.g., PINDYCK & RuBTN'ELD, supra note 112, at 11 ("A perfectly competitive
market has many buyers and seller, so that no single buyer or seller has a significant impact
on price."); id. at 241-42 ("Because each firm in a competitive industry sells only a small
fraction of the entire industry sales, how much output the firm decides to sell will have no
effect on the market price of the product. The market price is determined by the industry
demand and supply curves. Therefore, the competitive firm is a price taker: it knows that
its production decision will have no effect on the price of the product."); RicHARD H.
LEFTWIcH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 26 (4th ed. 1970) (citing as a
requirement of pure competition that "[e]ach buyer and each seller of the product involved
must be so small in relation to the entire market for the product that he cannot influence
the price of whatever it is he is buying or selling."); HAL R. VAR.AN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 25 (3d. ed. 1992) (profit-maximizing firms exhibit "price-taking behavior" ac-
cording to which they are "assumed to take prices as given, exogenous variables to the
profit-maximizing problem"); ROSEN, supra note 112, at 51 ("The Fundamental Theorem
[of welfare economics] holds only if all consumers and firms are price takers. If some
individuals or firms are price makers (they have the power to affect prices), then the alloca-
tion of resources will generally be inefficient.").
115. Oates & Schwab, supra note 8, at 337. See also Working Paper, supra note 7, at 6
("In the model, 'small' communities that behave as price-takers in a national capital mar-
ket seek . . . to maximize the welfare of their residents subject to a collective budget
constraint.").
116. Working Paper, supra note 7, at 14-15 ("The model is 'competitive' in spirit in the
sense that they perceive their decisions to have no effects on certain parameters such as the
rate of return to capital or the decisions of officials in other jurisdictions.").
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behaves as a "price-taker," a monopolist behaves as a "price-maker:"
the price the monopolist charges is constrained only by the volume of
product it wishes to sel. 117 A monopolist's price-making leads the
market to produce inefficient outcomes. When supplied by a monop-
oly, goods are both more expensive and more scarce than they would
be if the same goods were supplied by a competitive firm." 8
An oligopoly will manifest inefficiencies similar to those mani-
fested by a monopoly. However, because an oligopoly has more than
one (but generally no more than a few) participants with excessive
market power, it is distinguishable from a monopoly in several re-
spects. First, quantity of output in an oligopoly is likely to be less
different from competitive levels of output than in a monopoly be-
cause the market power of an oligopolist will be more diluted than
that of a monopolist. Output in an oligopoly can span anywhere from
competitive levels of output to the clearly suboptimal output levels of
a monopoly.1 9 Thus, oligopolistic output can be efficient, but it is
more likely to be inefficient. 20
Both industrial firms and states could manifest the characteristics
of monopoly or oligopoly. As an example of the latter, a few states
(oligopolists) could vie for a single new automobile manufacturing
plant (a monopolist). To the extent that the stringency of environ-
mental standards are part of the "price" paid by a state for newly sit-
ing or relocating industries, one would expect that where industry is
117. VARIAN, supra note 114, at 233 ("A competitive firm is a price-taker, a monopoly
is a price-maker."); id. ("[A] monopolist has market power in the sense that the amount of
output that it is able to sell responds continuously as a function of the price it charges.");
ROSEN, supra note 112, at 51.
118. PiNDYcK & RuBINFE.D, supra note 112, at 417 (unlike the perfectly competitive
firm whose equilibrium price equals marginal cost, in a monopolistically competitive mar-
ket the equilibrium price exceeds marginal cost); id. ("[T]he monopolistically competitive
firm operates with excess capacity; its output is below that which minimizes average cost.").
See also VARIAN, supra note 114, at 235-36 (the monopolist produces where marginal reve-
nue equals marginal cost; because, given certain conditions, the level of output at which
price equals marginal cost is Pareto efficient, "it is clear that a monopoly must produce a
level of output which is less than this Pareto efficient amount").
119. According to the classic Cournot model of oligopolistic behavior, the oligopoly
represents the case in between monopoly and perfect competition. VAMAN, supra note
114, at 290. In the Cournot model, if the portion of the total market output of an individ-
ual firm = 1, the equilibrium output will be the inefficiently low levels of output produced
by a monopoly. As this portion approaches zero, such that each firm's share of the mar-
ket's total output becomes negligible, the Cournot equilibrium approaches the competitive
equilibrium. Id.
120. Id. at 291 (reiterating the in-between status of oligopolistic markets but making
the general statement that an oligopolistic industry will produce an "inefficiently low level
of output").
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monopolistic or oligopolistic, states will have weaker environmental
standards and industrial firms will be under-supplied. 121
The consequences of states being monopolistic or oligopolistic
are somewhat different. Assuming, for example, that states are oligo-
polistic and firms are perfectly competitive, states will have excessive
market power vis-h-vis industries. Assuming most states want high
environmental quality, if it could be assumed that the market included
a great many industry participants (or at least enough to preclude in-
dustry from being monopolists or oligopolists), this excessive market
power on behalf of states might result in the state establishing inef-
ficiently stringent environmental standards (as opposed to inefficiently
lax standards).
(3) Conclusion
When competitive conditions are ideal, i.e., all market partici-
pants are "small," market interactions (and interstate competition in
environmental standard-setting) will lead to outcomes that are both
efficient and (theoretically) predictable. When one or the other side
of the market consists of essentially a single actor holding monopoly
power, market interactions, and hence competition, lead to outcomes
that are suboptimal though still (theoretically) predictable. When
either side of the market (or both) consists of actors that have dispro-
portionate market power, it can generally be presumed that a subop-
timal outcome favoring the stronger side will result; the precise
allocation, however, is generally much more difficult to predict.
Game theory was invented precisely to determine the resulting alloca-
tions that will occur in this more complex but less predictable
situation.122
In a game in the context of disproportionate market power, the
inefficiencies are manifested in payoffs that yield suboptimal results
121. For example, in contrast to a competitive firm, whose sales drop to zero if it
charges above the market price, the monopolist can sell his output at any price (though the
total quantity that he can sell will be limited by the price at which it chooses to sell).
VARAN, supra note 114, at 233. Normally, a monopolist maximizes his profits when he
sells the output quantity at which his marginal revenue equals his marginal costs. If a
monopolist, such as an industrial firm siting a new plant, only has one unit to sell, he will
sell at a price where marginal revenue far exceeds marginal cost. PnDYCK & RUBNFELD,
supra note 112, at 322-23.
122. PnmnycK & RUBINFELD, supra note 112, at 420-21 ("In [perfectly competitive and
monopolistic] markets, each firm could take price or market demand as given, and didn't
have to worry much about its competitors. In an oligopolistic market, however, a firm sets
price or output based partly on strategic considerations regarding the behavior of its
competitors.").
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for society overall but individual payoffs that reflect the benefits that
can accrue to individual players who can capture market power. The
Prisoner's Dilemma is just one (very simple) example of the type of
game that might result, but given the complexities of the real world,
many other, more complex games are imaginable. The point is that
whatever the form of the particular game, to the extent that it arises
from the concentration of market power, it is likely to lead to subop-
timal outcomes-and what might more informally be referred to as a
"race-to-the-bottom."
Game theory will govern the results of interstate interactions for
industry where the number of state participants is small. Game theory
will also govern the results of the market as a whole where the
number of industry and state participants are both small. Note that
game theory per se does not necessarily always result in outcomes that
are socially suboptimal. Game theory is simply a framework for ana-
lyzing how strategic interactions within the interstate market for in-
dustrial firms will be played out. However, the existence of strategic
interactions in an otherwise competitive market is itself an indication
of disproportionate market power and, hence, suboptimal outcomes
and inefficient environmental standards.
I. The Empirical Evidence
In order to determine whether the revisionists' neoclassical eco-
nomic model or the traditional game-theoretic approach best captures
the essential dynamics of interstate competition in real life, it is neces-
sary to test the assumptions of each model against data gleaned from
the real world. This is not to say that a model must perfectly reflect
the real world to have any validity; no model does or can, and yet
models can still prove highly useful. The real test of a model's validity
is its predictive ability.123 The relevant empirical questions are many:
Does industry hold disproportionate market power vis-A.-vis states?
Do states engage in strategic interactions in a bid for new industries?
Is there evidence that states do, in fact, compete against each other in
environmental standard-setting, and is there evidence that firms re-
spond positively to this competition in terms of plant location
decisions?
123. See DANIEL A. FARBER & P-mIp P. FRIcKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOiCE 27-28
(1991) (stating that, while models often make simplifying assumptions that are at best ap-
proximations, "[tlhe ultimate test of an economic model is its predictive ability").
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The following sections describe and discuss the empirical evi-
dence available that corresponds to this list. The evidence includes an
existing body of literature that uses statistical analysis to determine
the importance of differences in environmental standards in firm loca-
tion decisions, the author's own recent survey of state environmental
regulators and other persons influential in the setting of state environ-
mental standards, data on state bidding wars to attract new industry,
financial inducements as incentives to attract industry, and data re-
garding the number of state and industry participants in the market
for industrial sources.
Together, these sources of empirical data provide a basis upon
which to test the accuracy of the neoclassical account of interstate
competition and to test the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis more gen-
erally. Although the results of this theoretically informed appeal to
evidence and empirical arguments are not definitive, I argue that the
preponderance of the evidence points to the existence of significant
economic inefficiencies, including a race-to-the-bottom. Not only do
the data point to several failures in the market for new industrial
plants, but they demonstrate that while differences in environmental
standards are a statistically insignificant predictor of firm location, a
substantial portion of states will nonetheless apparently relax their en-
vironmental standards out of concern over industry relocation and sit-
ing. Either phenomenon (market failures or standard relaxation to no
effect) supports the conclusion that interstate competition is imper-
fect, and therefore environmental standards will be more lax and total
social welfare will be less than would be the case were states to regu-
late as island jurisdictions.
A. Characteristics of the Interstate Market for Industrial Firms
(1) Competition Among Firms
While competition between states for industry is extremely in-
tense, competition between firms for sites for new industrial plants is
extremely limited, if it exists at all. Statistics show that the number of
new plants siting at a given time in a given state are very few. 2 4 For
example, during a five-year period-between 1987 and 1992-just
12,976 new plants located in the entire United States, an average of 52
plants per state per year. Some regions, such as the northeast and the
124. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES 756-
57 (1995). To derive the net change in manufacturing firms, the total number of manufac-
turing establishments in each state and region in 1987 were subtracted from the total
number of manufacturing establishments in each state and region in 1992.
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middle Atlantic states, actually recorded a loss of over a thousand
plants each, demonstrating that more plants shut down during those
five years than opened their doors.125 Statistics on new plant openings
in the United States overall and by region between 1982 and 1987 are
about the same.126 Interviews with state economic development
agency officials suggest that the demand for new industries is so great
and the number of available sites so numerous that it would be highly
unusual to have more than one industrial entity competing for the
same site.127 This would seem to indicate that companies seeking sites
for newly opening or relocating plants have little or no competition
from other industries. Certainly this appears to be true with respect to
new automobile manufacturers,'2 s but appears to be true as well for
many other industries, otherwise incentive packages that states offer
to even small firms would be unnecessary.
A second characteristic worth mentioning is that demand for new
or relocating plants is extremely high relative to supply. For instance,
manufacturing employment in the United States between 1987 and
1992 dropped by 697,000 jobs. 29 This constituted an average drop of
13,667 manufacturing jobs per state (including the District of Colum-
bia). The region faring the worst was the mid-Atlantic states (New
York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania), losing an average of 144,000
manufacturing jobs per state, while the south central states fared the
best, gaining an average of 23,000 industrial jobs per state. These
125. Id. The six northeastern states (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut) lost a total of 1,426 manufacturing plants between 1987
and 1992. This constitutes an average loss of 238 plants per state over the five-year time
period or a loss of approximately 48 plants per state per year. The middle Atlantic states
(New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) lost a total of 3,894 manufacturing establish-
ments during this same time period. This constitutes a loss, on average, of 1,298 plants per
state within five years, or 260 plants per state per year.
126. Id. at 756.
127. Telephone Interview with Jim Kell, Research Associate, Division of Economic
Development, Columbus, Ohio (Aug. 7, 1996); telephone Interview with Lynn Morford,
Communications Manager, Illinois Department of Commerce (July 24, 1996).
128. New automobile plants appear to have no rivals when siting a new plant. New
automobile plants are so rare and the competition for them so intense that each company
is guaranteed to have the field all to itself. See, e.g., E. S. Browning & Helene Cooper,
Ante Up: States' Bidding War over Mercedes Plant Made for Costly Chase, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 24, 1993, at Al (reporting tri-state competition for Mercedes-Benz AG's first United
States car plant); Richard Brandt, Wherever GM Puts a Saturn, It's Going to Get a Sweet
Dea4 Bus. WK., Apr. 1, 1985, at 36 (discussing multi-state competition for GM's new Sat-
urn plant); Arun P. Elhance & Margaret Chapman, States Should Ally to Lure Business,
Cm. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1990, at C17 (discussing state bidding wars for new car manufacturing
plants).
129. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERcE, supra note 124, at 756-57.
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figures demonstrate that manufacturers were unlikely to experience
much competition from other manufacturers in obtaining sites for the
opening of new plants over a ten-year time period between 1982 and
1992, and that the demand for new plants was particularly intense.130
As a result of this imbalance between demand and supply, industries
are known to place additional demands upon states in order to agree
to site a facility.13 '
Finally, there exists some evidence that could be interpreted to
indicate that the usual number of states competing against each other
for the location of all but the largest plants is small.132 The author's
survey of persons influential in state environmental standard-setting
found that states were most likely to be familiar with the environmen-
tal standards of neighboring states (an approximate average response
of "fairly familiar"), less likely to be familiar with the standards of
states within their geographic region (an average response between
"not too familiar" and "fairly familiar"), and even less likely to know
about the standards of states outside their geographic region (an aver-
age response of "not too familiar"). 33 This could indicate that, to the
extent states compete with other states in setting environmental stan-
130. These data do not show whether manufacturers experienced competition for new
sites from non-manufacturing entities such as real estate developers. However, given the
losses in industrial employment in many regions and only small gains in others, it appears
unlikely that a state would not intervene to prevent the manufacturer from losing a pro-
spective site to another competitor. See infra text accompanying notes 181-221 (describing
arsenal of incentives used by state governments to attract and retain industrial
development).
131. See Thomas J. Murray, Going After Business, Bus. MoNrH, June 1988, at 48 (in-
dustry at the center of a state bidding war threatened to locate in another state unless a
state raised the value of the incentive package they had offered).
132. Evidence that the number of states engaged in competition for a single plant is
small is largely anecdotal, though some of it rests upon industry practice. With the excep-
tion of large automobile manufacturers, which may be attractive to many states, it is rare to
hear of more than two to four states, or, for that matter, states from more than one region,
competing for a single industrial plant. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 131, at 48 (four states
offered bids for a new steel mill); id. at 51 (many battles for new industry are fought among
states in the same region); id. at 49 (Oklahoma beat out other Plains states to obtain new
tissue mill). That the number of states competing for new plants is few is consistent with
the industry practice of keeping the list of sites they are considering secret until they have
narrowed down the list of candidate states to just a few. Corporations do so to keep real
estate prices low. See, e.g., Mark L. Goldstein, Choosing the Right Site, INDusTrY WK.,
Apr. 15, 1985, at 57, col. 3 (manufacturer of electronic components settled on cities in five
states prior to receiving state bids). It is not unusual to hear of many states and states from
more than one region competing for a new automobile manufacturer, however.
133. See infra Table 5, Question 17A-C; Appendix, Table 6, Question 16A-C. The dif-
ferences between these mean responses (i.e., whether respondents were more or less likely
to be familiar with the standards of neighboring states, states within their same geographic
region and states outside their same geographic region) were statistically significant. The
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dards to attract business, they are typically competing against only a
few other states. In sum, industrial firms looking to site new plants
appear to have disproportionate market power (monopolistic or oligo-
polistic), and the small number of actors on both sides of the plant site
market indicates that the interactions in this market are more likely to
resemble a strategic game than a perfectly competitive neoclassical
market.
(2) Interstate "Bidding Wars"
Interstate competition for new industrial plants is so intense that
it has been likened to a second war between the states. 34 To entice
new plants within their borders, or to prevent their existing plants
from leaving, states offer firms lucrative packages consisting of a diz-
zying array of economic incentives.135 While traditional economic in-
centives encompass subsidies, such as property tax abatements, low-
interest loans, tax-exempt bonds to finance expansions and improve-
ments, wage subsidies, special tax status, and grants of land and indus-
trial parks, more recently, states are turning toward providing
industries with customized services designed to help them improve
average responses of state environmental agency officials were similar to the average re-
sponses of all respondents combined. See infra Appendix, Table 7, Question 17A-C.
134. See ag., Allen R. Myerson, 0 Governor, Won't You Buy Me a Mercedes Plant?,
N.Y. TIms, Sept. 1, 1996, § 3, at 1; Russell L. Hanson, Bidding for Business: A Second
War Between the States?, 7 ECON. DEVEL. Q. 183, 183-84 (1993).
135. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF STATE DEVEL. AGENCIES, DIRECTORY OF INCENTIVES
FOR BusiNEss INvESiENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATE-BY-
STATE GUDE [hereinafter DIRECTORY] (8th ed. 1996); 29TH ANNuAL REPORT: THE 50
LEGISLATIVE CLIMATES, INDus. DEv., Jan-Feb. 1995. See also John C. Gray and Dean A
Spina, State and Local Industrial Location Incentives-A Well-Stocked Candy Store, 5 J.
CORP. L. 517 (1980) (describing the various types of incentives); Joshua P. Rubin, Note,
Take the Money and Stay: Industrial Location Incentives and Relational Contracting, 70
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1277, 1300-05 (1995) (categorizing incentives as either "as-of-right" and
thus available to all industries meeting specified criteria, or discretionary, and thus subject
to bargaining between the state and industry); Mark Taylor, Note, A Proposal to Prohibit
Industrial Relocation Subsidies, 72 TEx. L. REv. 669 (1994) (examining problems created
by industrial relocation subsidies). State incentive programs for industry are now so nu-
merous and diverse that a national organization of state officials publishes an annual direc-
tory that lists each program. The array of incentives offered by sites has led to the creation
of a booming site consulting business where companies can hire a consultant to help them
identify the most lucrative offer. Barbara Harrison, Survey of North American Business
Locations, FIN. TIMES, OCT. 19, 1994, at III.
January 1997]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
productivity and competitiveness. 136 Altogether, incentives given by
localities to business are estimated at $30 billion a year.137
There are several notable aspects of this bidding process. First,
states do not appear to discriminate on the basis of size, but rather
compete to attract even small industries.1 38 Second, the process of
bidding results in the winning state paying more for the newly-siting
or relocating plant than it would pay in the absence of competition. In
other words, competition "bids up" the value of the incentive package
necessary to obtain a plant. 39 Finally, many economists contend that,
in offering huge incentives packages, states often lose more than they
gain in compensating economic benefits. Mirroring this sentiment,
several government officials have likened the interstate bidding war to
136. See, eg., Timothy J. Bartik, Jobs, Productivity, and Local Economic Development
What Implications Does Economic Research Have for the Role of Government?, 47 NAT'L
TAX J. 847, 848-49 (1994) (describing "new wave" services, which include providing com-
panies with advice on technological innovation from university researchers, offering export
assistance, and setting up industrial networks); Hanson, supra note 134, at 183-84 (arguing
that "smokestack chasing" while still present, is being replaced by more systematic efforts
to encourage the growth of indigenous industries).
137. Hanson, supra note 134, at 183. A single state's incentive package for one indus-
try can constitute a tenth of the cost of industry to all states. See Myerson, supra note 134,
§ 3, at 1 (describing tax breaks and other subsidies offered by Alabama to win the state
bidding war for a Mercedes plant totaling $300 million, a cost to the state of $200,000 per
job).
138. Although the public is most familiar with the highly-publicized bidding wars for
large automobile manufacturers, the variety of loan and incentive programs available for
even small employers indicates that states are eager to attract smaller facilities as well. See,
e.g., DIRECroRY, supra note 135 (listing numerous incentives offered in each state to new
small businesses); Jeff Sturgeon, Tax Dollars at Work: Incentives to Lure Businesses Come
at a Price, but the Payoff May be in the Jobs They Create, ROANOKE TMMS AND WORLD
NEws, June 30, 1996, at 1 ("Most every company [in the Roanoke, North Carolina, region]
providing at least 25 new jobs gets something from the public trough."); Ron Bartlett, Jobs,
Economy at Heart of Legislative Concerns, TAwA TRm., Mar. 2, 1996, at 1 (citing state
lawmakers considering legislation offering tax refunds of $500 per job to any business that
creates over 10 jobs and offering all manufacturers tax exemptions for electricity). See also
Telephone Interview with Ken Poole, Director of the National Association of State Eco-
nomic Development Agencies (Aug. 10, 1996) (although receiving less publicity than auto-
mobile or semi-conductor plants, state and metropolitan area competition for small
projects is particularly intense); Interview with Kell, supra note 127 (same).
139. See, e.g., Myerson, supra note 134, § 3, at 10, (stating that North and South Caro-
lina found their bids for a new Mercedes plant matched or bettered by Alabama's); Rich-
ard Brandt, Wherever GM Puts a Saturn, It's Going to Get a Sweet Dea Bus. WEEK, Apr.
1, 1985, at 36 (detailing how states augmented their incentive packages to obtain a coveted
automobile-manufacturing plant as interstate competition intensified); Thomas M. Rohan,
Site Finders Dig Deeper; Great Golf Courses Don't Count Anymore, 226 INDus. WK., Aug.
19, 1985, at 20 (describing how South Carolina officials convinced a relocating lock-making




interstate "cannibalism" 140 or a "zero-sum game,"' 41 and offered pro-
posals for federal legislation that would eliminate competition
through incentives by taxing subsidies as income.142
B. Industry Location Studies
The prevailing impression is that the stringency of environmental
standards is an important determinant of firm location. Indeed, com-
mon sense would suggest that when choosing a location, a profit-maxi-
mizing producer would take the cost of compliance with local
environmental regulations into account together with other local cost
factors. This common sense conclusion is reinforced by popular news-
paper accounts and the rhetoric of disappointed political officials and
business representatives who frequently cite environmental laws as
the cause for a decision to open a plant in another location.143
This common sense notion is largely at odds, however, with the
empirical literature. Economists and political scientists who have con-
ducted systematic studies of the impacts of state environmental regu-
lation upon plant location decisions have nearly always concluded
that, contrary to prevailing belief, the stringency of environmental
standards is only a minor determinant of firm location. 144 This ap-
140. Taking Stock of Environmental Problems: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. On
Environment and Public Works, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1993) (testimony of Thomas C.
Jorling, Commissioner, New York Department of Environmental Conservation) (attribut-
ing reference to "cannibalism" to Governor Cuomo).
141. Myerson, supra note 134, § 3, at 1 (quoting Robert B. Reich, United States Secre-
tary of Labor, who went on to comment that, in the bidding war, "[r]esources are moved
around; Peter is robbed to pay Paul").
142. Id. (proposing that the federal government tax as income up to 100 percent of
"any incentives or subsidies that a company receives to relocate").
143. See, e.g., Timothy J. McNulty, Republican Governors Resist Great Lakes Pollution
Plan, Cm. TmB., Apr. 24, 1995, § 1, at 3 (reporting that resistance of Republican governors
to the adoption of stricter pollution standards for discharges into the Great Lakes is based
upon conviction that tougher pollution standards will cause industry to relocate else-
where); William Trombley, Bill to Ease Refinery Curbs Hit, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1992, at
A3, (reporting that several major oil companies are claiming they cannot follow through
with $5-9 billion investment in new and expanded facilities if they must comply with Cali-
fornia's strict environmental impact study procedures). See generally Adam B. Jaffe et al.,
Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the
Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. Lrr. 132, 148 (1995) ("There appears to be widespread
belief that environmental regulations have a significant effect on the siting of new plants in
the United States.").
144. Scholars have conducted numerous studies of the impacts of environmental regu-
lations upon firm location. See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL, MANUFACrURING ON THE
MoVE 55-58 (1993); ROGER W. SCHnIMENNER, MAICING BusrNEss LOCATION DECISIONS 39-
41 (1982); STATE TAXATION POLICY 222 (Michael Barker ed., 1983); WILLIAM R. LOwRY,
THE DIMENSIONS OF FEDERALISM: STATE GOVERNIMENTS AND POLLUTION CONTROL POL-
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pears to be true without much regard for the industry studied.
Rather, the most important indicators of firm location are the percent-
age of unionized workers, proximity to markets and raw materials,
access to transportation networks, quality of schools, and the costs of
housing and energy.145 Studies examining the impact of environmen-
tal regulations upon firm location employ three different methods: (1)
icIEs 12-15 (1992); Timothy J. Bartik, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Business
Location in the United States, 22 GROWTH AND CHANGE 22 (1988); Timothy J. Bartik,
Small Business Start-Ups in the United States: Estimates of the Effects of Characteristics of
States, 55 S. ECON. J. 1004, 1011 (1989); CHRISTOPHER J. DuERXSON, ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL PLANT SITING: How To MAKE IT WORK BETrTER (Conser-
vation Foundation 1984); Virginia D. McConnell & Robert M. Schwab, The Impact of En-
vironmental Regulation on Industry Location Decisions: The Motor Vehicle Industry, 66
LAND ECONOMICS 67 (1990); Joseph Friedman et al., What Attracts Foreign Multinational
Corporations? Evidence from Branch Plant Location in the United States, 32 J. REGION
Sc. 403, 410-14 (1992) (impact of state environmental policies upon the location of foreign
multinationals); STEPHEN M. MEYER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ECONOMIC PROSPERrrY:
TESTING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT HYPOTHESIS (Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, Project on Environmental Politics and Policy 1992); STEPHEN M. MEYER, ENVIRON-
MENTALISM AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY: AN UPDATE (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Project on Environmental Politics and Policy 1993); Paul H. Templet & Ste-
phen Farber, The Complementarity Between Environmental and Economic Risk: An Em-
pirical Analysis, 9 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 153 (1994); Arik Levinson, Studies in the
Economics of Local Environmental Regulation 41-96 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Columbia University); Michael Epping, Tradition in Transition: The Emergence of
New Categories in Plant Location, 19 ARK. Bus. & ECON. REv. 16 (1986); Jack Lyne, Ser-
vice Taxes, International Site Selection and the "Green" Movement Dominate Executives'
Political Focus, Srr SELECTION, Oct. 1990, at 1134; Howard A. Stafford, Environmental
Protection and Industrial Location, 75 ANN. ASS'N. AMER. GEOGRAPHERS 227 (1985); Bob
Hall, Gold and Green, S. ExPosuRE, Fall 1994, at 4. For an informative overview of sev-
eral of the most important of these studies, see Jaffe et al., supra note 143, at 148-50. Many
studies have been done on the effect of domestic environmental regulations upon indus-
try's choice to locate or relocate a plant in a foreign country. Like the results of the do-
mestic location studies discussed in this article (which examine whether differences in state
environmental regulations affect firm location) studies of the effects of domestic environ-
mental regulation upon the international location of industrial firms generally conclude
that, while pollution-intensive industries have migrated abroad, it is not clear that they
have done so because of increasingly strict environmental regulations. These studies are
summarized in Jaffe et al., supra note 143, at 142-48, and Stewart, supra note 3, at 2065-66.
145. See, e.g., John P. Blair & Roger Premus, Major Factors in Industrial Location: A
Review, 1 ECON. DEv. Q. 72 (1987) (reviewing determinants of firm location); ROGER J.
VAUGHAN, STATE TAXATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19-30 (1979); Timothy J.
Bartik, Business Location Decisions in the United States: Estimates of the Effects of Unioni-
zation, Taxes, and Other Characteristics of States, 3 J. Bus. & ECON. STAT. 14, 19 (1985)
(showing that differences in unionization across states have a large and statistically signifi-
cant effect upon industrial location in the United States); Friedman et al., supra note 144,
at 414-15 ("[Flour factors [are] important in determining the location choice of [foreign
multinational plants] in the United States ... market size, manufacturing wage rate, trans-
portation infrastructure, and state promotional activities designed to attract foreign
investment.").
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surveys of industry executives who were personally involved in choos-
ing a plant location; (2) "aggregate studies," or studies comparing,
within localities, aggregate measures of economic activity (e.g., growth
rate of employment) with aggregate measures of environmental regu-
latory stringency (e.g., the state's spending on environmental program
administration, the number of environmental laws adopted); and (3)
"establishment-level studies," or studies correlating the sites chosen
for new plants (or overall number of industrial plants) with various
measures of both environmental stringency and economic indicators.
(1) Surveys of Manufacturing Plant Executives
The results of surveys of executives who participated in plant lo-
cation decisions can be found in Table 1.146 Most of these surveys
conclude that environmental regulations play a minor role in plant
location decisions, though in a few, the executives claimed that envi-
ronmental regulations did have some influence upon their location
choice.147 It is difficult to compare surveys reaching opposing conclu-
sions, given that the surveys differ in both scope and methodology.
For example, some asked the respondents to rank a preselected list of
factors for their importance to firm location decisions, while others
asked open-ended questions about the factors that influence plant lo-
cation.14 Of the two conclusions, the nature of the expected bias
would tend to predict that industry executives would state that envi-
ronmental regulation is important to firm location, as such a conclu-
sion would work in industry's favor. Industry officials may say that it
was because of onerous environmental regulations in other locales,
but it is difficult to determine whether this is the real reason or the
reason industry officials would like the public to believe.149 For these
reasons, of the three types of location studies, surveys of executive
officials would seem to be the most susceptible to bias towards the
importance of environmental standards. Even so, the majority of such
146. See Epping, supra note 144, at 23-24; Lyne, supra note 144; Stafford, supra note
144, at 230-37; STATE TAXATION POLICY, supra note 144, at 245-59.
147. Compare STATE TAXATION POLICY, supra note 144, at 222 (finding little evidence
that environmental factors influenced the industry's choice of location) with Lyne, supra
note 144, at 1134-35 (finding environmental regulations did influence industry location
choice).
148. See Levinson, supra note 144, at 43, for a similar critique of the survey-based
studies.
149. This is in contrast to any bias that might exist in the responses given by environ-
mental agency regulators to the author's survey, which would tend to work against re-
vealing the influence of industry relocation upon the relaxation of environmental
standards.
January 1997]
studies find that environmental standards are a minor factor in pro-
portion to other location determinants.
Table 1 Impact of Differences in Environmental Regulations
Upon Plant Location: Surveys of Manufacturing
Plant Executives
STUDY DATA RESULTS
Barker (1983) Survey of executives of corpora- New firms: 11.1% stated that air
tions which made manufacturing quality regulations were a "moder-
investments in NY, MA, MT, KS, ate negative influence" and 73.3%
DE, NM, CO, RI, WV, ME, and stated that they were an "insignifi-
ND in 1979. cant influence" upon location
choice.
Expansions of existing firms: 14.3%
stated that air quality regulations
were a "moderate negative influ-
ence" and 71.4% stated they were
an "insignificant influence" upon
location choice.
Epping Survey of executives of manufac- "Favorable pollution laws" were
(1986) turers that located facilities during ranked between 43rd and 47th out
1957-77. of a total of 84 location factors.
Fortune Mag- 1981 survey of executives at 500 of When scale score answers were
azine Market the 1,000 largest U.S. industrial weighted and compared, executives
Research corporations who reported locating as a whole ranked "state and/or
(1981) a new facility during the past 10 local posture on environmental
years or planned to do so in the controls" 10th out of 26 given
next 10 years. factors.
Site Selection 1990 Site Selection magazine sur- 42% of executives listed "state
Magazine vey of corporate real estate execu- clean air legislation" among the
(1990) tives. three factors affecting location
choice. Executives were asked to
pick three factors out of a list of
12.
Schmenner New Fortune 500 plants built Environmental regulations were
(1982) between 1972-78. not listed among the top 6 location
factors mentioned.
Stafford Oral and written survey of largest Environmental regulations were
(1985) U.S. corporations, each of which ranked 5th out of 10 factors in
recently sited a new manufacturing national-scale location searches, 9th
branch plant (total of 162 plant out of 10 factors in regional scale
siting decisions). searches, and 6th out of 10 in local
scale searches.
(2) Aggregate Studies
Researchers have also attempted to determine the relative im-
portance of environmental regulatory stringency upon firm location
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through the use of aggregate studies, a summary of which is included
in Table 2.150 By demonstrating that there is no correlation between
stringent state environmental regulation and economic prosperity, ag-
gregate studies generally support the conclusions of the surveys of ex-
ecutive officials-that environmental regulations are not a significant
determinant of firm location. It is important to note that aggregate
studies do not specifically target the effect of environmental regula-
tory stringency upon firm location, however. Instead, these studies
focus on the impact of environmental regulatory stringency upon a
location's overall economic prosperity, of which the number of new
plant or branch plant openings may be one economic indicator among
several.
150. Duerkson, supra note 144 at 62-71,218-229; Meyer, supra note 144 at 8-41; Tem-
plet & Farber, supra note 144 at 154-60; Hall, supra note 144.
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Table 2: Impact of Differences in Environmental Regulations
Upon Plant Location Decisions: Studies Using
Aggregate Data
STUDY DATA RESULTS
Duerkson Compared the stringency of state No statistically significant differ-
(1984) environmental programs to ence in competitive shift among
increases in state industrial employ- states with high and low environ-
ment between 1970-76 and 1976-80. mental index scores between 1970-
76. States experiencing gains in
industrial employment between
1976-80 had higher (more strin-
gent) environmental index scores.
Meyer (1992) Correlated all 50 states' perform- Strong environmental programs are
ance between 1982-89 according to positively correlated with gross
5 economic indicators: gross state state product, total (non-farm)
product growth, non-farm employ- employment growth, and overall
ment growth, construction employ- labor productivity. "There is no
ment growth, manufacturing labor difference between strong and
productivity, and overall labor pro- weak environmental regimes in
ductivity, with the state's ranking terms of manufacturing labor pro-
according to Duerkson's 23 envi- ductivity.
ronmental factors.
Meyer (1993) Updated 1992 study and incorpo- Positive correlation between state
(Update of rated the more recent indicator of economic indicators and strong
1992 Study) state environmental performance environmental programs observed
from a 1991 study. in 1992 study was not changed.
Crandall Compares cost of environmental Compliance costs did not have a
(1993) compliance for manufacturing firms measurable effect upon the
during 1977-91 by state to levels of regional distribution of manufactur-
manufacturing employment. ing employment. New plant star-
tups and plant closures are not
affected by control costs, though
both expansions and contractions
are affected.
Hall (1994) Ranks all 50 states according to Nine states ranked among the top
250 environmental indicators and twelve states both in terms of
compares each state's environmen- environmental stringency and eco-
tal ranking with a list of economic nomic strength and, conversely,
indicators, twelve other states ranked as the
nation's lowest in terms of environ-
mental stringency and economic
strength.
Templet & Constructed an "E/J" ratio (emis- Economic and environmental risks
Farber (1994) sions to jobs) for all 50 states using are complementary. Higher state
statewide emissions data from the E/J ratios are positively associated
U.S. EPA Toxic Release Inventory with less stringent state environ-
database and U.S. Census data on mental programs and vice-versa.
employment, income and energy
use, and compared each state's E/J
ratio to the stringency of its envi-
ronmental programs.
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For example, an early aggregate study conducted for the Conser-
vation Foundation by Christopher Duerkson correlated data on
changes in state industrial employment during the 1970s with data on
the strength of each state's environmental programs and concluded
that environmental stringency had a negligible influence upon indus-
try employment levels.151 One problem with aggregate measurement,
illustrated by the Duerkson study, is that such studies do not distin-
guish between employment shifts attributable to industrial growth
versus nonindustrial growth, or between different changes within in-
dustrial growth, such as plant start-ups, shutdowns, and plant expan-
sions and contractions. That environmental regulations have little
impact upon levels of industrial employment does not necessarily
mean that they are insignificant in determining the location of new
industrial firms, however. Changes in net industrial employment
levels reflect employment changes resulting from closures of old
plants, contractions and expansions of existing plants, and the births
of new plants, rather than just those changes in employment resulting
from the opening of new plants. 152 Consequently, two states could
have the same levels of industrial employment, and yet have very dif-
ferent success rates in attracting new industrial firms. A state that
attracted no new firms and yet also did not lose any would have the
151. Duerkson, supra note 144, at 63-68. Duerkson's study tested whether there was a
"competitive shift" in employment toward states with relatively lax environmental stan-
dards between the years 1970 and 1976 and between 1976 and 1980. A competitive shift
was defined as the difference between the actual change in employment in a state and the
change that would have occurred had industry grown or declined at the national average
rate. The stringency of state environmental programs was rated by attributing to each state
a number based upon a weighted sum of measures such as per capita level of spending on
environmental program administration, the comprehensiveness of the state's environmen-
tal impact regulations, the extent of state regulations protecting critical wildlife habitat,
and the environmental voting record of the state's congressional delegation. Id at 78 n.55.
Considering manufacturing as a whole, the study determined that states having a positive
competitive shift between 1970 and 1976 had an environmental index value that was
slightly lower (meaning their laws were less stringent) than those experiencing a loss in
employment, but that the difference was not statistically significant. Interestingly, for pol-
lution-intensive industries as a whole, the difference was even slighter. The environmental
index was updated in 1983 to include 23 factors and has been widely used since then to
rank state environmental programs. However, the difference with respect to primary met-
als industry was statistically significant. Id. at 63. Between 1976 and 1980, the direction of
the competitive shift for states overall was the reverse: States experiencing gains in indus-
trial employment had higher environmental index scores than states suffering losses in em-
ployment. The differences between gainer and loser states in pollution-intensive industries
remained the same, however. Overall, this statistical evidence seems to indicate that while
weak environmental programs alone are insufficient to attract industries to states, environ-
mental stringency, alone, is insufficient to deter industries from states. See id. at 68.
152. See Levinson, supra note 144, at 45.
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same level of industrial employment as a state that attracted several
new firms but lost as many jobs as it gained through the closure of one
large industrial employer.
The design of two more recent aggregate studies, one conducted
by Dr. Stephen Meyer and the other by Robert Crandall,153 address
this weakness in the Conservation Foundation study.154 Meyer uses
the Foundation's data on the stringency of state environmental pro-
153. See MEYER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACr HYPOTHESIs, supra note 144, at 8-22.
154. Although other aggregate studies correlate more recent state economic and envi-
ronmental data by state, they contribute little to an understanding of whether relaxed envi-
ronmental policies attract industrial facilities because they fail to control for preexisting
economic conditions and thus cannot tell us whether it is the preexisting economic condi-
tions or the state's environmental policies that account for the observed differences in state
economic prosperity. See Hall, supra note 144; Templet & Farber, supra note 144. For
instance, in the Hall study, all 50 states are ranked according to 250 environmental indica-
tors, including such indicators as the number of high-risk, potentially cancer-causing facili-
ties, population in non-attainment areas, number of non-compliant public sewage-
treatment systems, total radioactive waste, gasoline use per capita, Toxic Release Inventory
releases, number of Superfund sites, cancer death rates, and pesticide use per capita. Hall
compared the ranking of each state on two lists, the first consisting of 20 environmental
indicators (e.g., toxic emissions, pesticide use, energy consumption, and spending for natu-
ral resource protection), and the second consisting of economic indicators (e.g., annual
pay, job opportunities, business start-ups, and workplace injury rates). Although finding
that 9 states ranked among the top 12 states on both the economic and environmental
scales (Hawaii, Vermont, New Hampshire, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Colorado, Oregon, Mas-
sachusetts, and Maryland) and, conversely, that 12 other states were among the worst 14
states on both lists (Louisiana, West Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Tennessee,
South Carolina, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Indiana, Arkansas, and Ohio), Hall does not indi-
cate whether the poor environmental conditions are responsible for the poor economic
conditions or whether conditions would in fact be worse if the states had adopted more
environmentally protective environmental policies. This is also true of Templet & Farber's
study which demonstrated the complementarity between economic and environmental
risks. See Templet & Farber, supra note 144. Templet & Farber found that a state's rela-
tive environmental risk, measured by the state's ratio of total polluting emissions to jobs in
the manufacturing sector, was positively correlated with rates of unemployment, poor envi-
ronmental quality, and weak environmental regulatory policies. Id at 155-160. Although
the Templet & Farber study observed a correlation between poor economic and environ-
mental conditions, the study was not designed to determine either the direction of the
causation nor whether a state is better or worse off as a result of high levels of environmen-
tal risks. Id. at 160-61 ("What we observe is, in fact, poorer welfare conditions where
environmentally risky activities are more intense. However, the direction of causation can-
not be determined from the data presented in this study. It is a legitimate question
whether poor welfare conditions create an atmosphere of tolerance toward risky activity,
either in policies toward the types of industries encouraged or in policies of environmental
regulation; or whether risky activities can further deteriorate welfare conditions by eroding
tax bases, restricting the development of a skilled and educated work force, negatively
influencing government, or externalizing costs. Probably, the relation goes both ways in
the form of a vicious cycle .... Whether a state is better off with a particular risky activity
than without it is also a legitimate question. This study does not tell us how much better or
worse a particular state would be with and without a particular activity.").
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grams but examines several different economic indicators (as opposed
to examining only net changes in industrial employment levels)155 to
conclude, like Duerkson, that variations in environmental regulatory
stringency has little bearing upon state economic prosperity. One eco-
nomic parameter used by Meyer does have a direct bearing upon in-
dustrial migration: construction employment growth. Construction
employment growth should be a good indicator of the attractiveness
of a state to new plants because it reflects future business plans. As
Meyer explains, "industries planning to migrate three or five years in
the future need facilities to move to."'1 56 Consequently, if it is true
that industry will flee toward states with less stringent environmental
standards, Meyer should have observed a slowdown in construction
employment as environmental regulations increase or tighten and an
increase in such employment as environmental regulations are re-
laxed. In fact, Meyer's data show just the opposite. Meyer found that
there was a strong positive correlation between construction employ-
155. Data for the economic indicators were collected for the 50 states during the period
1982-89, a time period representing a time of the greatest divergences in environmental
policies and a period of substantial national economic growth. MEYER, ENVIRONMENTAL
ImAcr HyPoTHEsis, supra note 144, at 9. Because Meyer used Duerkson's environmental
data, however, his data for his environmental indicators came from the late 1970s and early
1980s. Here Meyer's preferences for a data set and the data set he used are at odds. Ac-
cording to Meyer, the period from 1982-89 represents the height of the new federalism,
during which the Reagan Administration cut federal funding to the states, reduced federal
enforcement efforts, and generally encouraged states to act in areas such as the environ-
ment in which the federal government had previously been supreme. Meyer states that
this period is thus an optimal time period to study the environmental indicators because it
would be the time of the greatest divergences in state environmental policies, with some
states choosing to take up the environmental mantle thrown down by the federal govern-
ment and others choosing to let environmental regulation suffer by failing to make up for
the losses in federal involvement. Nevertheless, Meyer ends up using a data set reflecting
the environmental policies of the 1970s and early 1980s, the era preceding that of Reagan's
new federalism. Meyer justifies the discrepancy between the time periods used for the
environmental versus the economic indicators as having the advantage of exhibiting the
"enduring medium term" (as opposed to "one-shot") effects of environmental policies
upon state economies. Id. at 10. There is obvious merit to having a lag between the time
period for viewing the environmental and economic indicators. A lag time helps assure
that the economic indicators take into consideration the enduring effects of an earlier era's
environmental policies. Nevertheless, incorporating a lag time into a comparison using
1980s economic data meant that Meyer was not able to use data from the 1980s as well, the
time period Meyer convincingly argues is the best time to view the economic effects of
environmental policies given the divergences between state environmental policies borne
out of Reagan's new federalism. It is more likely that the discrepancies between the time
periods of Meyer's economic and environmental data sets are attributable more to the lack
of availability of an environmental-indicator data set during the 1980s than to the advan-
tages of a lag-time-period indicator data set.
156. Id. at 4.
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ment and strength of environmental programs. Average construction
employment growth among environmentally strong states was about
53% for the period 1982-89, while the environmentally weak states
showed an average decline of approximately 1.4%. 157
The lack of a negative impact of environmental regulations upon
construction employment turns out to be Meyer's strongest evidence
for his conclusion that the "environmental impact hypothesis" (the
thesis that all else being equal, states with weak environmental poli-
cies should exhibit greater economic vitality than states with strong
environmental policies") 158 is false. Meyer's study actually finds that
strong environmental programs are positively correlated with gross
state product, total (non-farm) employment growth, and overall labor
productivity, and that there is no difference between strong and weak
environmental regimes in terms of manufacturing labor productiv-
ity.159 The strength of Meyer's study is the care with which he refutes
possible alternative explanations for his results. For example, Meyer
refutes two compelling alternative explanations for the apparent posi-
tive correlation between environmentalism and economic growth: (1)
the possible overshadowing effect of the big state economies of Cali-
fornia, New York, and Texas, and (2) greater per capita wealth of the
157. One problem with Meyer's data, however, is that it is not clear whether the in-
creases in construction employment he notes in states with strong environmental programs
reflects an increase in the employment of construction workers by polluting industries or
only an increase in overall construction employment, including construction of houses,
roads, and polluting and nonpolluting industries. Meyer states only that his construction
employment data "were obtained from the U.S. Labor Department's Employment and
Earnings publication." Id. at 9. Thus, Meyer's data might merely reflect a residential
building boom in states with stringent environmental standards and a drop in residential
building in states with lax environmental standards. Even residential construction employ-
ment should, however, reflect increases in the location of firms because they would reflect
the rising number of workers. Even increases in residentially related construction employ-
ment should reflect an increase in industry because it likely includes the housing demand
of new industrial workers. (It is possible, though unlikely, that the increases in residential
housing demand would be attributable to the demand for vacation homes or the homes of
workers in nonpolluting industries only.)
158. Id. at 8. Meyer does this by constructing a growth difference index for each state
that calculated the difference in growth rate for each of the study's five economic indica-
tors between the periods of 1973-80 and 1982-89. Meyer found that, whereas the economic
performance of environmentally strong states improved during the 1980s vis-A-vis their
performance during the 1970s, the economic performance of environmentally weak states
declined. Id. at 25, Tables III & IV.
159. Id. at 19. Meyer found the following correlations between environmental rank
and economic indicators: growth in gross state product +0.35; growth in non-farm employ-
ment +0.23; growth in construction employment +0.54; growth in manufacturing labor pro-
ductivity +0.007; growth in overall labor productivity +0.33. Id, at 12, Table II.
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residents of strong environment states.160 However, Meyer achieved
substantially similar results even after he controlled for large state
economies and for wealthy residents. 161 While Meyer himself is not
entirely convinced of the accuracy of the positive correlation he ob-
serves between strong environmental programs and economic pros-
perity, 62 by failing to find any negative association between the two,
his results appear to strongly refute the argument that weak environ-
mental policies are advantageous to the overall economy.
Crandall used census data on manufacturers' environmental com-
pliance costs to determine the approximate effect of environmental
policy upon levels of manufacturing employment by geographical lo-
cation and between plant start-ups, expansions, contractions, and clo-
sures.163 Surprisingly, Crandall found that compliance costs for
manufacturers between 1977-91 did not have a measurable effect
upon the regional distribution of manufacturing employment. Ac-
cording to Crandall, the high compliance costs for industries in the
dirtier and older northeastern states is compensated by the more strin-
gent standards generally applicable to new industries in the cleaner
160. Similarly, one might predict, consistent with the "income effect," that wealthy
states will spend more on the environment than poor states, and thus the greater economic
prosperity Meyer observes in some states is really attributable to wealth rather than better
environmental policies.
161. Meyer dispels the possibility that the association he finds between environmental-
ism and economic growth is attributable to the strong economies of the states with strong
environmental programs by demonstrating that he would still find a positive correlation
between strong environmental policies and total employment and construction employ-
ment (but not with overall economic growth) even if he limited the data set to the twenty-
five states with gross state products under $40 billion. MEYER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
HYPOTmSIS, supra note 144, at 38. However, when Meyer restricted the data set to the 41
states with gross state products under $80 billion (as opposed to the twenty-five states with
gross state products under $40 billion), environmentalism was positively associated with all
five of the study's economic indicators. Id In an update to his 1992 study, Meyer demon-
strated that when he controlled for wealth, the positive association between environmental
rank and economic indicators remained. MEYER, ENVIRONMENTALiSM AND ECONOMIC
PROSPERITY: AN UPDATE, supra note 144, at 6.
162. The positive correlation between environmentalism and economic prosperity may
be attributable to a third factor that is associated with both environmentalism and eco-
nomic growth, such as a tendency by the state to invest in education, health, transportation,
communications, or other factors that stimulate economic growth. MEYER, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACr HYPOTHESIS, supra note 144, at 42. On the other hand, there are perfectly
plausible explanations for the positive association. For example, highly skilled and well-
educated workers may be attracted to regions that offer a better quality of life. This would
mean that new industries and high-technology firms might well migrate to environmentally
strong states. Id.
163. CRANDALL, supra note 144, at 56-58.
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and less heavily industrialized states of the South and West.164 More
interestingly, Crandall found that environmental compliance costs
slow both plant expansions and plant closures. While environmental
compliance costs slow plant expansion, the proportionately higher
cost of environmental controls for new plants will tend to prevent
companies from closing, it being preferable to continue the operation
of an old plant than to shut it down and build a new plant.165
(3) Studies Using Establishment-Level Microeconomic Data
The most sophisticated studies of the effects of environmental
regulation on business location in the United States, the results of
which are found in Table 3, use establishment-level microeconomic
data, or specific data on the firm location. 166 In contrast to studies
relying on aggregate data, studies using microdata usually distinguish
between different types of business location decisions, such as the
opening of new plants, the opening of branch plants, the closing of
plants, or the expansion or contraction of existing plants. These stud-
ies thus give a more accurate picture of the impact of environmental
regulation on specific forms of industrial location decisions. The focus
of such studies is the conditional probability, given that a plant will be
opened, that a corporation will choose a particular site for its location.
This conditional probability is modeled in each of the microeconomic
data studies using a conditional logic model.167 The basic idea of such
164. Id. at 56-57. New plants are subject to more stringent requirements under each of
the major federal pollution statutes. The rationale frequently given for this different treat-
ment is that new plants are better able to absorb the costs because it is less expensive to
build controls into design of a plant as opposed to retrofitting an old plant with pollution-
control equipment. However, environmental grandfather provisions also protect an ex-
isting industry from competition from a new industry. See Heidi G. Robertson, If Your
Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can You: Environmental "Grandfather Clauses" and Their
Role in Environmental Inequity, 45 CAmH. U. L. R. 131, 168-69 (1995).
165. Indeed, fear that this is the case is responsible for much criticism about the
tougher standards for new plants and remains one of the strongest arguments for the
EPA's bubble policy. Keeping older plants on line will tend to keep pollution levels higher
since older plants will tend to be larger polluters than newer plants using more modem
equipment.
166. See Bartik, Small Business Start-ups, supra note 144; Bartik, The Effects of Envi-
ronmental Regulation, supra note 144; Levinson, supra note 144; McConnell & Schwab,
supra note 144; Friedman, supra note 144.
167. See Bartik, The Effects of Environmental Regulation, supra note 144, at 27. Bar-
tik's 1988 study used variables that would reflect the stringency of environmental regula-
tions according to two different measures. The first resulted in two variables, one for air
and one for water pollution, which was based upon the state's spending upon air and water
pollution control divided by state manufacturing employment. These variables thus re-
flected the probability with which a polluter in the state would face inspections as well as
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a model is to determine which of all the available sites will yield the
maximum profit, and hence will carry the highest probability that it
will be chosen as the actual location of a plant. The significance of
environmental regulations for the probability of a plant siting at a par-
ticular location is determined by comparing the stringency in the envi-
ronmental regulations of the sites chosen with that of the sites not
chosen, after adjusting for the other factors.
the level of the state's public concern for environmental quality. Two other environmental
variables were based upon the costs for particular industries of complying with air and
water pollution regulation in the state, as compared with the national average. Non-envi-
ronmental, location-specific variables included the total land area of the state, the percent
of the labor force that is unionized, the corporate and property tax rates, the number of
existing manufacturing facilities, the wage rate, the educational level of the population,
construction costs, and energy prices. See Bartik, Small Business Start-ups, supra note 144,
at 30.
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Table 3: Impact of Differences in Environmental Regulations
Upon Plant Location Decisions: Studies Using
Microeconomic Establishment-Level Data
STUDY DATA RESULTS
Bartik (1988) Used updated Dunn & Bradstreet Current variations in state environ-
data on the location of new branch mental regulations have no statisti-
plants and a comprehensive group cally significant effect upon
of environmental and other indus- business location.
try-cost variables, varied by specific
state, to determine whether state
environmental regulations were a
significant determinant of the
actual location of new Fortune 500
branch plants during the 1970s.
Bartik (1989) Location of small business start-ups Differences in stringency of envi-
for 19 manufacturing industries was ronmental standards had a very
compared with the strictness of small but statistically significant
state environmental controls, as impact upon small manufacturing
measured by Duerkson's 1983 plant starts-ups.
study.
McConnell & Examined a variety of county char- Regional differences in environ-
Schwab acteristics on the locations of 50 mental regulations had no signifi-
(1990) new branch plants in the motor cant effect upon the choice of
vehicle industry during 1973-82 location of new motor vehicle
using a conditional logic model. branch plants between 1973-82.
Levinson Census of Manufacturers data on No evidence that variations in
(1993) number of new branch plants environmental stringency affects
between 1982-87. plant location choice in general,
although there is some evidence
that variations affect the location
choice of the largest multiplant
companies in pollution-intensive
industries.
Friedman, Compared siting of 884 new for- While negative, the stringency of
Gerlowski, & eign manufacturing branch plants state pollution regulations did not
Silberman between 1977 and 1988 with strin- exert a statistically significant effect(1992) gency of state environmental pro- upon location of new foreign
grams measured by state pollution branch plants between 1977-88.
abatement capital expenditures
divided by state gross product
originating in manufacturing indus-
tries.
The microeconomic studies uniformly find that variations in envi-
ronmental regulations do not affect industry location decisions in any
significant manner. In an early microeconomic study, Virginia Mc-
Connell and Robert Schwab examined the impact of local air pollu-
tion regulations controlling facility emission of volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) upon the locations chosen for opening 50 branch
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automobile plants between 1973 and 1982. McConnell and Schwab
found that whether a particular county was in attainment with the am-
bient ozone standard168 was irrelevant to where the branch plants
were opened.169 There was some evidence, however, that firms were
deterred from opening branch plants at the most polluted cities in the
country, cities where the ambient ozone levels were severely out of
attainment. 70 The significance of the results of the McConnell &
Schwab study are somewhat reduced by the fact that the motor vehi-
cle industry, according to the authors' own admission, has traditionally
kept associated plants in contiguous locations.' 7' Prior studies con-
clude that agglomeration and transport economies were extremely im-
portant to the automobile industry's origins in the Detroit area. One
scholar criticizes McConnell and Schwab's results as being closer to an
anecdote than a general conclusion. 72
A more recent study of much broader scope conducted by
Timothy S. Bartik examined the effects of state environmental regula-
tions upon the location of new manufacturing branch plants owned by
Fortune 500 companies between 1972-78. Bartik examined branch
plants because he was more likely to detect even a small effect of dif-
ferences in state regulation upon branch plant openings than upon
relocations of existing plants. 173 According to Bartik, his results "do
not show any statistically significant effect of current variations in
168. Ozone is one of six air pollutants for which Congress has directed the EPA to
establish national ambient air quality standards (NAAQs). See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409 (1994). Initially, the EPA's ozone NAAQ was .08 ppm, not to be exceeded more
than once per year. In 1979, the EPA raised the standard to .12 ppm. States are in "attain-
ment" when the level of the pollutant is lower than the applicable NAAQ and in "nonat-
tainment" when the levels of the pollutant exceed the NAAQ.
169. McConnell & Schwab, supra note 144, at 79.
170. Id. These cities were out of attainment in both 1977 and 1982. The severity of the
nonattainment problem of these cities is recognized when it is remembered that in 1979,
EPA raised the ozone NAAQ from .08 ppm to .12 ppm. McConnell and Schwab's study
thus concludes that, because of environmental regulations, branch plants of the automobile
industry were deterred from locating in just three U.S. cities, each of which was severely
out of attainment with the ozone NAAQ: Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and Houston. Id. at
79 n.28.
171. Id. at 70 (discussing industry's origins in Detroit).
172. Levinson, supra note 144, at 46 (remarking that McConnell & Schwab's finding
that environmental regulation was a statistically significant factor for only three cities that
were extremely far out of compliance with the Clean Air Act "closer in spirit to an anec-
dote than a general conclusion: a particular industry, with a particular pollution problem,
appears to be deterred from three specific cities").
173. Unlike existing plants, branch plants lack investments that deter mobility. Fur-
thermore, the environmental laws applied to new plants are generally more stringent stan-
dards than those that apply to existing plants. Bartik, The Effects of Environmental
Regulation, supra note 144, at 23.
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state environmental regulations upon business location" at conven-
tional levels of significance. 174 Bartik was able to rule out the exist-
ence of all negative effects upon industry location attributable to
environmental regulatory stringency with the exception of small ef-
fects. By small, Bartik means effects so small that were a state to
tighten its standard for particulate reduction (the most sensitive of the
environmental parameters tested) sufficient to raise its rankings from
the national average to the top one-third in state environmental strin-
gency, it might possibly lose as much as 3.3% of the total number of
new plants that would have located in its state absent such a shift. By
comparison, the same size change in the percentage of a state's labor
force that is unionized, would produce a statistically significant 30-
40% drop in the number of new firm sitings.175 Moreover, Bartik was
unable to detect any effect upon highly polluting industries, though he
performed additional statistical tests designed specifically to capture
such an effect. 1
76
A subsequent study using more recent data largely confirmed
Bartik's results. Using data from the Census of Manufacturers on the
opening of new branch plants between 1982 and 1987177 and the 1991
"Green Index," ranking states for their environmental stringency,178
Arik Levinson found "no evidence that variations in regulatory strin-
gency across states affect plant location choice in general.' 79 Levin-
son did find some evidence that such variations affected the location
decisions of the "largest multiplant companies in pollution-intensive
industries."' 8 0
174. Id. Standard errors on the coefficients for environmental variables were roughly
the same size as the coefficients themselves, indicating no significance at the 99, 95 or even
90 percent confidence intervals. Id. at 32 (Table 1).
175. Id. at 32-33.
176. Id. at 33 (failing to detect a negative effect upon branch company location result-
ing from environmental regulation even after conducting an additional statistical test
weighing the coefficients of highly polluting industries).
177. Prior studies had used data from Dunn & Bradstreet, while Levinson used data
from the Census of Manufacturers. See Levinson, supra note 144, at 48.
178. Bartik's data, as well as the other studies, were based upon data on state environ-
mental regulations during the 1970s. Yet, the 1980s witnessed a tremendous increase in
state involvement in environmental policy-making, as states passed environmental legisla-
tion that would qualify them to run federal environmental programs. This state activity is
likely to have increased the variation in environmental regulations and hence the sensitiv-
ity of business location decisions to state environmental regulations. Id. at 46-47.
179. Id. at 65.
180. Id. Levinson attributes this to two factors: "that multi-plant firms have econo-
mies of scale in location searches" and that branch plants are "geographically footloose" in
that they are less likely to be tied to any specific region than plants opened by single
entrepreneurs. Id at 63.
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In summary, the general consensus conclusion of the large
number of studies on the determinants of firm location is that varia-
tions in the stringency of environmental standards, if it affects firm
location at all, is at most a minor factor. This indicates that to the
extent that state regulators relax environmental standards in order to
encourage the location of new firms or to discourage the relocation of
existing ones, such changes will lead to suboptimally low environmen-
tal standards; social welfare losses attributable to lower standards are
not compensated by economic benefits.
C. Survey of Players in State Environmental Policy-Making on the Role
of Interstate Competition
(1) Survey Design and Purpose
In order to determine, empirically, whether states seek to relax
their environmental standards in order to attract or retain industry,
the author conducted a survey of five separate groups of respondents
who either were responsible for or influential in state environmental
standard-setting: state environmental regulators, state legislators,
state economic development agency officials, state chamber of com-
merce officials, and directors and staff members of state citizen envi-
ronmental organizations. 81 The survey asked each group of
respondents to fill out a questionnaire containing five sets of substan-
tive questions relevant to the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis. 182
181. State environmental regulators actually include three separate subgroups: direc-
tors of state water pollution administrators, state air pollution administrators, and adminis-
trators of state environmental agencies. Table 4 in the Appendix shows the numbers of
individuals from each group surveyed as well each group's response rate.
182. Using the questionnaire for the state environmental regulators as an example, the
following sketches the nature of the different sets of questions. The respondent was asked
in the first set of questions how he or she rated the importance in industry location deci-
sions, of the stringency of environmental standards and other frequently mentioned fac-
tors. The second set of questions asked respondents whether government officials in their
state were concerned about the possibility that industry currently located in the state might
relocate elsewhere or that firms would choose other states in which to site new plants and,
if so, whether this concern had ever played a role in the state's environmental actions,
decisions, or policies. Ten questions within this set asked the respondent whether concern
over industry relocation had ever played a role in the state taking particular actions such as
not adopting, or adopting a less stringent, environmental standard, reducing the steps em-
ployed in the state's typical permit review process, or not enforcing or assessing lighter civil
or criminal penalties in the enforcement of an environmental violation. The third set asked
respondents the degree of their familiarity with other state's environmental standards, the
source of that familiarity, and how likely the respondent was to know whether another
state's standard was more or less stringent than his or her own state's standards. In the
fourth set, respondents were asked questions regarding the relationship of their state's
standards to the standards of other states. For instance, they were asked whether they
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A new study was deemed necessary because of the paucity of re-
search on this topic. While many on both sides of the debate over
whether a race-to-the-bottom exists assume that states relax their
standards in response to interstate competition, systematic searches
through the legal literature failed to uncover a single study whose pur-
pose was to confirm this fact. A survey was chosen as the format for
obtaining evidence relevant to the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis for
several reasons. For example, as just discussed, there exist numerous
studies of the importance of environmental standards to industry loca-
tion, nearly all of which conclude that they are relatively unimportant.
It could be argued from these studies that the race-to-the-bottom does
not exist because if industry is not influenced by environmental stan-
dards, states obviously cannot compete through their use. This argu-
ment assumes, however, that states understand and believe that
environmental standards are not important to firm location. If the
evidence indicates that states do not understand or believe that envi-
ronmental standards are unimportant to firm location and hence con-
tinue to use them to compete for firms, just the opposite could be
argued: that a race-to-the-bottom exists (because more lax environ-
mental quality is not made up for by the economic benefits of new
firMs).183
believed it most important for their state's standards to be more or less stringent than, or
of about the same stringency as, the standards of other states and whether their state had
ever revised their state standards to copy the standards of another state after discovering
that the other state's standards were more or less stringent than their own. In the final
substantive section of the survey, respondents were asked whether their state had recently
enacted any of a list of popular regulatory reform measures and whether concern over
industry relocation and siting, or the adoption of a similar measure by another state, had
played a role in the state's adoption of the measure.
The survey was designed to both determine the actual role of concern over industry
relocation and siting in state environmental agency's actual actions and policies, and to
determine the effect of this concern upon the lobbying of groups influential in state envi-
ronmental agency decisionmaking. Thus, the survey asked state environmental regulators
what their agency did or they themselves believed; state citizen environmental groups, who
were placed in the role of double-checking the responses of the regulators, were asked
what they believed state regulators did and believed; and state legislators, state economic
development agencies, and state chamber of commerce officials were asked what role con-
cern over industry relocation had played, if any, in prompting them to lobby for or against
or to support or oppose certain types of environmental legislation or environmental regula-
tions. To ensure that the respondents held a common body of experience and knowledge,
a final set of questions in the survey asked the respondent questions about the breadth and
nature of his or her own background and experience in state environmental matters.
183. See LowRY, supra note 144, at 13 ("Even if it is true that few industries base
relocation decisions on differentiated policies, that does not mean that states do not com-
pete through such policies.").
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A survey is one way to determine the importance, attributed by
state regulators, of environmental standards upon firm location. If,
despite the conclusions of firm location studies, regulatory officials
nevertheless believe that the stringency of environmental standards is
important to industry, and consequently relax them under a belief that
this is necessary in order to retain or attract industry, a race-to-the-
bottom may exist. Evidence that states relax their standards in re-
sponse to an industry relocation threat, when coupled with data on the
significance of environmental standards to firm location decisions,
provides compelling prima facie evidence of suboptimal outcomes.
Further, a survey can reveal similarities in state interactions with ac-
tors in a game, thus providing evidence of the applicability of game
theory to interstate competition.
The principle liability of survey data is, of course, bias. There are
two types of survey bias: bias in the selection of respondents and bias
in the actual responses of those respondents. 184 Although pains were
taken to exclude bias from the present survey's results, 8 5 biased re-
sponses cannot be ruled out. However, to the extent that bias was
present in the respondents' answers, it is quite plausible that it worked
against the respondents owning up to their state governments relaxing
environmental standards out of concern over industry relocation and
siting. Such revelations might be viewed as "caving in" to industry, an
appearance that environmental regulators would presumably want to
184. Charles H. Backstrom & Gerald Hursh-Cesar, SURVEY RESEARCH 66-76, 122-24
(2d ed. 1981).
185. The survey contained several design features intended to minimize the influence
of bias. First, respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their responses. For in-
stance, respondents were informed that the survey was being concluded as an anonymous
survey. Each questionnaire was affixed with a unique study number that was correlated
with the personal names of the respondents only to determine which questionnaires had
been returned and who needed a reminder letter or phone call. Respondents were assured
that neither the personal names nor the names of individual states would be used to inter-
pret or explain the survey results. Finally, the respondents were assured that, once all
completed questionnaires were received, the list of names to whom the survey was sent
would be destroyed. See Appendix (directions to survey respondents). Second, to avoid
pointing respondents in any particular direction in their responses, respondents were of-
fered alternative explanations for state behavior. For example, as noted above, respon-
dents were asked both if they believed states were engaged in a race-to-the-bottom and if
they believed states were engaged in a race-to-the-top; whether they copied other state's
more stringent standards and whether they copied other state's less stringent standards.
Third, similar sensitive questions were rephrased and repeated in different parts of the
questionnaire so as to provide a basis for double-checking a respondent's earlier response
for bias. (Note, however, that the response rate to some questions was low; for example,
24% of legislators in Table 5, and a low response rate raises questions of validity.)
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avoid. Thus, response bias, if it exists, would tend to result in underre-
porting of standard-relaxation.
Bias in responses among the groups surveyed may be predicted to
be strongest with respect to the political agency appointees, and weak-
est with respect to career officials, and indeed, the survey results could
be interpreted to confirm this (although other explanations could also
explain the occasional observed differences between the responses of
career and political appointees). 8 6 A counter-bias, a tendency to
overemphasize the influence of the industry relocation threat upon
standard-relaxation, may account for the responses of the other
groups besides the environmental regulators. State legislators, for ex-
ample, may have been elected because they promised to be concilia-
tory toward industry. Such bias may also creep into the responses of
the constituency groups surveyed, such as the state chamber of com-
merce officials and citizen environmental organizations, both of whom
might stand to gain from revealing instances in which regulatory offi-
cials have been solicitous of industry.'8 7
(2) Summary of Survey Results
The interstate competition survey revealed that many states are
concerned about industry relocation and siting, that such concern does
at times influence their environmentally related actions, policies and
standards, and that a substantial minority of states have relaxed their
standards in response to this concern at some point in the past. The
following summary is drawn from the analysis of the survey results
found in Tables 4-6 in the Appendix.
Focusing upon the responses of environmental agency officials-
the largest and most important group surveyed-several conclusions
can be made.188 First, the possibility that industry might relocate or
186. See infra text accompanying notes 202-04.
187. Chambers of Commerce and state economic development agencies have a busi-
ness constituency and would therefore be expected to emphasize their successes in cutting
back environmental regulations. Citizen environmental groups may have motives to em-
bellish the extent to which regulators are intent upon dismantling environmental laws so as
to create a sense of urgency and importance to their work. When interpreting the re-
sponses of citizen groups, however, this incentive for bias must be balanced against their
potentially broader perspective. While a state environmental regulator may only know his
or her department's policies with respect to the narrow scope of issues he or she is assigned
to, a citizen group may be familiar with the actions of that entire agency as well as the
activities of other state agencies with environmental responsibilities.
188. The data related to state environmental regulators are drawn from 80 mailed
questionnaires sent to regulators between April and July, 1996. The author has subse-
quently received additional questionnaires from additional state environmental regulators.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD-SETITNG
site a new plant elsewhere is something of a concern to the environ-
mental regulators in many states, and affects environmental policy-
making in some manner in most states. Indeed, 57 out of 65 regula-
tors (88%) who responded to the question (out of a total of 80 regula-
tors surveyed) stated that concern over industry relocation and siting
affects environmental decisionmaking in their state.189 Also support-
ing this conclusion are data showing that environmental regulators as
a group rank environmental stringency last among five possible fac-
tors influencing industry location decisions, but over half (59%, or 47
out of 80 respondents)' 90 believed that this factor was a fairly or a
very important determinant of industry location.
For a substantial minority of regulators, this concern over indus-
try relocation and siting has played a role in the state somehow re-
laxing or choosing not to adopt, implement, or enforce its
environmental health or safety standards. Of the given range of reac-
tions to industrial siting or relocation, environmental regulators re-
ported that a state was most likely to reduce the number of steps in its
typical permit review process (25 out of 54, or 46% of those who an-
swered the question);' 9 ' adopt a less stringent environmental standard
(18 out of 52, or 35% of those who answered the question); 92 delay
the adoption of an environmental standard (19 out of 54, or 35% of
those who answered the question); 93 levy a smaller civil penalty or a
lighter criminal penalty for an environmental violation (16 out of 51,
or 31% of those who answered the question); 94 or oppose the adop-
tion of a standard (16 out of 53, or 30% of those who answered the
question). 195
These same state environmental regulators were less likely to re-
port that concern over industry relocation and siting had played a role
in decisions relating to monitoring, permit-issuance, or whether or not
the state abandoned an ongoing enforcement action. Thus, fewer reg-
ulators cited industry location concerns as a factor in their state al-
lowing a permittee to reduce the frequency or comprehensiveness of
While these later-received questionnaires are not incorporated in the data set discussed in
this Article, they reinforce the conclusions discussed herein. The author plans to publish
the results of all questionnaires received from state environmental regulators, together
with a more detailed analysis of the survey as a whole, at a later date.
189. Appendix, tbl. 5 at Question 4.
190. Id. at Question 1(A).
191. Id. at Question 10.
192. Id. at Question 7.
193. Id. at Question 6.
194. Id. at Question 14.
195. Id. at Question 5.
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environmental monitoring (6 out of 52, or 12% of those who answered
the question);196 granting a pending permit (9 out of 54, or 17% of
those who answered the question);197 or dropping an enforcement ac-
tion altogether (9 out of 54, or 17% of those who answered the
question).198
Some environmental regulators (10 out of 80 total) stated that
concern over industry siting and relocation had played "no role" in
their state's environmental standard-setting, permitting, and enforce-
ment actions.199 When asked to explain why they believed that con-
cern over industrial development did not influence environmental
decisions, regulators were most apt to cite the existence of minimum
federal environmental standards which reduced the state's discretion
to use more lax standards to attract industry.200 For this group of reg-
ulators, the state's desire to attract nonpolluting industries and the im-
portance of environmental quality to the state's residents over and
above the economic benefits of industry were secondary explanations
for the immunity of environmental decisions to the state's desire to
attract industry.201
The types of agency actions most likely to be attributed, at least
in part, to concern over industry relocation or siting differed across
the subgroups of environmental regulators. As a general matter, a
lower level official in a state's air pollution control division was more
likely to claim that concern over industry siting or relocation nega-
tively affected the vigor of the state's environmental efforts than the
administrator or secretary of the entire state agency (or even a mem-
ber of the administrator's or secretary's staff, since many of the secre-
taries and administrators had staff members fill out the survey
questionnaires). This was especially true with respect to standard-set-
ting and certain actions relating to the permitting process. Thus, for
example, as opposed to 14% (2 out of 14) of state agency administra-
tors or secretaries answering the particular question, 43% (10 out of
23) of state air program officials answering the question stated that
concern over industry siting and relocation had played a role in their
state not adopting an environmental standard and in their agency ask-
ing for less information from an environmental permittee.202 Simi-
196. Id. at Question 9.
197. Id. at Question 12.
198. Id. at Question 13.
199. Id. at Question 4.
200. Id. at Question 16(C).
201. Id. at Question 16(A), 16(B).
202. Appendix, tbl. 6 at Questions 5, 8.
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larly, as opposed to 21% (3 of 14) of those agency administrators or
secretaries who answered the question, 43% (10 of 23) of the air pro-
grams office officials who responded to the question stated that this
concern had played a role in their state delaying the adoption of an
environmental standard.20 3 Only with respect to reductions in the
number of steps involved in the typical permit review process did the
percentage of agency administrators and staff members answering the
question match the percentage of air pollution control officials who
stated that their state had made such a reduction out of concern over
industry relocation and siting (46% air program officials answering
the question as opposed to 43% of agency secretaries or administra-
tors answering the question). 2 4 While the distinction may be attribu-
table to bias, it could also be due to the different perspectives of the
offices held by these two groups of individuals. Agency administra-
tors are much less likely to get involved in the substantive standards in
an agency permit, though they may well be involved in the administra-
tive permit review process by virtue of their positions at the head of
an agency.
The responses of agency regulators did not greatly differ across
geographic regions, however. With the exception of the responses of
regulators in northeastern and mid-Atlantic states, the answers given
by state environmental regulators were fairly uniform. Regulators in
the northeast and mid-Atlantic states were more likely to report that
their state had relaxed an environmental standard than regulators in
other regions of the country;205 however, because of the small number
of regulators from northeastern and mid-Atlantic states included in
the survey (8 in total), it is difficult to generalize on the basis of the
survey results alone.
Interestingly (and not wholly surprisingly), citizen environmental
organizations as a group were more likely to report that concern over
203. Id. at Question 6.
204. Id. at Question 10.
205. See, eg., Appendix, tbl. 7, at Questions 5-15, 23, 23(A), 24, 24(A). For example,
83% of northeastern-mid-Atlantic regulators reported that concern over industry siting
and relocation had contributed to their state reducing steps in the typical permit review
process; 75% said that this concern had contributed to their state levying a smaller civil or
a lighter criminal penalty for an environmental violation. Id. at Questions 10, 14. How-
ever, these percentages represent the responses of only five and three regulators, respec-
tively. Similarly, 57% of northeastern/mid-Atlantic regulators claimed that their state had
revised a standard upon learning of another state's less stringent standard, and only 14%
stated that the state had mimicked another state's more stringent standard. Id. at Ques-
tions 23, 24. Again, however, these percentages represented the responses of only a few
regulators-four and one regulator respectively.
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industry siting and relocation influenced state environmental decision-
making than were state environmental regulators. Thus, nearly all or-
ganization members responding to the particular question reported
that this concern contributed to discouraging their state from adopting
environmental standards (17 out of 19, or 90% of the members an-
swering the question),206 encouraging their state to adopt less strin-
gent standards (17 out of 18, or 94% of the members responding to
the particular question),20 7 encouraging their state to allow industries
to discharge larger amounts of pollutants (13 out of 14, or 93% of
those responding to the particular question), 208 and leading their state
to grant otherwise questionable environmental permits (14 out of 15,
or 93% of the members answering the particular question).20 9 Envi-
ronmentalists were in least agreement on some of the actions that also
witnessed less agreement among the environmental regulators. Ap-
proximately three-quarters of environmental group members believed
that concern over industry siting and location influenced the monitor-
ing frequency required of industry by their state regulators (11 out of
15, or 73% of the group members answering this particular ques-
tion),210 and a similar percentage thought that this concern contrib-
uted to their state dropping ongoing environmental enforcement cases
(8 out of 11, or 73% of the members answering this particular ques-
tion).21' The differences between citizen groups and environmental
regulators could be attributable to a biased assessment of state offi-
cials' priorities, or, alternatively, to the broader perspective possessed
by citizen groups who oversee the workings of not just a single divi-
sion within an agency or even a single agency, but all aspects of state
government that impinge upon the environment.
Another conclusion supported by the data is that states strive to
mimic the standards of other states-activity that is at least consistent
with the hypothesis that states act strategically when establishing envi-
ronmental standards. On average, environmental regulators agreed
"strongly" with the proposition that it was important that their state's
standards be of about the same stringency as the standards of neigh-
boring states.212 Regulators rated uniformity more important than
their state's standards being either less stringent or more stringent
206. Appendix, tbl. 5 at Question 5.
207. Id. at Question 7.
208. Id. at Question 11.
209. Id. at Question 12.
210. Id. at Question 9.
211. Id. at Question 13.
212. Id. at Question 20(C).
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than the standards of other states (though they slightly preferred that
their standards be less stringent rather than more stringent).213 Envi-
ronmental regulators reported that they were generally likely to know
the standards of neighboring states, which would make such uniform-
ity possible.214
While the responses of the environmental regulators indicate that
states may act strategically, it is unclear whether this strategic interac-
tion prompts states to establish more or less stringent standards than
they would otherwise establish were they islands. The importance of
uniformity to the regulators could indicate that states duplicate each
other's standards regardless of whether they are lax or stringent. The
regulators' responses to other survey questions also failed to establish
a clear trend upward or downward; on average, regulators "disagreed
somewhat" with both the proposition that competition for industry
leads states to race to relax their environmental standards in order to
attract industry or to prevent industry from moving to another state
and that states race to enact tougher environmental standards.215 On
the other hand, that strategic state standard-setting leads to a race to
laxity cannot be ruled out. Although regulators disavow such a race,
this disavowal is somewhat undercut by their responses to other sur-
vey questions, namely (1) the admission, by a sizable number of regu-
lators, that the existence of federal minimum standards is a "fairly
major reason" for why states do not relax their standards to attract
industry;216 and (2) the greater number of regulators who claimed
their state had relaxed a standard so as to be uniform with another
state (18 out of 67, or 27% of the regulators responding to the particu-
lar question) 217 than the number of regulators who claimed their state
had tightened a standard so as to be uniform with another state (14
out of 27, or 21% of the regulators responding to that particular ques-
213. Id. at Questions 20(A), 20(B), 20(C).
214. Id. at Questions 17(A), 17(B), 17(C). States were less likely to be familiar with
the standards of states that were merely within their same geographic region and even less
likely to be familiar with the standards of states outside their same geographic region.
215. Id. at Questions 21, 22.
216. Id. at Question 21(A)(i). On average, those regulators who rejected the race-to-
the-bottom thesis rated the existence of federal minimum standards as the best explanation
for the lack of such a race. These regulators also rated the importance of environmental
quality to residents as somewhat more than a "minor reason" for the lack of a race, and
rated the state's knowledge that environmental standards are relatively unimportant in
industry location decisions as only a "minor reason." Id. at Questions 21(A)(iii),
21(A)(ii).
217. Id. at Question 23, 23(A).
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tion).2 18 Furthermore, on average members of environmental organi-
zations reported that state environmental regulators believed it was
just as important to have standards that were less stringent than neigh-
boring states as to have uniform standards and that either option was
preferable, in the eyes of the regulators, to their state having more
stringent standards.2 19
The distinction between states following each other in setting
more stringent or less stringent standards (or both) is not as important
as it might seem. As discussed more thoroughly below in Part V.A.,
to the extent that states act strategically in setting environmental stan-
dards, the market for industrial plants cannot be presumed to be effi-
cient and thus, according to the definition employed by the
revisionists, it is plausible to presume that states are engaged in a wel-
fare-reducing "race-to-the-bottom." Thus, the presence of strategic
interactions responds to the fundamental question of whether a race-
to-the-bottom exists, while the issue of whether interstate competition
pushes states to adopt more or less stringent standards only elaborates
upon the nature of the race-to-the-bottom. Because the race-to-the-
bottom is simply a race to inefficiency, that race can occur both when
states adopt standards that are too stringent as well as when states
adopt standards that are too lax.
The survey results also demonstrate that concern over industry
relocation and siting causes state legislators and business groups to
exert substantial pressure upon state environmental regulators to re-
lax the strictures of state environmental programs. Large percentages
(often over 50% of those answering the particular question) of state
legislators, state economic development agency officials, and state
chambers of commerce officials reported that this concern had
prompted them to introduce or sponsor measures to relax the state's
environmental standards or to not adopt or to delay the adoption of
an environmental regulation.220 Also, while economic development
and chamber of commerce officials, like environmental agency regula-
tors, disagreed that a race-to-the-bottom existed, their other responses
218. Id. at Question 24.
219. Id. at Questions 20(A), 20(B), 20(C) (on average, citizen environmental group
members stated they "agree somewhat" with the proposition that state environmental reg-
ulators believe that it is important that their state standards be less stringent than those of
neighboring states and also "agree somewhat" with the proposition that regulators believe
it to be important that they have standards that are less stringent than those of neighboring
states, but disagreed with the proposition that state regulators believed that it was impor-
tant that their state have more stringent standards than neighboring states).
220. Id. at Questions 5-14.
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seemed to support the existence of such a race. For instance, these
two groups were over six times more likely to report that their state
had revised its standards upon learning of another state's less strin-
gent standard than they were to report a revision in response to an-
other state's more stringent standard.221
Thus, survey data demonstrate that state regulators and others
influential in state environmental standard-setting and permitting be-
lieve that the stringency of environmental standards is an important
factor in firm location decisions. The data furthermore demonstrate
that for a substantial minority of states, concern over industry siting
and relocation has contributed to the state relaxing, not adopting, vig-
orously implementing, or enforcing environmental standards. Hence,
survey data indicate that state regulators are either not aware of or do
not believe the results of firm location studies demonstrating the
unimportance of environmental standards to firm location, or are
under political pressure, regardless of their awareness or belief, and
that many states relax their environmental standards without being
assured of compensating economic benefits.
D. Recent Developments in State Environmental Law
Recent developments in state environmental law support the re-
sults of the author's survey, demonstrating that interstate competition
for industry prompts states to reduce the stringency of their environ-
mental programs and that states often seek to copy the environmental
laws or regulations of other states. Two developments are discussed
here: the outbreak of state laws forbidding state environmental agen-
cies from promulgating standards more stringent than the minimum
standards promulgated by the federal government, and the spread of
state legislation protecting the fruits of corporate environmental com-
pliance audits from discovery or use by government enforcement
authorities.
(1) "No More Stringent Than" State Legislation
As discussed in an earlier section, most federal environmental
statutes direct EPA to promulgate minimum standards, but authorize
states implementing the federal program to enact standards more
stringent than these federal minimums if they wish.2z2 While many
221. Id. Compare responses of economic development agency and Chambers of Com-
merce officials to Questions 23, 23(A) with the responses of these same officials to Ques-
tion 24, 24(A).
222. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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states have enacted more stringent standards, an opposite trend has
also taken place: a large number of state legislatures have passed laws
preventing their state agencies from promulgating standards more
stringent than the federal minimums. 223 In essence, states enacting
such laws have turned the "federal minimums" into "federal
maximums."
The trend toward "federal minimum/state maximum" laws is con-
sistent with the existence of the race-to-the-bottom, though other in-
ferences are possible. In the states enacting such legislation, it is clear
that the federal standards are the most stringent standards that the
state would possibly consider enacting and most likely constitute stan-
dards more stringent than the state's preferred standards. It is cer-
tainly plausible that such artificial dampening of state environmental
standards is attributable to a concern, by state legislatures, that more
stringent standards will place their state at a competitive disadvantage
in the quest for new businesses vis-h-vis other states.224 The results of
the author's survey, showing that state legislators were more likely to
be concerned about industry relocation and siting than environmental
agency regulators and that this difference appears to be statistically
significant,225 supports this interpretation.
On the other hand, other inferences are also possible. For exam-
ple, it could be that the federal standards are "too stringent," i.e., the
welfare benefits that would accrue from less stringent standards are
greater than the welfare losses that accrue from lower environmental
standards. Consequently, in preventing their state's standards from
outdoing the stringency of the federal standards, states are simply at-
tempting to minimize the welfare losses that would accrue from more
stringent standards.
223. As of 1995, a total of nineteen states had enacted at least one statute limiting the
authority of a state agency to promulgate rules more stringent than that required by fed-
eral environmental laws. See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to
Adopt Environmental Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considera-
tions and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. Rv. 1373, 1376 n.13 (1995) (citing such state
laws). Although most of these laws are media- or source-specific (e.g., restricting enact-
ment of more stringent hazardous pollutant standards than the federal standards), the laws
in several states generally prohibit their state environmental agencies from enacting any
regulation more stringent than the federal laws or regulations. Id. at 1377. See also James
M. McElfish, Jr., Minimal Stringency: Abdication of State Innovation, 25 E.L.R. 10003
(1995) (discussing recent sweep of "no more stringent than" state laws).
224. See Organ, supra note 223, at 1388-89.
225. See infra Appendix, tbl. 6, Question 3.
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(2) State Audit Privilege and Immunity Legislation
A second development supporting the author's survey results is
the recent rash of state acts affording the fruits of corporate environ-
mental self-audits protection from discovery by government enforce-
ment officials. State audit legislation generally provides that
voluntary internal corporate environmental audits are privileged from
disclosure to government officials through discovery, or that the self-
disclosure of corporate noncompliance with environmental laws is im-
mune from civil and criminal penalties, or some combination of both
privilege and immunity legislation.226 As of this writing, sixteen states
had passed some form of corporate audit legislation just within the
past three years, and audit privilege and immunity bills are currently
pending in twenty-three others. 227
The similarities among audit privilege bills and the alacrity with
which such legislation has spread among the states demonstrates the
degree to which states are aware of environmental initiatives in other
states and copy such initiatives for adoption in their own state. The
audit privilege example also demonstrates that industry can be re-
sponsible for spreading environmental legislation. According to some
accounts, certain corporations have had a significant role in causing
audit privilege and immunity legislation to spread from state to
state.228 These industries, many of which have had less than stellar
environmental report cards, are reportedly the driving force behind
national business lobbying groups who are pushing state representa-
226. See generally, Mia Anna Mazza, The New Evidentiary Privilege for Environmental
Audit Reports: Making the Worst of a Bad Situation, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 79 (1996) (discuss-
ing the privilege, its effects, and alternative methods employed to protect environmental
audit reports).
227. States that have enacted some form of corporate audit procedures include: Ar-
kansas (ARx. CODE ANN. § 8-1-301 (Michie 1995)), Colorado (CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-25-126.5 (West 1995)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 9-802 (1996)), Illinois (ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 415, para. 5/52.2 (1996)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-1 (West 1994)), Kansas
(KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3333 (1995)), Kentucky (Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040 (Bald-
win 1996)), Michigan (MicH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 324.14802 (West 1996)), Mississippi
(MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (1995)), New Hampshire (N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-E:1
(1996)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-57-10 (Law Co-op. 1996)), South Dakota
(S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-40 (1996)), Texas (TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc
(West 1996)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-103 (1996)), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN.
§ 10.1-1198 (1995)), Wyoming (Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-1105 (1995)).
228. CHRISTOPHER BEDFORD, DIRTY SEcRm: THm CORPORATON'S CAMPAIGN FOR
AN ENmONiNmNTAL AuDiT PRIVILEGE (Environmental Action Foundation Feb. 1996)
(alleging that industries who have recently been subject to greater public scrutiny of their
environmental records are behind the wave of state audit privilege bills).
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tives to introduce and pass corporate self-audit privilege and immu-
nity bills. 229
It is not so clear, however, whether the spread of state audit privi-
lege and immunity laws constitutes a downward shift in environmental
quality or an upward shift. Proponents of such bills argue that audit
legislation encourages companies to monitor and correct their envi-
ronmental compliance because any noncompliance that is discovered
will not be revealed to authorities or used as the basis for penalties.230
From this it might be argued that the widespread adoption of such
legislation constitutes an upward shift because it will lead to a cleaner
environment.
On the other hand, critics argue that audit privilege legislation
simply saves polluters from adverse publicity and exonerates them
from responsibility for their illegal acts.231 From its recent actions, it
is clear that the Clinton Administration views audit privilege legisla-
tion as a threat to state environmental programs. The EPA recently
withheld delegation of the Clean Air Act's permitting program from
one state due to the state's enactment of an audit privilege statute.232
In an effort to head off the further multiplication of such state laws,
the Clinton Administration promulgated its own audit privilege policy
affording certain immunities to companies who discover, report, and
correct environmental noncompliance pursuant to a self-audit.23 This
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Jim Moore and Nancy Newkirk, Not Quite a Giant Step, 12 EmcTL. L.
FORUM 16, 16-17 (1995); John H. Cushman, Jr., Many States Give Polluting Firms New
Protections, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at Al.
231. Craig N. Johnston, An Essay on Environmental Audit Privileges: The Right Prob-
lem, the Wrong Solution, 25 ENv-rL. L. 335, 337-43 (1995) (arguing that the creation of
privileges "is not the way to go" because they increase costs of environmental enforce-
ment, enforcement-related investigations, and would shield some violators from criminal
enforcement).
232. 61 Fed. Reg. 30,570, 30,572 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70) (proposed
June 17, 1996) (reproposing to deny delegation of Clean Air Act operating permits pro-
gram to Idaho based upon Idaho's enactment of a statute providing that any person who
voluntarily discloses an environmental audit report identifying circumstances that may con-
stitute an environmental violation shall be immune from civil or criminal penalties associ-
ated with the violation).
233. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711 (1995). The EPA policy provides that the EPA will
waive gravity-based (noneconomic benefit) penalties and will recommend against criminal
prosecution where a violation is discovered through a voluntary environmental audit, cor-
rected, and measures put in place to prevent recurrence. The EPA policy also states that
the EPA will reduce gravity-based penalties by 75% even for violations that are voluntarily
discovered, corrected, and remedied, even if they were not found through a formal policy.
Finally, the EPA promised that it would adhere to its long-standing practice of refraining
from routine requests for environmental audit reports. Id.
[Vol. 48
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD-SETTING
would indicate that the adoption of audit legislation signals a down-
ward shift because it will lead to a more polluted environment.
IV. Lessons from the Empirical Evidence
A. Significance of Empirical Evidence to the Theoretical Debate
The record of empirical evidence is less than ideal in that it does
not conclusively answer many of the unresolved issues relevant to the
race-to-the-bottom debate. Nevertheless, the empirical record is suffi-
cient to sketch a broad outline of conclusions. As a general matter,
the empirical evidence indicates that the conditions of interstate com-
petition for industry in the real world differ from the conditions neces-
sary to yield efficient environmental standards. These conditions are
sufficient to predict suboptimal standards, whether the assumed theo-
retical framework for interstate competition is competitive neoclassi-
cal economics (as argued by the revisionists) or game theory (as
traditionally argued). This is because the evidence appears to show
both that the interstate market for industrial firms is not perfectly
competitive and that it contains the imperfection-small numbers of
states and firms-that triggers the applicability of non-cooperative
game theory. Because of these differences between the conditions
necessary for perfect competition and those existing in the real world
market for new industry, there is little basis for asserting, as the revi-
sionists do, that interstate competition can be presumed to lead to effi-
cient state environmental standards. The following sections apply the
empirical evidence detailed above to the conditions outlined in Part
III that either trigger market failures or otherwise undermine the con-
ditions necessary for perfect competition.
(1) The Empirical Data Provide Prima Facie Evidence that States Engage
in a "Race-to-the-Bottom"
Studies on the importance of various site-specific characteristics
upon firm location demonstrate that variation in the stringency of
state environmental standards has, if anything, only a minor influence
upon firm location decisions. Were states both aware of this informa-
tion and rational economic actors, it could safely be assumed that
there is no race-to-the-bottom; no rational economic actor supplied
with such information could expect that relaxing environmental stan-
dards would occasion much, if any, improvement in a state's economic
health. Indeed, the most obvious conclusion to be drawn from studies
on firm location is that relaxing state standards will lower social wel-
fare by lowering environmental quality without substituting in its
January 1997]
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place greater economic benefits. According to the responses received
in the author's survey, however, a substantial minority of officials in-
fluential in the state environmental standard-setting process concede
that their state has relaxed its standards and permit procedures in or-
der to attract or retain industrial firms.234 Thus, when combined, data
from statistical modeling studies on the actual importance of environ-
mental stringency upon firm location decisions and survey data from
state environmental regulators on the influence of concern over indus-
try location upon environmental standard-setting seem to provide
prima facie evidence that states are indeed engaged in a race-to-the-
bottom. Because industry is unlikely to respond much to differences
in environmental standards, the states relaxing their standards will
end up with lower social welfare; the welfare losses experienced by
states that relax their environmental standards are unlikely to be off-
set by compensating economic gains.
It is legitimate to wonder why many state regulators act in such
an apparently economically irrational manner as to relax environmen-
tal standards, not only without any assurance of social welfare gains,
but in the face of evidence indicating that such reductions will result in
social welfare losses. It could be that state regulators are simply not
aware of the evidence demonstrating the unimportance of environ-
mental standards to firm location. Some evidence supporting this ex-
planation is revealed by the author's survey in which a majority of the
state environmental regulators responding (59%) stated that environ-
mental standards were either a "fairly" or "very" important factor in
determining firm location. 35 Indeed, if regulators are not familiar
with the empirical studies on firm location, it would be difficult for a
regulator to tell, solely on the basis of the regulator's own experience,
whether the siting of new plants (or the failure of existing plants to
leave) is attributable to the state's lax standards or whether the plant
locations would have occurred even with more stringent standards.
On the other hand, regulators were not uninformed when it came to
the relative importance of environmental standards vis-h-vis other fac-
tors. As a group, state regulators ranked the stringency of environ-
mental standards last in importance to four other given factors
(proximity to transportation, skill and unionization of the workforce,
proximity to natural resources, and the availability of economic incen-
tives), a ranking that is consistent with the findings of most industry
location studies.
234. Appendix, tbl. 5 at Questions 5-15.
235. Id. at Questions 5-14.
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More likely, environmental regulators relax environmental stan-
dards to attract industry because they are responding to different in-
centives. Rather, like any group of government officials, they are
subject to politically rational, but not always economically rational,
political pressures to accommodate industry with the use of less strin-
gent environmental standards. Indeed the groups one might expect to
exert political pressure upon state environmental regulators to
weaken regulations both placed greater importance upon environ-
mental stringency in firm location and responded more favorably to
the idea that states should use relaxation of environmental standards
to attract industry. For example, 86-87% of state legislators, economic
development agency officials, and members of state chambers of com-
merce responded that environmental standards were a "fairly" or
"very important" factor in firm location233 6 Each of these three
groups ranked the stringency of environmental standards relatively
highly-second or third out of the five factors337 Additionally, these
groups responded with surprising frequency that concern over indus-
try location or relocation had played a role in prompting them to pres-
sure their state government (or, in the case of legislators, introducing
or sponsoring legislation) to relax their state's environmental stan-
dards.238 These data indicate that regardless of what environmental
regulators themselves may believe about the efficacy of less stringent
environmental standards in attracting industry, they are subject to
pressure from others, some being quite powerful, who do believe (or
at least profess to believe), that stringency is important and are more
favorably inclined to relax standards in order to attract industry.
Studies of economic development incentives may provide an ad-
ditional clue as to the real explanation for why some states engage in
an all but fruitless effort to relax their standards to attract industry.
This same, seemingly counterintuitive behavior, is manifest in state
officials' use of financial incentives to attract industry. In much the
same way they have discredited the view that differences in environ-
mental standards affect industry location, social scientists have ques-
tioned the effectiveness of business incentive programs. Most scholars
agree that relative to other factors (such as proximity to an appropri-
ately skilled labor force, transportation, and raw materials), business
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. For example, 56% of the legislators, 65% of the economic development
agency officials, and 82% of the chamber of commerce officials who answered the question
responded that concern over industry location or relocation had prompted them to dis-
courage their state from adopting an environmental standard. Id. at Question 5.
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incentives are not a significant determinant of firm location.239 Never-
theless, business incentives are still a cornerstone of most state devel-
opment policies. In an attempt to resolve this apparent contradiction,
some scholars have concluded that financial incentives continue to be
used both because they allow officials to claim credit for successful
business locations and provide a symbolic measure of respect for busi-
ness important to signaling a hospitable business climate. 240 This
could also be the case with respect to lax environmental standards.
(2) The Excessive Market Power Held by Industries and States Implies that
Interstate Competition Is Inefficient
As discussed above in Part Ill, if the companies supplying indus-
trial firms, or the states demanding such firms, possess excessive mar-
ket power, this constitutes a market failure, and state policies resulting
from such a market will likely be inefficient.
Data on plant sitings indicate that the number of plants and states
in a given market are very few. For example, the evidence shows that
relatively few new plant sitings occur at any given time in any given
state, and that the value of the jobs created by a plant that does site is
increasing due to dwindling employment in manufacturing industry as
239. See, e.g., ROGER WILSON, STATE Busnhmss INcENTrvEs AM ECONOMIC GROWTH:
ARE THEY Er-ncrrvE? A REvIEw OF THE LIrERATuRE 22 (Wash., D.C. Council of State
Governments 1989); MICHAEL KInsCHNIcK, TAXES AND GROWTH: BusINEss INCENTIVES
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Wash., D.C. Council of State Planning Agencies, 1981);
Roger J. Vaughan, State Taxation and Economic Development (Wash., D.C. Council of
State Planning Agencies, 1979); Oliver A. Houck, This Side of Heresy: Conditioning Loui-
siana's Ten-Year Industrial Tax Exemption upon Compliance with Environmental Laws, 61
TULANE L. REV. 289, 299-308, 346 (1986) (presenting data showing that Louisiana's ten-
year exemption for new or expanding manufacturers from state, parish, and municipal
property taxes has had little, if any, effect in attracting new industry; the exemption has
gone mostly to expansions of existing industries, which the author claims did not need the
inducement to stay).
240. See DeLysa Burnier, Becoming Competitive: How Policymakers View Incentive-
Based Development Policy, 6 ECON. DEVEL Q. 14, 22 (1992) (On basis of study of Ohio's
business tax abatement policies, Burnier concludes that "[i]ncentives similar to the enter-
prise zone are important for their symbolic content. They give practitioners the opportu-
nity to appear active and engaged, and they give elected officials the chance to claim credit
and reassure community members that jobs are being created. Finally, incentives are 'im-
portant as a symbolic measure of the esteem that business interests command in the com-
munity"'); Lee Axelrad, What Motivates California's Global Promotion Efforts?, 6
BERKELEY PLANNING J. 161, 170 (1991) ("FDI [Foreign Direct Investment, or foreign own-
ership of productive assets in the United States] promotional activities are increasing de-
spite the fact that access to markets is vastly more important than state promotions. This
increase seems to follow from the perceived need, on the part of governments, to demon-
strate to potential investors and other constituents that the bureaucracy is doing everything
it possibly can to attract new investment.").
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a whole. Since virtually all plants are thus welcomed by a state, plants
appear to choose locations in the virtual absence of competition from
other industries. With respect to states, the evidence suggests that the
power of states is usually relatively weaker than the near monopoly
position held by a firm attempting to site a large plant.
This evidence indicates that industry participants in the market
for industrial plants are likely to be monopolistic, or, at best, oligo-
polistic, and that states are likely to be oligopolists. Whether monop-
olists or oligopolists, companies clearly have excessive power in the
market for new industry. In the absence of distorting market failures
on the state side of the market, the excessive market power of indus-
try will cause industry to under supply new firms and "overcharge" for
the firms it provides. Because the stringency of environmental stan-
dards is frequently considered part of the industry purchase "price,"
firms would appear to possess the power to demand that environmen-
tal standards be relaxed on their account.
Indeed, this is what the evidence seems to show. Iidustry ap-
pears to exert considerable influence over states when choosing a lo-
cation for a new or relocating plant. For instance, according to the
results of the author's survey, for a substantial minority of states, con-
cern over industry relocation and siting was a factor in their decision
to relax existing environmental standards or adopt less stringent stan-
dards in the first place.241 The influence of industry in state adoption
of corporate audit privilege and immunity laws is also an example of
the industry's excessive market power.
Being few in number, states would also appear to possess an ex-
cess of market power. In the absence of monopolistic or oligopolistic
behavior on the part of industry, this power would work to the advan-
tage of states vis-t-vis industry, providing states with the power to
keep the purchase price of industrial firms low without sacrificing firm
locations. Thus, were the oligopolistic behavior of states the only im-
perfection in the market for new firms, it is possible that state environ-
mental standards might be suboptimally stringent. As it is, while their
oligopolistic status may improve their bargaining power with industry
over what it would be were the number of states in a given market
plentiful, industry still pretty clearly holds the upper hand (or states
believe that it does). Were this not the case, no state would invest, as
many now do, in lower environmental standards and financial incen-
tives in an effort to attract industrial firms. Thus, while both industry
241. Appendix, tbl. 5 at Questions 5-14.
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and states possess excessive market power, industry seems to possess
more market power than states.
(3) As Compared to Competitive Neoclassical Models, Game Theory Is a
More Appropriate Model of State Interactions
The small number of states involved in any one instance in a com-
petition for an industrial plant has the further repercussion that in
their interactions with one another, states will act strategically. As a
consequence, game theory is likely to supply a more appropriate con-
ceptual framework than competitive neoclassical economics in under-
standing the interactions of the state market participants. While the
empirical evidence is not sufficient to indicate the type of game being
played, plausible scenarios are available which would predict that
states will establish suboptimal environmental standards. The impor-
tant point, however, is that because of the applicability of game the-
ory, state environmental standard-setting cannot be presumed (as
indicated by the revisionists) to result in efficient environmental
standards.
A prerequisite for strategic interactions is the ability to influence
the actions of others. The evidence demonstrates that states influence
the "price" at which other states "pay" for the location of industrial
plants. For instance, nearly one-third of all environmental regulators
claimed that their state had altered a standard when another state had
a less stringent requirement for a similar standard, and somewhat
fewer state regulators claimed that their state had done the same thing
when confronted by another state's more stringent standard.242 The
responses of state environmental groups indicate that the frequency of
such mimicry may in fact be much greater.243 In addition, on average,
environmental regulators "agreed somewhat" with the statement that
it was important that their environmental standards be of the same
stringency as the standards of other states. Finally, accounts of state
"bidding wars" for industry indicate that the size of the location incen-
tives offered by one state can affect the size of the incentives offered
by another state.244 Oates has himself recognized that bidding wars
"suggest[ ] the potential of a game-theoretic approach to understand-
ing at least certain facets of [interstate] competition." 245
242. Id. at Questions 23, 24.
243. See Appendix, tbl. 4.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 136-239.
245. Oates, Working Paper, supra note 7, at 27-28.
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While the above constitutes direct evidence of strategic behavior,
indirect evidence might be found in the practice of many states of re-
laxing their environmental standards in response, at least in part, to
concern over industry relocation and siting. To the extent that such
concern is a factor because other states are offering industries more
appealing incentive packages, this practice is indicative of the influ-
ence exerted by states over one another. Additional indirect evidence
that states are capable of influencing the price at which other states
purchase industrial plants is found in the recent developments in state
environmental law discussed in Part III.A.4 (state enactment of "no
more stringent than" laws and corporate self-audit privilege and im-
munity legislation).
The applicability of game theory opens the door to the possibility
that the interstate market for industrial firms will yield suboptimal en-
vironmental standards, a possibility that Oates himself clearly recog-
nizes.246 Where players are engaged in a non-cooperative game, there
exists the possibility that one strategy yields, or might be perceived to
yield, higher payoffs to the individual than a competing strategy that
yields higher payoffs to society overall. Suboptimal environmental
standards are possible in a non-cooperative game, regardless of
whether states rate the highest individual payoffs to accrue from lax or
stringent standards. Thus, for instance, states might perceive the
payoffs from standards to be structured such that it receives the high-
est payoffs from winning the location of an industrial firm, even if it
must relax its environmental standards (and/or offer lucrative finan-
cial incentives) to do so. If one state perceives the payoffs to be so
structured, it is likely that several states likewise perceive it to be so
structured, with the result that several states in the same market in-
crease the value of the incentives they offer to industry (in the form of
more relaxed standards and/or greater financial incentives). The ulti-
mate result, of course, is precisely the type of result predicted by Pris-
oner's Dilemma-like games: a reduction in total social welfare.
Alternatively, states could perceive the payoffs to be highest
when they enact stringent environmental standards. Meyer's study of
246. Id. at 14-15 (noting that his and Schwab's model relied on assumption of "small-
ness"-that local officials have no power to influence upon the rate of return of capital or
the decisions of officials in other localities, but that the presence of strategic interactions
may result in outcomes that are not Pareto-efficient) (citing Jack Mintz and Henry Thlkens,
Commodity Tax Competition Between Member States of a Federation: Equilibrium and Ef-
ficiency, 29 J. PuB. ECON. 133 (1986) (presenting a model in which strategic interactions




the relationship between employment and economic growth and the
stringency of state environmental programs noted an association be-
tween state economic growth and strong state environmental pro-
grams. This is consistent with the possibility (though it does not
dictate) that individual state payoffs for environmental stringency are
higher than the payoffs for environmental laxity.247 If state officials
believe in the reality of such a scenario, they might be encouraged to
make their standards more stringent so as to achieve the larger indi-
vidual state payoffs predicted in Meyer's study. Indeed, one-fifth of
the state environmental regulators surveyed claimed that their state
changed its standards in response to another state's more stringent en-
vironmental standards. Where states race to make their standards
more stringent, the result may still be suboptimal environmental stan-
dards. The difference is that the standards established are subop-
timally stringent, as opposed to suboptimally lax. Either way, this
game-theoretic interaction leads to a "race-to-the-bottom."
Both of the scenarios in which states establish suboptimal envi-
ronmental standards assume that the game being played by states in
setting standards follows the basic outline of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
While plausible, the empirical evidence is simply too incomplete at
this time to determine whether the game engaged in by states is a
Prisoner's Dilemma or instead, some other game. Interestingly, data
obtained from the author's survey do not in fact support the argument
that states are engaged in a Prisoner's Dilemma. If states were en-
gaged in a Prisoner's Dilemma, one would expect (assuming the regu-
lators answered honestly and depending upon whether they perceived
stringent or lax standards to result in the highest social payoffs) that
the states would rank as most important that either their state's stan-
dards be less stringent than the standards of other states or that their
standards be more stringent than the standards of other states. In-
stead, states ranked as most important that their standards be of the
same stringency as those of other states.248 This would seem to indi-
cate that states mimic each other's standards, both when they are
more and when they are less stringent than their own, behavior that is
not consistent with the classic Prisoner's Dilemma.
The exact type of game being played in state standard-setting is
an interesting question, and one on which I hope future research may
shed some light. Nevertheless, the lack of a clear answer on this side
issue does not detract from the fundamental point that, whatever
247. See MEYER, ENvoNmENTAL IMPACT Hynmsis, supra note 144.
248. Appendi, tbl. 4 at Question 20(C).
[Vol. 48
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD-SETrING
game is being played, the very applicability of game theory (and hence
games that, like the Prisoner's Dilemma, result in suboptimal stan-
dards) means that state environmental standards cannot be presumed
to be efficient.
(4) Conclusion
The empirical evidence provides several bases for concluding that
interstate competition in environmental standard-setting will be
suboptimal (i.e., that states will "race-to-the-bottom"). First, results-
oriented data consisting of industry location studies and survey data
indicate that states which relax their environmental standards in part
to attract or retain industry are probably not achieving adequate com-
pensating economic benefits for the welfare losses that they sustain in
lower environmental quality. Second, both states and industry (and
industry more so than states) possess excessive power in the market
for industrial firms. The presence of excessive market power is a clas-
sic market failure leading to inefficiency. If it is true (as the evidence
seems to indicate) that industry possesses greater market power than
do states, the inefficiency resulting from both states and industry pos-
sessing excessive market power is that state environmental standards
will probably be suboptimally lax (as opposed to suboptimally strin-
gent). Finally, states' use of lax environmental standards and eco-
nomic benefits as incentives to attract or retain industry is
characterized by strategic interactions among the states. The resulting
potential applicability of game theory to state environmental stan-
dard-setting makes it plausible that states are engaged in a game, such
as the classic Prisoner's Dilemma, that would result in suboptimal en-
vironmental standards. Although available evidence is insufficient to
determine what game it is that states are "playing" (indeed, available
evidence does not conclusively support the proposition that the game
is the Prisoner's Dilemma), the potential applicability of game theory
means that it cannot be presumed that state environmental standards
will be optimal.
B. Implications of Empirical Data for the Efficiency of the Oates and
Schwab Neoclassical Economic Model
(1) Specific Preconditions for Efficiency under the Oates and Schwab
Neoclassical Economic Model
As discussed above, the particular neoclassical economic model
relied upon by the revisionists for their claim that interstate competi-
tion yields efficient environmental standards is a model developed by
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economists Wallace Oates and Robert Schwab.249 In addition to the
general prerequisites for efficiency detailed in Part Ill.C., the Oates
and Schwab model relies upon a set of highly restrictive conditions.
While these conditions apply only to their particular model, the test-
ing of their empirical validity is nonetheless important given that the
Oates and Schwab model is the primary model upon which the revi-
sionists rely for their argument that interstate competition yields effi-
cient state environmental standards. Among these are the
assumptions that (1) the society is classless, consisting solely of wage-
earners at local industrial plants; (2) the jurisdiction employs head
taxes to pay for local consumption goods rather than taxes on capital;
(3) government officials, consistent with the median-voter model, act
only in the best interests of their constituents as a whole; and (4) the
production function of all industries exhibits constant returns to scale.
A later paper written by Oates recognizes the restrictive nature of
many of these very assumptions.250
First, the Oates and Schwab model assumes that all residents
work as wage-earners in the local industrial plants.251 Each resident,
it must be remembered, also lives within the same jurisdiction as the
plant for which she works and thus is personally exposed to the ill
effects of the plant's polluting emissions.252 Given this context, the
249. See Oates & Schwab, supra note 8 and text accompanying notes 98-111.
250. Oates & Schwab, supra note 8 (describing how their model would produce ineffi-
cient standards if particular conditions did not hold true); Oates, Working Paper, supra
note 7, at 14-17 (conceding that his and Schwab's model is "admittedly restrictive in some
important ways," that the framework necessary for the workings of the invisible hand to
result in efficient outcomes when jurisdictions compete against each other "takes some
strong assumptions" and that "[c]ertain realistic amendments to the model can easily intro-
duce allocative distortions").
251. Oates & Schwab, supra note 8, at 336.
252. Id. The Oates & Schwab model appears to assume that pollutants are dispersed in
such a way that their concentration is uniform throughout a single jurisdiction. This is at
odds with generally held assumptions elsewhere. With the exception of the tall-stacks phe-
nomenon, it is generally assumed that the concentration of the pollutants are greatest near-
est the plant and taper off the farther the distance from the plant. In addition to
dispersion, the risk of exposure to plant emissions will be unevenly distributed throughout
the population of a jurisdiction because of the placement of the plant within the given
jurisdiction. Many recent studies demonstrate that noxious facilities such as hazardous
waste treatment storage and disposal facilities tend to be located in neighborhoods dispro-
portionately populated by the poor and by racial minorities. See, e.g., UNrrED CHURCH OF
CHRIST, COMMISSION ON RACIAL JusTIcE, Toxic WASTFS AND RACE IN THE UrrED
STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIo-EcONOMIC CHARACrEpISTICS
OF COMMUNITIES wVrrT HAZARDous WASTE SrrEs 13-14 (1987) (noting that the percent-
age of minorities living in zip code areas in the United States containing one operating
hazardous waste facility is approximately double that living in zip code areas without such
facilities-24% to 12%). Although many of the studies demonstrating that noxious facili-
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assumption that all residents work for the jurisdiction's firms is critical
to the authors' conclusion that the environmental standards estab-
lished by each jurisdiction are socially optimal because it collapses,
into each person, the alleged trade-offs between economic and envi-
ronmental benefits. Thus, each individual pays, in terms of health and
quality of life, for the wage hikes that accrue from lowered environ-
mental quality standards, and vice versa. Because each resident
stands to both gain and lose from any relaxing of the jurisdiction's
environmental standards, those standards preferred by the individual
resident represent socially-optimal standards.
The efficiency prediction of Oates and Schwab's model is under-
mined, however, by the self-evident fact that workers obtain their in-
come from different sources and accordingly support different policies
designed to maximize their opportunities to enhance their income
given their particular occupation. According to the model, a jurisdic-
tion populated by both wage-earners in the local industrial plants and
non-wage earners who obtain their incomes from other sources will
establish suboptimal environmental standards, regardless of whether
the wage-earners or the non-wage earners are in the majority.253
When the workers are in the majority, the model predicts that the
locality's environmental standards will be higher than optimal because
workers will choose to attract industry entirely though subsidies (paid
for by all residents, wage-earners, and non-wage-earners alike, but
from which only wage-earners benefit through the higher wages re-
sulting from increased capital) rather than through lowered environ-
mental standards2 4 In contrast, where the non-wage-earners are in
the majority, the model predicts that standards will be lower than op-
timal because non-wage-earners desire a positive tax on capital (from
which they benefit) and hence will be forced to lower environmental
ties are disproportionately located in poor, minority areas are national in scope, a few
specifically examine whether such facilities are disproportionately located in poor, minor-
ity neighborhoods within a single state or local jurisdiction. See e.g., Douglas L. Anderton
et al, Environmental Equity: The Demographics of Dumping, 31 DEMOGPAPHY 229,236-39
(1994) (finding that the percentage of minorities living within a 2.5 mile radius of an oper-
ating hazardous waste facility is double the percentage living in the census tracts outside
this radius but still within the standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA); percentage of
minorities living within the census tract in which a hazardous waste facility is located is not
significantly different, however, than the percentage of minorities living in all other census
tracts within the SMSA).
253. Oates & Schwab, supra note 8, at 349 ("If the jurisdictions are divided between
workers and non-wage-earners, not only will there be a divergence of desired policies
within each community, but the median-voter outcome will not, in either case, be an eco-
nomically efficient one.").
254. Id. at 347.
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standards to retain industry that would otherwise leave the jurisdic-
tion because of the higher tax rate.25
A second assumption of the Oates and Schwab model is that ju-
risdictions will finance local public goods for residents (e.g., police and
fire protection, street-cleaning, and garbage pick-up) through head
taxes, as opposed to taxes on capital32 6 Should a locality tax capital,
or tax capital to cover the costs of general public services beyond
those necessary to pay for the public benefits to capital itself, the
Oates and Schwab model, consistent with the general conclusions of
the public finance literature, predicts that public goods (including en-
vironmental standards) will be established at suboptimally low
levels.2 7 Thus, the applicability of the "efficiency" predictions of the
model to the real world would be weakened by data showing that lo-
calities, for whatever reason, raise revenues through corporate or
other taxes upon corporate earnings.
This second assumption is followed by a third: government offi-
cials make decisions which reflect the preferences of the median voter
(the "median-voter" model).25 8 Thus, the model's applicability is vul-
nerable if it can be shown that political decision-making can distort
255. Id. at 348.
256. Id. at 342-43.
257. Id. at 343. See also Oates, Working Paper, supra note 7, at 16 (arguing that taxes
on capital will tend to underprovide for local public goods). The prediction that localities
will underprovide public goods is based on the assumption that, in order to have the least
effect upon capital, localities will raise the tax rate only to the point at which the cost of the
public good equals the benefits for their individual locality. Because public goods that
leave one community go to other communities where they are still of benefit, the locality's
choice of a tax rate on capital will result in the underprovision of public goods because it
will fail to take into account the beneficial externalities one locality's public goods create
for other communities. The environment is, of course, a public good that would be under-
provided. For a discussion of the theory that "distorting taxes," or taxes upon capital, will
lead to the underprovision of public goods, see George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski,
Pigou, Tiebou Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods, 19 J.
Unn. ECON. 356 (1986); John D. Wilson, Optimal Property Taxation in the Presence of
Interregional Capital Mobility, 17 J. UxR. ECON. 73 (1985); John D. Wilson, A Theory of
Interregional Tax Competition, 19 J. URB. ECON. 296 (1986); Remy Prud'homme, Merits
and Demerits of Fiscal Competition, in PunBic FIN 'acE wITH SEVERAL LEVELS OF Gov-
ERI'IMENT 281 (Peggy Musgrave ed., 1991); David E. Wildasin, Interstate Tax Competition:
Comment, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 353 (1986); David E. Wildasin, Interjurisdictional Capital Mo-
bility: Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy, 25 J. URnB. ECON. 193 (1989); David E.
Wildasin, Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition, 35 J. PuB. ECON. 229 (1988).
258. Oates & Schwab, supra note 8, at 339-340. Because of their reliance upon the
median-voter model, Oates and Schwab could assume that the preferences of the individ-
ual resident (each of whom is identical in the model) for environmental quality would be
perfectly reflected in the jurisdiction's environmental standards. For a more detailed ex-
planation of the median-voter mode, see ROSEN, supra note 112, at 125.
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voter preferences. Finally, the Oates and Schwab model assumes that
the production functions of all firms exhibit constant returns to
scale.259 This means that local environmental standard-setting may
not yield optimal standards if local industries are found to exhibit in-
creasing returns to scale.
(2) The Interstate Market for Industry Fails to Comply with Specific
Preconditions for Efficiency Under the Oates and Schwab
Model
An examination of empirical evidence reveals that the underlying
assumptions of the Oates and Schwab model just discussed are un-
likely to hold true in the real world. Due to the importance of these
assumptions to the model's conclusions that interstate competiti6n
yields efficient environmental standards, the failure to validate the as-
sumptions with real world data means that the model cannot predict
that interstate competition in the real world will yield efficient envi-
ronmental standards.
As discussed above, the assumption that society consists of a sin-
gle class of workers employed by the local industrial plants is integral
to the model's efficiency predictions. Yet it is self-evident that society
is not composed of a single class of workers employed in local indus-
tries. According to 1994 labor force statistics, while approximately 24
million workers were employed in various polluting industries (min-
ing, manufacturing, and construction), approximately 49 million
worked in non-polluting industry occupations (public administration,
and business and repair, personal, entertainment and recreation, and
professional, services). 260 Because the "classless society" assumption
of Oates and Schwab's model plainly does not hold in the real world,
neither does its prediction that states will produce efficient environ-
mental standards.
Oates and Schwab recognized the fragility of the assumption that
society is classless in their 1988 publication introducing their model.261
259. Oates & Schwab, supra note 8, at 336 ("We posit further than [sic] the production
function exhibits constant returns to scale and possesses all of the nice curvature properties
of a standard neo-classical production function.").
260. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUs, supra note 124, at 416 (Table No. 653 "Employ-
ment, by Industry: 1970 to 1994). To break down the nonpolluting industrial labor force a
bit, in 1992, the United States labor force consisted of approximately 2 million writers,
artists, entertainers, and athletes, 1 million social and religious workers, 5 million teachers,
2 million doctors and nurses, 680,000 maids, and, last (but not about to let themselves be
forgotten), 821,000 lawyers. Id at 411-13 (Table No. 649 "Employed Civilians, by Occupa-
tion, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1983 and 1994").
261. Oates & Schwab, supra note 8, at 347.
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When the authors varied their model only slightly to encompass a
community which contains two types of persons: wage-earners in pol-
luting firms and non-wage earners who earned income from other
sources (presumably doctors, lawyers, teachers, and employees in
other professions and service industries), they found that the environ-
mental standards established when either group was in the majority
was not socially optimal.262
Another critical assumption of the Oates and Schwab model-
highlighted by the authors as questionable-is the assumption that ju-
risdictions will finance local fire, police, and other public services
through the advent of head taxes as opposed to taxes on capital.263 As
Oates and Schwab recognized, however, communities may be forced
to tax capital due to constitutional limitations upon their authority to
raise taxes through an alternative mechanism.264 Thus, the Oates and
Schwab model compels the conclusion that communities that impose a
positive tax rate on capital will engage in a race-to-the-bottom. 265
Oates and Schwab's use of the median-voter model is also inte-
gral to their predictions of efficiency. Application of competing mod-
els of the outcome of majority rule yield very different results,
however. For example, when Oates and Schwab assume that local bu-
262. Id at 349. Oates and Schwab found that, where workers constitute a majority, a
community will want to subsidize capital, as opposed to setting a zero tax rate on capital.
This is because workers reap all of the benefits of the increases in wage income resulting
from additional capital, but do not bear the full cost of a subsidy since part of the cost of
the subsidy will fall upon the non-wage-earners. Id at 347. In contrast, where non-work-
ers are in the majority, the community will want to tax capital because they gain all of the
benefits from such a tax and are generally unaffected by the impact of such a tax on wages.
Because the result in either case is different than a zero tax on capital, neither is socially
optimal. Id at 349. Oates and Schwab also theorize that workers and non-workers will
have different preferences as to environmental quality. Id. at 351.
263. Id at 342-43.
264. Id. at 342. See also Oates, Working Paper, supra note 7.
265. Although Professor Revesz concedes that this real world condition may cause
states to lower their environmental standards to suboptimally low levels, he refuses to con-
sider this a race-to-the-bottom because, in setting the too-high rate of tax on capital that
triggers the race, states are failing to "act in an economically rational manner." Revesz,
supra note 1, at 1243. It is not clear, however, what rationality should have to do with
whether states are engaged in a race-to-the-bottom. According to the definition of such a
race given by Revesz in his article, a race-to-the-bottom occurs whenever interstate compe-
tition causes states to establish suboptimal environmental standards. Id. at 1219. It would
not seem to make a difference whether this was because of rational or irrational state
policies. In addition, it is not necessarily irrational to raise revenue through a tax on capi-
tal when states have no other legal option (due to a state constitutional or statutory bar
upon other forms of revenue raising); in such a case the state's action could be viewed as a
rational response to a bad situation.
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reaucrats act first and foremost to maximize their agency's budget,266
the model predicts that localities would establish inefficiently low envi-
ronmental standards.267 Yet a third alternative is presented by public
choice, according to which the voting behavior of elected politicians
reflects the preferences of powerful interest groups who support poli-
ticians who allow them to "rent-seek" against other, less powerful in-
terest groups. 268 While neither the median-voter, nor the Niskanen
model, nor the public choice model appears to reflect the outcome of
majority rule in real life,269 the existence of plausible alternatives to
266. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACy AND REPRESENTATrvE GovERN-
mENT 37 (1971). The Niskanen model is based on the proposition that a bureaucrat's sal-
ary, reputation, power, and the capacity to award patronage increases as the budget of the
bureaucrat's agency increases.
267. Oates and Schwab, supra note 8, at 344-46. This follows from the assumption that,
because the Niskanen bureaucrat increases her salary, power, etc., with additional public
revenues, she will seek to increase the tax base by enticing more capital into the jurisdic-
tion by relaxing environmental standards. The fiscal effect of this strategy is excessive local
pollution. See also Oates, supra note 7, at 15-16.
268. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System,
98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 15-17 (1984); Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract
Clause, 51 U. Cm-. L. REv. 703, 713-17 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Mode 86
CoLum. L. REv. 223 (1986).
269. In addition to assuming that voter preferences are single-peaked (i.e., ranked
along a single spectrum), the median-voter model assumes that all substantive policy mat-
ters are decided through direct democracy. However, in our political system referenda are
a fairly unusual way of deciding issues, most issues being decided by elected representa-
tives. Although one scholar argues that vote-maximizing elected representatives will, in
fact, adopt the preferences of the median-voter, ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMC Tan-
oRY oF DEMOCRACY 73-74 (1957), this result assumes, unrealistically, that neither ideol-
ogy, personality, nor notions of leadership or charisma will sway a politician from vote-
maximizing behavior. ROSEN, supra note 112, at 133-34. The Niskanen model might be
verified by comparing the costs and outputs of a government agency to those of a private
firm producing the same product. If those costs were the same, this would be persuasive
evidence that the Niskanen model was invalid. In real life, it is extremely difficult to con-
duct such a test because many goods are either not made by private firms or their quantity
or quality is hard to measure. Consequently, "the widespread suspicion that a bureaucrat's
main concern is empire building is hard to confirm or deny." Id. at 137. Finally, although
some argue strenuously that public choice accurately reflects the voting behavior of politi-
cians, others find the empirical basis of public choice theory weak. Compare Geoffrey P.
Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and
Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 83, 128-30 (1989) (using public choice theory to illustrate his-
tory of "margarine wars") with FARBER & FRICKEy, supra note 123, at 27-33 (reviewing
the literature attempting to test, empirically, public choice theory and concluding that "the
supporting evidence is quite thin"). For commentary on the unrealistic nature of public
choice theory from a long-time state legislator, see Abner J. Mikva, Foreword to the Sym-
posium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167, 167-69 (1988) (commenting
that not even five terms in the Illinois state legislature had prepared him for the political
villainy depicted by public choice scholarship).
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the median-voter model compels us to look skeptically upon other
models, such as Oates and Schwab's, whose outcomes rely upon its
validity.
Finally, the Oates and Schwab model assumes that the production
function of all firms exhibits constant returns to scale.270 However, in
a model of interjurisdictional competition developed by James
Markusen, Edward Morey, and Nancy Olewiler, in which interjuris-
dictional competition for mobile capital results in suboptimally low
environmental standards, 271 the production function exhibits increas-
ing returns to scale.272 As it turns out, the inefficient environmental
standards established by jurisdictions in the Markuson, Morey, and
Olewiler model are attributable to the assumption that firms exhibit
increasing returns to scale.273 Industry studies show that many large
industries experience increasing returns to scale.274 Thus, because the
assumption of constant returns to scale may very well be unrealistic,
so also may be the results of the Oates and Schwab model, which rely
upon this assumption.
In sum, Oates and Schwab's neoclassical economic model-the
model relied upon by the revisionists to support their claim that states
engaged in interstate competition for industry will establish efficient
environmental standards-rests upon numerous restrictive assump-
tions that empirical data demonstrate are unlikely to hold true in the
270. Oates & Schwab, supra note 8, at 336 ("We posit further than [sic] the production
function exhibits constant returns to scale and possesses all of the nice curvature properties
of a standard neo-classical production function.").
271. James R. Markusen et al., Competition in Regional Environmental Policies when
Plant Locations are Endogenous, 56 J. PuB. ECON. 55, 67, 70,73 (1995) (Tables 1, 2, and 3)
(demonstrating that the combined welfare of two regions establishing environmental stan-
dards while engaged in interstate competition for mobile industry is lower at each of three
possible noncooperative equilibrium than at nonstrategic tax rates).
272. Id. at 58.
273. Levinson, supra note 144, at 23-25. In the Oates and Schwab model, where re-
turns to scale are assumed to be constant, the only economic rents earned are the marginal
product of labor earned by every laborer; consistent with the assumption of perfect compe-
tition, the manufacturer makes no profit. In contrast, in the Markuson, Morey, and
Olewiler model, the manufacturer earns profits from production as a result of the firms
increasing returns to scale. However, because the local residents only capture the rents by
taxing the firm, jurisdictions will compete over this tax, and thereby bid it down below its
proper level. In doing so, jurisdictions will relax their environmental standards to subop-
timally low levels since the tax also serves in the model to reduce pollution by raising the
marginal cost of production. Id.
274. See, e.g., Kavuri Suryaprakasa Rao et al., 27 Ee TRANSACtIONs 435 (Aug. 1995)
(continuous production processes such as chemical, petroleum, petrochemicals and fertiliz-
ers); Kathleen Morris, Arrow Electronics: Consider Those Economies of Scale, 161 FiN.
WoRLD 18 (Mar. 31, 1992) (electronic parts); Bulletin Boards Represent Key Element in
Post-636 Era, 76 PIPE Lnqm INOus. 21 (May 1993) (gas distribution industry).
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real world. While no model can duplicate the conditions of the real
world exactly, the degree to which these assumptions depart from re-
ality render the model's predictions of efficient state environmental
standards highly questionable.
V. Solutions to the Race-to-the-Bottom: Are Federal
Minimum Standards the Answer?
The above sections demonstrate that the race-to-the-bottom hy-
pothesis is strongly supported by a broad range of empirical evidence,
and that there is good reason to believe that absent federal standards,
both environmental quality and overall social welfare would be lower
than it is today. The question remains, however, whether the adop-
tion of minimum federal environmental standards-the standards
adopted so far-is the best approach to preventing a race-to-the-bot-
tom. Admittedly, these types of standards have numerous drawbacks.
Indeed, dissatisfaction with the methods for redressing the race-to-the-
bottom may have fueled the recent questioning of the race-to-the-bot-
tom hypothesis itself. The following section discusses the debate over
the remedies to the race-to-the-bottom. It concludes that the mini-
mum and uniform technological standards approach has much to rec-
ommend it. Nevertheless, in order to maximize opportunities for state
experimentation and leadership in environmental standard-setting,
the federal government should experiment with mechanisms to
counter the "race-to-the-bottom" by ratifying environmentally pro-
gressive multi-state agreements.
A. Existing Remedies for the Race-to-the-Bottom
While it is generally accepted (at least until recently) that the
remedy to the race-to-the-bottom is federal intervention, the appro-
priateness of the particular form that the federal regulation has taken
has sparked vigorous criticism.275 Scholars make three principal argu-
ments against the minimum environmental quality and uniform tech-
nology standards prevalent in environmental laws: they are
economically inefficient; they can trigger a welfare-reducing "race-to-
the-top"; and they undermine federalism. Uniform technology stan-
dards are said to be inefficient because they ignore differences in
275. See supra text accompanying notes 55-70 (discussing how federal minimum envi-
ronmental quality standards and uniform technology standards have traditionally consti-
tuted the federal response to the race-to-the-bottom).
January 1997]
abatement costs between and among different industrial sources.276
Critics cite studies showing that abatement costs could be reduced by
up to ninety percent if abatement burdens were allocated in a
nonuniform manner that reduced society's overall costs. 277
The federalism critique argues that any scheme of federal regula-
tion short of wholesale nationalization of all regulatory function is in-
adequate to stem the race-to-the-bottom, and wholesale
nationalization is, of course, anathema to federalism.278 Less than
wholesale federalization is asserted to be inadequate to stop interstate
competition because, if prevented from competing in one realm, states
will simply shift to competing in another. Consequently, although fed-
eral minimum and uniform standards might prevent states from com-
peting over environmental standards, it will simply cause states to
compete over minimum wage laws, fair labor standards, or product
liability laws.279 Thus, argue critics, the only certain way to halt the
race-to-the-bottom is to nationalize all areas that might provide grist
for interstate competition.280
A further problem with setting environmental standards at the
federal level is that it provides an opportunity for states to "rent-seek"
against other states through Congress. For example, Peter Pashigian
found that northern-urban constituencies-living in dirty-air areas-
voted for adoption of a policy preventing clean air areas from allowing
their air to deteriorate, while southern, rural and western constituen-
cies-living primarily in clean air areas-voted against them.28'
276. See e.g., James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in
a Federal System-And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. Rnv. 1226, 1228-30 (1995); James E.
Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro-and-Micro-Mistakes, 22
UCLA L. Rnv. 323, 324-30 (1974); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and In-
ternational Competitiveness, 102 YALE L. J. 2039, 2088 (1993); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL &
WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONmENTAL POLICY 284-96 (1988); MENNELL
& STEWART, supra note 9.
277. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons For
Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 363 (1989), citing T. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS
TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTON POLICY 15 (1985).
278. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1244-47.
279. Id. at 1246.
280. Id.
281. B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being
Protected?, 23 ECON. INOUiRY 551 (1985). Pashigian examined the geography of the dis-
tricts of members of Congress who voted for and against incorporating the EPA's "preven-
tion of significant deterioration" ("PSD") policy into the 1977 amendments to the Clean
Air Act. The PSD policy, which was adopted into the Act, prevents regions which have
cleaner air quality than the federal minimum standards from allowing their air quality to
significantly deteriorate below their "cleaner than federal minimum" standards. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7470-7492 (1994).
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Pashigian explains this voting phenomenon according to the "self-in-
terest" hypothesis. Specifically, he argues that the PSD policy was de-
veloped to "attenuate the locational competition between developed
and less developed regions and between urban and rural areas. ''282
There are some reasons to doubt these claims, or at least their
more extreme form. Uniform standards are of great benefit to indus-
try, especially industries producing polluting products. Not only do
they eliminate competition, but they free industries whose products
have a national market from having to comply with fifty different
standards as opposed to a single national standard.283 Market-based
solutions, though economically efficient under ideal circumstances and
zero transaction costs, are in practice often expensive to develop, ad-
minister, and enforce. Finally, it is not at all clear that redressing the
race-to-the-bottom with federal minimum standards presents quite the
"slippery slope" away from the values of federalism that some have
claimed. As John Dwyer reminds us, the federal government needs
the states, that is, it needs state bureaucracies to carry out federal laws
and needs state politicians for their political support of environmental
legislation.284 Because, as a practical matter, the federal government
needs state assistance, we can be sure that state concerns and prefer-
ences will continue to be reflected in federal environmental laws and
administrative regulations. Furthermore, where the federal govern-
ment does impose minimum environmental standards to prevent a
race-to-the-bottom, states are usually allowed to impose more strin-
gent standards above these federal minimums. Thus, "federalization"
has not meant the wholesale nationalization of state environmental
law.
B. Suggested Revisions to the Existing Approach: The Northeastern
Ozone ransport Commission as a Model of Multistate
Environmental Decision-Making
Given the evidence suggesting that state environmental standard-
setting is indeed a race-to-the-bottom, the existing approach to
preventing the race should not be abandoned-certainly not without
an adequate replacement. Granted, there is no assurance that the fed-
eral environmental regulators will develop "efficient" environmental
standards any more so than their state counterparts. Nevertheless,
even if inefficient, the federal standards have, at least historically,
282. Pashigian, supra note 281, at 553
283. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
284. Dwyer, supra note 35, at 1216.
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been more stringent than the standards the states would establish in
the absence of federal intervention. Given the huge gaps in our ability
to determine the "costs" and "benefits" of environmental protection,
it may be more prudent to err on the side of over-protection rather
than under-protection.28 5 Moreover, other compelling reasons exist
for federal environmental protection aside from efficiency. The need
to guarantee human rights to environmental quality, for example,2 8 6
might demand levels of protection over and above those sufficient to
meet the demands of "efficiency" and hence the greater stringency of
the federal standards may be independently justifiable.
In any case, the location studies discussed in Part IV.2. suggest
that even if Professors Revesz, Oates, and Schwab are correct in prin-
ciple, there is very little to be lost in practice in terms of economic
benefits from preventing interstate competition. These studies find
that variations in environmental standards have at most a minor effect
upon the location of new industrial firms (and possibly no effect at
all). Consequently, even the potential efficiency gains to be had by
allowing competition are likewise small (and possibly nonexistent).
Thus, the bar upon standards-based competition imposed by federal
minimum environmental regulations is causing, at most, a minor re-
duction in the efficiency of environmental standards (and possibly no
reduction at all). That is, the competition-stifling aspect of federal
standards can be having at most a small effect upon the overall effi-
ciency of a state's economy. This does not preclude the possibility
that other (non-competition related) aspects of federal standards may
be the source of significant inefficiencies, however. If the revisionists
are right, the efficiency gains from adopting these recommendations at
most will be small; but if they are wrong, the losses from mistakenly
adopting their recommendations could be huge, given the large polit-
ical pressures on state regulators. Indeed, by requiring states to have
more stringent environmental standards, it is possible (though far
285. This is the point of the "precautionary principle" which avers that activities should
be subject to regulation before harm is demonstrated and thus shifts the burden of proving
the "harmlessness" of a challenged activity to the persons or entities who wish to engage in
the activity. See Bernard A. Weintraub, Science, International Environmental Regulation,
and the Precautionary Principle: Setting Standards and Defining Terms, 1 N.Y.U. ENvrL L.
J. 173, 204-09 (1992). The precautionary principle has been incorporated into several ma-
jor international environmental conventions, including the 1985 Vienna Convention, the
1987 Montreal Protocol, the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, the 1992 Climate Change Con-
vention, and the 1992 Rio Declaration. See Philippe Sands, The "Greening" of Interna-
tional Law: Emerging Principles and Rules, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293, 297-302
(1994).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 30-55.
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from certain) that federal environmental regulators may be doing
states a favor. According to Stephen Meyer's study, a prosperous
state economy is positively associated with more stringent state envi-
ronmental laws; this finding is consistent with a causal connection be-
tween more stringent state environmental programs and economic
prosperity, though it does not prove such a causal connection.
Rather than throwing the baby out with the bath water (or jeop-
ardizing environmental protection for the possibly elusive goal of eco-
nomic efficiency), Congress and federal regulators could experiment
with less drastic revisions to the existing standard-setting approaches
for preventing a race-to-the-bottom. Any standard-setting scheme for
preventing such a race should meet the following criteria: the scheme
should enhance the relative power of states vis-A-vis industry; it should
provide for a uniform floor of environmental standards among states
likely to engage in interstate competition for industrial firms, and it
should provide an opportunity for a superauthority to impose man-
dates upon (or at least enforce agreements among) states where nec-
essary to prevent states from "defecting" by adopting suboptimal
standards. In addition, in order to overcome a frequent criticism of
existing approaches-that they fail to provide for geographic and
other variations-a revised standard-setting approach could provide
for setting uniform environmental standards on an issue- or media-
specific basis within specific geographic regions.
Thus, a possible addition to the existing regulatory approaches
for preventing a race-to-the-bottom is the creation of regional bodies
responsible for developing uniform, media-specific standards applica-
ble in all states in a specific region and which may be enforced, where
appropriate, by the federal government. The following describes a re-
cent environmental standard-setting initiative that appears to be an
example of such an approach: the multi-state northeastern Ozone
Transport Commission (OTC). The OTC could constitute a standard-
setting model for other multi-state regions with particular environ-
mental problems.
Congress created the Ozone Transport Region (OTR) in the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act after recognizing that the natural
transport of ozone precursors throughout the northeastern corridor
rendered the ozone attainment strategies of the affected eleven states
(plus the District of Columbia) interdependent.28 7 Pursuant to the
287. Clean Air Act § 184, 42 U.S.C. § 75110 (1994). The eleven states are: Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
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Act, the EPA Administrator convened the OTC, which by law must
consist of the governor of each OTR state, air pollution control offi-
cials representing each state, the EPA Administrator, and the EPA
Regional Administrators of each EPA region included within the
OTR.28 8 Upon a majority vote of the non-federal members of the
Commission, the OTC can petition the EPA to require states within
the OTR to adopt those additional control measures deemed neces-
sary by the Commission to bring all or part of a region into attainment
with the Clean Air Act.289 Thus, the OTC is in effect a regional air
pollution government-an environmental authority between the
states and EPA-which, upon majority rule and the approval of EPA,
can override the decisions of a single state and require it to adopt
more stringent standards.
In its brief history, the OTC has already proven itself a progres-
sive environmental problem-solver and an effective model of intra-
and inter-governmental cooperation. The OTC gained national atten-
tion when, in 1994, it voted 9 to 4 to petition the EPA to impose Cali-
fornia's stringent vehicle emission standards upon all states in the
OTR, including the District of Columbia.290 Due to the particular his-
tory of auto-emission standards under the Clean Air Act, the auto-
emission standards in effect in any state will be the EPA-promulgated
federal standards unless the state adopts California's standards.
Although the precise outcome of the petition is still unresolved, it has
already had the effect of provoking an unprecedented counterpro-
posal by the auto-industry: in return for the OTC dropping its adop-
tion of the California standards, and specifically, the zero-emission
(electric) vehicle sales mandate, they will support the EPA's promul-
gation of more stringent federal auto-emission standards applicable in
all states other than those that have adopted the California stan-
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See also 59 Fed. Reg. 48,664, 48,665 (1994) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 85) (proposed Sept. 22, 1994).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 7506a(b)(1) (1994). While Congress created the OTR, Congress au-
thorized the EPA Administrator to establish an interstate transport region on the Adminis-
trator's own motion whenever the Administrator "has reason to believe that the interstate
transport of air pollutants from one or more States contributes significantly to a violation
of a national ambient air quality standard in one or more other States." 42 U.S.C.
§7506a(a) (1994).
289. 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(c)(1) (1994).
290. See 59 Fed. Reg. 48,664, 48,667 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 85) (pro-
posed Sept. 22, 1994). New Hampshire, Virginia, Delaware, and New Jersey voted against
the recommendation.
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dards.291 More recently, the OTC signed an agreement with north-
eastern utilities imposing upon that industry some of the most
stringent air pollution regulations applicable to electrical utilities any-
where in the nation.292
The OTC represents a model that could be used to supplement
the existing approaches for preventing the race-to-the-bottom. The
OTC appears to match the criteria for a standard-setting scheme
designed to prevent a race-to-the-bottom. First, the OTC provides for
the enhancement of the power of state environmental policy-makers
vis-A-vis important polluting industries. Were all of the twelve OTC
states to adopt California's auto-emission standards, the auto industry
would be required to make a major, and to its mind, premature, in-
vestment in electric cars. Thus, the industry was prompted to offer its
support for more stringent federal auto-emission standards that omit-
ted the zero emission sales mandate. Without the threat of being re-
quired to service such a large zero-emission vehicle market, it is
unclear whether the auto industry would have made this offer.
Second, by using majority rule to decide which environmental
policies will be applicable to the OTR, the OTC's decision-making
structure reduces the opportunities for strategic state interactions that
could lead to states "defecting" by adopting standards that they be-
lieve might benefit their state individually, though only at the cost of
reducing the welfare of all states within the region as a whole. For
example, were a single OTR state allowed the opportunity not to
adopt the California auto-emission standards, that state might believe
that not adopting such standards would bestow an advantage over
other northeastern states in attracting and retaining transportation-re-
lated industries, such as trucking firms or retail distributing firms.
One state's defection may lead to other states defecting, with the re-
291. After first proposing to grant the OTC's petition to have the California standards
apply to all states in the OTR, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,644 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
85) (proposed Sept. 22, 1994), the EPA reversed course and proposed the auto industry's
plan that would require low emission vehicles in all states except those that have adopted
the California standards (so far, this includes all states besides California). 60 Fed. Reg.
52734 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 85, 86) (proposed Oct. 10, 1995).
292. See Massachusetts: State, Energy Producers Agree on Plan to Reduce Nitrogen
Oxide by More than 15 Percent, ENvT. REP. CuRRENT DEVEL. IN THE STATES (Aug. 2,
1996). The nitrogen oxides initiative demonstrates something of the inadequacies of the
regional approach when the industry being regulated is producing a nationally distributed
product. Due to recent moves to deregulate utilities, midwestern utilities are free to sell
electricity to northeastern power-users. As a result, OTC officials are now worried that
production increases by midwestern utilities not subject to the nitrogen oxide reductions
mandated by the OTC-industry agreement could easily wipe out the nitrogen oxide reduc-
tions achieved by the northeastern industries subject to the agreement. Id.
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sult that the Northeast remains saddled with its severe ozone problem.
In addition, the provision allowing the EPA to mandate the OTC poli-
cies that have received majority support reinforces this safeguard
against state defections.293
In summary, although our current framework of federal laws
designed to prevent the race-to-the-bottom arguably has numerous
drawbacks relative to a platonic ideal, the possible losses resulting
from wholesale abandonment of the current framework are likely to
be far larger than any putative benefits from such draconian reform.
Consequently, federal regulators should experiment with less drastic
reforms of the current legal structure. One reform, explored above, is
to supplement the current model with region-based, problem-specific,
state or local regulatory decision-making similar to the OTC. The
OTC model could be used to address other regional environmental
problems, such as the extremely serious pollution problems of the
Mississippi Gulf Coast region (to name just one example).
Conclusion
The two sides of the current debate over the existence of a wel-
fare-reducing race-to-the-bottom in state environmental standard-set-
ting are rooted in two long-standing theoretical traditions: game
theory and neoclassical economics. According to prior applications of
these two approaches to questions of interstate competition for mo-
bile capital, the game-theoretic approach predicts that state environ-
mental regulations will result in suboptimal standards, while the
competitive neoclassical model predicts optimal standards. My goals
in this Article have been (1) to identify the key assumptions between
the two theories that account for their different outcomes; (2) to pres-
ent empirical evidence that can be used to evaluate which approach-
game theory or neoclassical economics-is most likely to describe the
real environmental standard-setting behavior of states competing for
industrial firms; and (3) to draw conclusions from this attempt to
match theoretical approaches to real world conditions about whether
states engaged in interstate competition for industry are also engaged
in a race-to-the-bottom (i.e., promulgating inefficient environmental
standards).
293. Such a provision is necessary since states, as sovereign entities, have no mecha-
nism for imposing their will upon each other short of engaging in civil war or obtaining a
majority of votes for their policy in both houses of Congress.
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Drawing from industry location studies, my own survey of per-
sons influential in state environmental policy-making, and various
sources of data on the characteristics of the state and industry partici-
pants in the market for new industrial firms, I ultimately conclude in
this article that the preponderance of the evidence indicates that
states engaged in interstate competition for industry are also engaged
in a race-to-the-bottom in environmental standard-setting, and that
the general direction of the race is toward more lax standards. This
ultimate conclusion is based upon two prior conclusions: first, that
non-cooperative game theory (which generally predicts that the out-
comes of competition will be suboptimal), as opposed to neoclassical
economics, better describes the dynamics of environmental standard-
setting of states engaged in interstate competition for mobile industry;
and second, that, even if one relies upon the neoclassical economic
framework, empirical evidence indicates that the real world conditions
of interstate competition fail to reflect the assumptions underlying the
framework's predictions of efficiency.
Thus, even before weighing all the evidence in detail, there is lit-
tle plausible ground for asserting (as the revisionists do) that inter-
state competition is presumptively beneficial. Indeed, it appears the
presumption should run in the opposite direction.
Assuming a welfare-reducing race-to-the-bottom does in fact ex-
ist, the question becomes whether the dominant approaches to federal
environmental regulation-minimum environmental quality standards
and uniform technology standards-are the most appropriate ap-
proaches to preventing a race-to-the-bottom. Available evidence indi-
cates that the losses that would accrue from the wholesale
abandonment of these approaches would likely far outweigh the bene-
fits. This does not mean, however, that all proposals for enhancing
the efficiency of environmental regulation ought to be rejected. One
of the lessons of game theory is that binding agreements are effective
in preventing parties from engaging in destructive competition. Thus
a promising modification of our current approach to environmental
protection consists of implementing minimum environmental quality
and technology standards on a regional basis through interstate en-
forcement mechanisms akin to binding agreements. Indeed, some-
thing similar to this approach was used by Congress when establishing
the Ozone Transport Commission. I recommend that future proposals
for regulatory reform take their cue from this successful example.
The findings of this Article point to the need for additional re-
search on both the empirical and theoretical fronts. On the empirical
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front, further research elucidating in greater detail the actual dynam-
ics of interstate competition for industrial firms is needed. For exam-
ple, although this Article has presented evidence to support the claim
that the number of states which compete for a given industry is small
(and hence, that game-theoretic approaches will be more appropriate
than perfectly competitive neoclassical models), additional research
on this question would help clarify how "small" this is relative to the
level needed to approximate competitive conditions.
This question leads directly to research needs on the theoretical
front. A better theoretical understanding of the kinds of environmen-
tal standard-setting "games" in which states are actually engaged is
critical. As discussed in Part IV.A.(3), my survey of state environ-
mental regulators suggests that states do in fact engage in strategic
interactions (and thus, that they are likely involved in some kind of
sub-optimal standard-setting "game"), but it does not appear to sup-
port the argument that the game conforms to the classic Prisoner's
Dilemma. The exact type of game being played thus remains an inter-
esting but open question.
In sum, what is needed on the research front, is, on the one hand,
more theoretically-informed appeals to evidence, and, on the other,
more empirically-informed appeals to theory. Only when theoretical
understandings are able to pass the difficult test of consistency with
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Table 7: Summary of Responses of State Environmental
Regulators by Geographic Region
North-
east - South South
Description of Survey Question MidAtl.42 Mid-west43 Atlantic" Central" West"
Number of Respondents 8 20 14 11 27
1. How important do you believe 1.37 1.4 1.8 1.7 1.7
industry considers the following fac- (8) (20) (14) (11) (27)
tors when determining the location
of an industrial plant? (mean47)
Stringency of envt'l stnds
(Number of responses)
Proximity to transp. facil. 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.8
(Number of responses) (8) (20) (14) (11) (27)
Nature of labor force 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.6
(Number of responses) (8) (20) (14) (11) (27)
D. Tax incentives to new plants 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.3
(Number of responses) (8) (20) (14) (11) (27)
Proximity to nat. resources 1.86 1.8 2.0 2.3 1.7
(Number of responses) (8) (20) (14) (11) (27)
2. How important do you believe 2.47 2.21 2.1 2.2 2.1
industry considers the following (7) (19) (14) (11) (27)
envt'l factors when determining the
location of an industrial plant?
(mean4 )
A. Time/expense in obtaining per-
mits
(Number of responses)
B. State officials flexibility and will- 2.28 2.26 2.0 2.0 2.2
ingness to help industry (7) (19) (14) (11) (27)
(Number of responses)
C. Stringency of written envt'l stnds 1.44 1.63 1.9 1.6 1.9
(Number of responses) (7) (14) (14) (11) (27)
3.How concerned are government 1.5 1.35 1.1 1.5 1.1
officials in your state that existing (8) (20) (14) (11) (27)
industrial plants may relocate or new
plants may choose to locate in states
other than yours? (mean)49
(Number of responses) II _ I
42. The Northeast-Mid-Atlantic region includes: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maine, New Hamp-
shire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut.
43. The midwest states consist of: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, and Nebraska.
44. Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Florida.
45. Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.
46. Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, Cali-
fornia, Alaska, and Hawaii.
47. The mean constitutes the average of the following responses and their values: "not a factor" = 0; "not
too important a factor" = 1; "fairly important a factor" = 2; "very important a factor" =3.
48. The mean constitutes the average of the following responses and their values: "not a factor" = 0; "not
too important a factor" = 1; "fairly important a factor" = 2; "very important a factor" =3.
49. The mean constituted the average of the following responses and their values, as recoded: "no concern"
= 0; "minor concern" = 1; "major concern" = 2.
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4. Percent claiming concern over 88% 80% 91% 91% 86%
poten. impacts on indus. has played (7 of 8) (12 of 15) (10 of 11) (10 of (18 of
a role in their agency's actions, deci- 11) 20)
sions, or policies.
(Number of responses)
5. Percent claiming concern over
industry relocation and siting has
played a role in their agency [ ]o 1 1
6. [not adopting an envtl health and 50% 36% 22% 20% 29%
safety stnd] (3 of 6) (4 of 11) (2 of 9) (2 of 10) (5 of 17)
(Number of responses)
7. [delaying the adoption of an 57% 42% 11% 30% 38%
envt'l. health and safety stnd] (4 of 7) (4 of 11) (1 of 9) (2 of 10) (6 of 16)
(Number of responses)
8. [adopting a less stringent envt'l 40% 27% 10% 60% 38%
health and safety stnd than the (2 of 5) (3 of 11) (1 of 10) (6 of 10) (6 of 16)
agency might have adopted in the
absence of this concern]
(Number of responses)
9. [reducing the amount of info. 60% 25% 30% 10% 35%
demanded of a permitee prior to 3 of 5 (3 of 12) (3 of 10) (1 of 10) (6 of 17)
granting or denying an envt'l permit]
(Number of responses)
10. [allowing a permitee to perform 17% 18% 0% 0% 19%
less frequent or comprehensive mon- (1 of 6) (2 of 11) (0 of 4) (0 of 10) (3 of 16)
itoring]
(Number of responses)
11. [reducing steps in the typical 83% 36% 40% 40% 47%
permit review process] (5 of 6) (4 of 11) (4 of 10) (4 of 10) (8 of 17)
(Number of responses)
12. [in your agency reducing the 20% 27% 20% 50% 18%
number of steps your agency (1 of 5) (3 of 11) (2 of 10) (5 of 10) (3 of 17)
employs in its typical permit review
process?]
(Number of responses)
13. [granting a permit that might not 40% 18% 20% 10% 11%
otherwise have been granted] (2 of 5) (2 of 11) (2 of 10) (1 of 10) (2 of 18)
(Number of responses)
14. [dropping an enforcement 50% 9% 10% 0% 24%
action] (3 of 6) (1 of 11) (1 of 10) (0 of 10) (4 of 17)
(Number of responses) 1 1
15. [levying a smaller civil or a 75% 27% 22% 20% 35%
lighter criminal penalty for an envtl (3 of 4) (3 of 11) (2 of 9) (2 of 10) (6 of 17)
violation]
(Number of responses)
50. This statement should read to precede the different phrases found in brackets for each of Questions 5-14.
January 1997]
16. (For those respondents who 1.0 0.3 3.0 1.0 1.7
claimed that concern over industry (1) (3) (2) (1) (3)
relocation and location played no
role in agency's envt'l actions, deci-
sions and policies):
How important are following in
explaining why indus relocation and
siting has played "no role"?
(mean"1 )
A. Because envt'l quality is more
important to our residents than the
benefits accompanying industry loca-
tion
(Number of responses)
B. Because state is interested in 2.0 0.3 2.0 1.0 1.0
attracting nonpolluting industries (1) (3) (2) (1) (3)
(Number of responses)
C. Because of the current existence 3.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.0
of fed. minimum stnds. (1) (3) (2) (1) (3)
(Number of responses)
D. Because of the existence of other 1.0 0.3 1.5 2.0 2.0
inducements (subsidies/tax breaks) (1) (3) (2) (1) (3)
(Number of responses)
17. How familiar are your state 2.1 2.1 2A 1.8 1.8
envt'l policymakers with the envt'l (8) (19) (14) (11) (27)




B. States win your same geographic 1.88 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.7
region (8) (19) (14) (11) (27)
(Number of responses)
C. States outside your same geo- 1.75 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0
graphic region (8) (19) (14) (11) (27)
(Number of responses)
18. How likely are officials in your 2.0 1.9 2.2 1.8 1.8
state agency to know about the (7) (18) (13) (10) (22)
following? (mean')
A. Other state's envt'l stnds
(Number of responses)
B. Other state's permitting proce- 1.53 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.6
dures (7) (18) (13) (10) (22)
(Number of responses)
C. Whether the other state's stnds 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.1
are more stringent (7) (18) (13) (10) (22)
(Number of responses)
D. Whether the other state's stan- 1.94 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.1
dards are less stringent (7) (18) (13) (10) (22)
(Number of responses) 1 _
51. The mean constitutes the average of the following responses and their values: "not a reason" = 0; "a
minor reason" = 1; "a fairly important reason" = 2; "a very important reason" = 3.
52. The mean constituted the average of the following responses and their values: "not at all familiar" = 0;
"not too familiar" = 1; "fairly familiar" = 2; "very familiar" = 3.
53. The mean constitutes the average of the following responses and their values: "will not know this" = 0;
"unlikely to know this" = 1; "fairly likely to know this" = 2; "pretty sure to know this" = 3.
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E. Whether the other state's stan- 1.67 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.0
dards are more stringent than fed. (7) (18) (13) (10) (22)
stnd.
(Number of responses)
19. From whom do the regulators in 1.2 1.2 1.8 0.9 0.9
your state get their info about other (7) (17) (13) (10) (22)
state's envt'l programs? (mean):
A. Industry representatives
(Number of responses)
B. Federal agencies 0.97 1.2 0.8 1.7 1.7
(Number of responses) (7) (18) (13) (10) (22)
C. Natl orgs of state officials 1.72 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9
(Number of responses) (7) (18) (13) (10) (22)
D. Business orgs. 1.06 0.8 1.5 0.7 0.7
(Number of responses) (7) (17) (13) (10) (22)
E. Research by a state agency 1.44 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.0
(Number of responses) (7) (18) (13) (10) (22)
F. Citizen groups 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4
(Number of responses) (6) (17) (13) (10) (22)
20. Do officials in your state agree 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.5
or disagree with the following stints? (8) (17) (14) (10) (27)
(mean')
A. Its important that our state's
stnds be less stringent than neighbor-
ing state
(Number of responses)
B. It's important that our state's 2.1 1.7 2.0 1.5 1.4
stnds be more stringent than neigh- (8) (18) (14) (10) (27)
boring state
(Number of responses)
C. It's important that our stnds be 3.25 3.2 2.8 3.0 1.5
of about the same stringency neigh- (8) (17) (14) (10) (27)
bor state
(Number of responses)
21. Agree that interstate competition 2.0 1.7 2.4 2.0 3.0
for industry leads states to race to (8) (18) (14) (10) (27)
relax envt'l stnds to attract or retain
industry (mean')
(Number of responses)
21A. Competition for industry does 2.0 2.5 1.3 2.3 2.0
not lead states to race to relax stnds (5) (15) (9) (6) (19)
because (mean'):
I. Fed. Minimum envt'l stnds elimi-
nate states' ability to compete
(Number of responses)
54. The mean constitutes the average of the following responses and their values: "not our information
source" = 0; "a minor information source" = 1; "a major information source" = 2.
55. The mean constituted the average of the following responses and their values: "disagree strongly" = 1;
"disagree somewhat" = 2; "agree somewhat" = 3; "agree strongly" =4.
56. Id.
57. The mean constituted the average of the following responses and their values: "not a reason" = 0; "minor
reason" = 1; "fairly major reason" = 2; "major reason" =3.
January 1997]
II. State officials know that envt'l 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.5 2.3
stnds are a minor factor in indus. (5) (15) (9) (6) (19)
location decisions
(Number of responses)
III. Envt'l quality so important 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.8 1.5
states will not relax stnds to compete (5) (15) (9) (6) (19)
for new industrial firms
(Number of responses)
22. Agree that states race to enact 1.8 2.4 1.8 0.9 1.8
tougher envt'l stnds to satisfy those (8) (17) (14) (10) (24)desiring high envt'l quality (meae )
23. Percent claiming state revised 57% 29% 18% 30% 18%
stnd upon learning of another state's (4 of 7) (5 of 17) (2 of 11) (3 of 10) (4 of 22)less stringent standard.
(Number of responses)I
A. Percent claiming their state 75% 40% 0% 67% 75%
revised stnd to match the other (3 of 4) (2 of 5) (0 of 2) (2 of 3) (3 of 4)
state's less stringent stnd.
(Number of responses)
24. Percent claiming state revised 14% 35% 18% 27% 10%
stnd upon learning of another state's (1 of 7) (6 of 17) (2 of 11) (3 of 11) (2 of 21)
more stringent standard.
(Number of responses)
A. Percent claiming their state 100% 33% 50% 67% 50%
revised stud to match the other (1 of 1) (2 of 6) (1 of 2) (2 of 3) (1 of 2)
state's more stringent stud.
(Number of responses) r _ _ _ __"_
58. Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
